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Erschienen in:
2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
How to Order the Alternatives, Rules, and the Rules to Choose Rules: When the Endogenous Procedural Choice Regresses
verfasst von : Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita
Erschienen in: Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation
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Abstract
A procedural choice problem occurs when there is no ex ante agreement on how to choose a decision rule nor an exogenous authority that is strong enough to single out a decision rule in a group. In this paper, we define the manner of procedural selection as a relation-valued procedural choice rule (PCR). Based on this definition, we then argue for some necessary conditions of a PCR. One of the main findings centers on the notion of consistency, which demands concordance between judged-better procedures and judged-better outcomes. Specifically, we found that the consistency principle and a modified version of the Pareto principle yield a simple impossibility result. We then show how the weakening of these conditions results to a degenerate PCR or the existence of a procedural veto. Finally, we show that the restriction of the preference domain to an extreme consequentialism can be seen as a positive result.