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Erschienen in:
On Complex Economic Dynamics: Agent-Based Computational Modeling and Beyond Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Heterogeneity, Price Discovery and Inequality in an Agent-Based Scarf Economy

verfasst von : Shu-Heng Chen, Bin-Tzong Chie, Ying-Fang Kao, Wolfgang Magerl, Ragupathy Venkatachalam

Erschienen in: Complex Systems Modeling and Simulation in Economics and Finance

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter, we develop an agent-based Scarf economy with heterogeneous agents, who have private prices and adaptively learn from their own experiences and those of others through a meta-learning model. We study the factors affecting the efficacy of price discovery and coordination to the Walrasian Equilibrium. We also find that payoff inequality emerges endogenously over time among the agents and this is traced back to intensity of choice (a behavioural parameter) and the associated strategy choices. Agents with high intensities of choice suffer lower payoffs if they do not explore and learn from other agents.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Modelling Price Discovery in an Agent Based Model for Agriculture in Luxembourg
Nächstes Kapitel Rational Versus Adaptive Expectations in an Agent-Based Model of a Barter Economy
Fußnoten
1
More specifically, t refers to the whole market day t, i.e., the interval [t, t − 1).
 
2
Given this symmetry, the type-wise grouping of agents does not qualify as a source of real heterogeneity in terms of characteristics. This, as we will see in the later sections, will be characterized in terms of the agents’ learning mechanisms.
 
3
More precisely, the good that he is endowed with.
 
4
Following [4], a normalization scheme is also applied to normalize the propensities qi,k(t + 1) as follows:
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} q_{i,k}(t+1) \leftarrow \frac{q_{i,k}(t+1)}{q_{i,a_{il}}(t+1)+ q_{i,a_{sl}}(t+1)}. \end{aligned} $$
(17)
 
5
The results do not vary qualitatively for perturbations of these parameters.
 
6
We have examined the system by simulating the same treatments for much longer periods and we find that the results are robust to this.
 
8
The granularity of λ values is chosen in increments of 0.1, and hence there are 81 distinct values of λi corresponding to U(0,8).
 
9
In our model, there is no material wealth or savings since all goods are consumed entirely within each period. However, it is possible to interpret the accumulated payoffs of each agent over the simulation period as a proxy for their ‘quality of life’ or ‘lifetime wealth’.
 
10
In the psychology literature, the power law of practice states that the subjects’ early learning experiences have a dominating effect on their limiting behaviour. It is characterized by initially steep but then flatter learning curves.
 
11
See also: [16].
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Heterogeneity, Price Discovery and Inequality in an Agent-Based Scarf Economy
verfasst von
Shu-Heng Chen
Bin-Tzong Chie
Ying-Fang Kao
Wolfgang Magerl
Ragupathy Venkatachalam
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Buch
Complex Systems Modeling and Simulation in Economics and Finance

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-99622-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-99624-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99624-0_6