2003 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Heterogeneous, Boundedly Rational Agents in the Cournot Duopoly
verfasst von : F. Alkemade, J. A. La Poutré
Erschienen in: Heterogenous Agents, Interactions and Economic Performance
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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A Cournot duopoly market modeled as a co-evolving system of autonomous interacting agents is investigated. We present results for different types of boundedly rational agents. Agent types differ both in the complexity of their strategies and the information they have available to make their decision. Some types of agents use very simple strategies to make a production decision, while other types use a quite sophisticated decision rule. All agents types are tested in a round robin tournament. We consider the evolutionary stability of the evolving populations, especially with respect to the different equilibria of the Cournot game. Furthermore, we investigate the performance of the different agent types under changing market conditions.