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2021 | Buch

Ideological Seduction and Intellectuals in Putin's Russia

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Über dieses Buch

Dieses Buch untersucht das Zusammenspiel zwischen wichtigen Herrschern und Intellektuellen bei der Schaffung und Aufrechterhaltung populärer Diskurse, die häufig dazu beitragen, Herrscher an der Macht zu halten. Indem er sich insbesondere auf die Beziehung zwischen Putin und Dugin während des frühen Putin-Regimes konzentriert, nähert sich der Autor der fragwürdigen Ehrlichkeit in Putins Interesse an Dugins Philosophie und der Instrumentalität dieser Philosophie für den Aufbau eines strategischen Regimes. Das Buch argumentiert, dass Ideologie größtenteils durch politische Philosophien gestützt wird, die an Popularität gewinnen, und hinterfragt das Ausmaß, in dem Herrscher ihren erklärten Ideologien wahrscheinlich treu bleiben werden. Dieses Buch bietet vor Ort Einblicke in Putins Herrschaft und richtet sich an Forscher und politische Entscheidungsträger, die sich mit der postsowjetischen Politik befassen.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
There are several ways that intellectuals interact with the ruling elite. It is clear that they follow the dictum of the totalitarian ruler because of the fear of repression. Still, intellectuals in the West are also not free and usually follow the ruler in the form of a variety of incentives. While the above-mentioned models of control are widespread, they are not the only ones. There is also what could be defined as “intellectual seduction,” in which the ruler pretends that he is really fascinated with the intellectual’s output and his grand, lofty goals, whereas he is plainly using the particular intellectual for his practical interest. Putin’s interaction with Alexander Dugin, one of the most well-known intellectuals in post-Soviet Russia, could be here a good example.
Dmitry Shlapentokh
Chapter 2. Putin Regime as Example of “Synthetic” Model
Abstract
“Intellectual seduction,” a method of ideological deception, can be found in many societies. Still, it is most\popular in the regimes in transition, as was the case with Putin’s regime in the very beginning of its existence. While most Russians wanted the restoration of Soviet totalitarianism in this or that form and to undo privatization, Putin, after some hesitation, decided to preserve Yeltsin-era socioeconomic arrangements. At the same time, Putin and his tycoons, whose interests he represents, were not sure about the regime’s stability, and needed a cover-up: restoration without restoration. And here, Dugin’s theories became quite handy. Dugin preached the creation of a grand “Eurasian” empire. His theory also had a lot of elements of neo-Sovietism. Still, it marginalized nationalization, the economy in general, and this was what made him and his theories pleasant for Putin. People in the Kremlin pretended that they were really fascinated with Duginism, and Dugin was easily “seduced.” The reason was Dugin’s personality. He had actually “two bodies.” On the one hand, he was the product of Soviet dissident culture. The Westernized dissidents not only think about lofty and grand goals, but also despise the views of officials, officially institutionalized intellectuals and the hoi polloi. On the other hand, he acquired an “American body,” which clamored for success and power.
Dmitry Shlapentokh
Chapter 3. Putin as Dictator Savior
Abstract
Dugin was elated by Putin’s rise and soon was noted by the Kremlin as a potentially useful person. Dugin’s major attraction was that his theory, while having external similarities with Soviet ideological constructions, marginalized the economy in the overall picture and practically ignored nationalization. This was what led to the Kremlin’s support of Dugin’s political ventures, leading to the creation of the Eurasian Party, which pleased Dugin’s “American body,” i.e., the desire for fame and power. Still, soon enough, the Kremlin folk realized that they had overestimated the Russian people’s penchant for revolt, and many of them were quite happy with Putin’s pseudo-totalitarianism in the first years of his rule. In addition, Dugin exhibited not just his “American body”’s craving for success and power, but also his “old body” of Soviet dissident intellectualism. And this “body” did not just want to accommodate the wishes of the ruler, but play its own distinct role. Dugin wanted to guide Putin to lofty, grand goals. All of this led to Kremlin folk changing their minds about Dugin in the future.
Dmitry Shlapentokh
Chapter 4. The Popularity of Duginism: Duginism as Dream Come True
Abstract
