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Erschienen in:
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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Illusion and Dazzle: Adversarial Optical Channel Exploits Against Lidars for Automotive Applications

verfasst von : Hocheol Shin, Dohyun Kim, Yujin Kwon, Yongdae Kim

Erschienen in: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2017

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

With the advancement in computing, sensing, and vehicle electronics, autonomous vehicles are being realized. For autonomous driving, environment perception sensors such as radars, lidars, and vision sensors play core roles as the eyes of a vehicle; therefore, their reliability cannot be compromised. In this work, we present a spoofing by relaying attack, which can not only induce illusions in the lidar output but can also cause the illusions to appear closer than the location of a spoofing device. In a recent work, the former attack is shown to be effective, but the latter one was never shown. Additionally, we present a novel saturation attack against lidars, which can completely incapacitate a lidar from sensing a certain direction. The effectiveness of both the approaches is experimentally verified against Velodyne’s VLP-16.

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Vorheriges Kapitel How to Break Secure Boot on FPGA SoCs Through Malicious Hardware
Nächstes Kapitel Hacking in the Blind: (Almost) Invisible Runtime User Interface Attacks
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Fußnoten
1
\(2 \cdot 100 / 3\mathrm {e}8~[\text {s}]\times 360 \cdot 20~[^\circ /\text {s}]\). Note that 20 Hz is the maximum update rate of VLP-16.
 
2
However, we could not find any function alerting the occurrence of saturation.
 
3
Raw packet captures for 10 Hz & 0.2\(^\circ \) can also be found in the appendices.
 
4
Its detailed circuit diagram is given in the appendices.
 
5
This is considerably smaller than the case in Fig. 8. The differences in the light source strength and beam diameter may be the cause.
 
6
As we fired attacking pulses for every two target lidar pulses, \(10 \cdot 2 \cdot 0.1^\circ = 2.0^\circ \). Note that \(0.1^\circ \) was the horizontal resolution of VLP-16 then.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Illusion and Dazzle: Adversarial Optical Channel Exploits Against Lidars for Automotive Applications
verfasst von
Hocheol Shin
Dohyun Kim
Yujin Kwon
Yongdae Kim
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Buch
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2017

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-66786-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-66787-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_22