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In this paper, using data from the pre-electoral and post-electoral Spanish surveys conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) in the 2015 and 2016 general elections and assuming that parties maximize votes, we use an iterative algorithm to derive the optimal party positions (as predicted by spatial competition models based on proximity and directional models of voting). These optimal policy positions constitute a Nash equilibria, in which no party can increase its vote share by changing unilaterally its policy position. Then we compare the actual ideological positions of Spanish parties (as perceived by all voters) to their ideological party positions. Our aims are to examine the predictive power of proximity and directional models in the two Spanish electoral processes, to explore the degree to which parties deviate from their ideal positions and to examine the evolution of party positions from December 2015 to June 2016.
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Survey numbers 3117 and 3141 are included in a two stage panel data study (panel 7715).
We have considered as voters of Podemos respondents who voted for the alliances in which Podemos participated in Cataluña, Galicia and Valencia.
Based on the Linz-Moreno question, the standard CIS question on the balance of Spanish and regional identities, which asks people if they feel only Spanish; more Spanish than from their autonomous community; both Spanish and from their autonomous community; more from their autonomous community than Spanish; only from their autonomous community.
IU averages are based on just the 2015 values. Podemos values are based on its values in 2015 and the values of Unidos Podemos in 2016. This decision was based on the relative electoral size of Podemos and IU in the 2016 Unidos Podemos coalition.
The prevalence of directional voting among rightist voters has been also identified by [ 3] in several Latin American party systems.
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- Ideal and Real Party Positions in the 2015–2016 Spanish General Elections
M. D. García-Sanz
M. A. Manrique
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