What seemed to be Dugin’s meteoric rise to the country’s political Mt. Olympus coincided with his popularity among the people in the former USSR. Western observers also started to pay attention to Dugin. The reason for this was clear: the early paradigms of “transitology,” which implied that Russia, together with other former socialist countries, should move from totalitarian “abnormality” to Western capitalist “normality,” do not work. And here, Duginism emerged as the potential ideological framework of nationalist, “post-Weimer” Russia.
Dmitry Shlapentokh
Chapter 5. Dugin as a Putin Rescuer
Abstract
Dugin was quite popular in the beginning of Putin’s tenure and leader of his own party. Some of Putin’s actions, e.g., the purge of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oil tycoon, who challenged Putin, seemed to indicate that the regime was finally in the process of true totalitarian transformation, and that Dugin would be installed in the Kremlin as Putin’s advisor. This, however, did not happen. Consequently, Dugin’s praise of Putin became increasingly mixed with criticism. Dugin noted here that Putin made mistakes because of the wrong advisor, and the problem could be easily fixed if Dugin and similar-minded people were near Putin to guide his actions.
Dmitry Shlapentokh
Chapter 6. Flirtation with Seleznev
Abstract
While Dugin continued to believe that Putin would finally realize that only Dugin could show him the meta-historical essence of his rule, the Kremlin continued to ignore Dugin. Moreover, the Kremlin clearly withdrew its support of the Eurasian Party, which soon collapsed. Dugin became increasingly frustrated with Putin and started to assert that despite Putin’s achievements, he could lead the country to disaster. Consequently, Dugin tried to enter the big politics another way: he tried to flirt with various political parties and groups. Communists were among these. Still, the attempt was not successful.
Dmitry Shlapentokh
Chapter 7. Conclusion
Abstract
As this monograph has shown, the Kremlin’s interest in Duginism in the early 2000s was mostly due to the fact that it was a great ideology for regime mimicry. The Kremlin wanted to convince the Russian public, which craved the return to the Soviet era, that the regime was indeed moving in the direction of restoration. At the same time, the Russian elite hardly wanted true restoration of the Soviet arrangement. In this context, Duginism, with clear elements of late Soviet ideology (e.g., call for the restoration of the USSR and building a global Eurasian empire) was quite handy, plainly because these projects marginalized nationalization. The Kremlin soon found out that its folk overestimated the rebellious spirit of the Russian populace, and the interest in nationalization lost its importance in the minds of the maturing post-Soviet generation. At the same time, Dugin refused to behave as an obedient servant of the regime, and wanted to play the role of “prophet.” It was not what Putin wanted. Consequently, Dugin was demoted from potential player in Putin’s court to the position of second- or even third-tier of “political adjunct,” whom the Kremlin might use on occasion, as had happened during the 2008 and 2014 crises. At the same time, interest in Dugin and his theories was declining among the new generation of Russian intellectuals. This was not due to the fact that they had become fascinated with democracy, but plainly because Dugin and his theories—both rooted in Soviet tradition and cultural milieu of dissident society—had become hardly the pathway to a successful academic career, either in the West or in Russia. At the same time, interest in Dugin was sparked anew after 2014 in the West, including the USA; at least this was the case with liberal intellectuals. The rise of “populism,” fragmentation of the EU and especially Trump’s election, indicated the serious crisis of the capitalist democratic West and the possibility of radical or even catastrophic replacement of the old order. Western elite sensed that it could not solve the problem in the context of the prevailing socioeconomic order. Consequently, the elite tried to find outside reasons for the problem. And here, Putin with his “interfering” in the US election and similar dastardly deeds was chosen as the cause of the problems. In this context, Dugin also reemerged as a potent and malevolent force. Dugin was happy to confirm Western views on his global importance. His inflated ego prevented him from understanding that he would be “seduced,” used, and abandoned by the West soon enough, as had been the case with the Kremlin. Seduction, both intellectual and physical, can be a hard enterprise. Still, it can be quite easy if the person wants to be seduced, as the case of Alexander Dugin demonstrates.
Dmitry Shlapentokh
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Ideological Seduction and Intellectuals in Putin's Russia
verfasst von
Assoc. Prof. Dmitry Shlapentokh
Copyright-Jahr
2021
Electronic ISBN
978-3-030-49832-0
Print ISBN
978-3-030-49831-3
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49832-0