nach oben

AI & SOCIETY

Erschienen in:

01.04.2008 | Original Article

Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person

verfasst von: David J. Calverley

Erschienen in: AI & SOCIETY | Ausgabe 4/2008

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

As non-biological machines come to be designed in ways which exhibit characteristics comparable to human mental states, the manner in which the law treats these entities will become increasingly important both to designers and to society at large. The direct question will become whether, given certain attributes, a non-biological machine could ever be viewed as a “legal person.” In order to begin to understand the ramifications of this question, this paper starts by exploring the distinction between the related concepts of “human,” “person,” and “property.” Once it is understood that person in the legal sense can apply to a non-biological entity such as a corporation, the inquiry then goes on to examine the folk psychology view of intentionality and the concept of autonomy. The conclusion reached is that these two attributes can support the view that a non-biological machine, at least in theory, can be viewed as a legal person.

Vorheriger Artikel Ethics and consciousness in artificial agents

Nächster Artikel Ethical robots: the future can heed us

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Briefly, a word about terminology; some use the term “non-biological machine” or “artificial intelligence (AI),” others “artilect,” and still others “artifact.” For ease of use and consistency I will use the term “non-biological machine,” except where quoting directly, but any of the others would suffice.

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Adams W (2004) Machine consciousness: plausible idea or semantic distortion? J Conscious Stud 11(9):46–56

Angel L (1989) How to build a conscious machine. Westview Press, Boulder

Arbib M, Fellous J (2004) Emotions: from brain to robot. Trends Cogn Sci 8(12):554CrossRef

Austin J (1832) The province of jurisprudence determined, 1955 edn. Weidenfeld, Nicholson, London

Ayer AJ (1963) The concept of a person. St. Martin’s Press, New York

Boden M (1996) Autonomy and artificiality. In: Boden M (ed) The philosophy of artificiallife. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Brentano F (1924–1973) Psychology from an empirical standpoint (Rancurello AC, Terrell DB, McAlister L Transs.). Routledge, Kegan Paul, London

Clark A (2003) Artificial intelligence and the many faces of reason. In: Stich S, Warfield T (eds) The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. Blackwell, Malden, MA

Covigaru A, Lindsay R (1991) Deterministic autonomous systems. AI Mag Fall, pp 110–117

Damasio A (1994) Descartes’ error. Harper Collins, New York

Donaldson T (1982) Corporations and morality. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ

Floridi L, Sanders JW (2004) On the morality of artificial agents. Mind Mach 3(14):349CrossRef

Frankfurt H (1988a) Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. In: Frankfurt H (ed) The importance of what we care about. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Original work published 1969)

Frankfurt H (1988b) Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. In: Frankfurt H (ed) The importance of what we care about. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Original work published 1971)

Frankfurt H (1999) Autonomy, necessity and love. In: Frankfurt H (ed) Necessity, volition and love. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Original work published 1994)

French P (1984) Collective and corporate responsibility. Columbia University Press, New York

Gray JC (1909–1921) The nature and sources of the law. Macmillan, New York

Green L (1988) The authority of the state. Clarendon Press, Oxford

Heckman C (1999) Liability for autonomous agent design. Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. Kluwer, The Netherlands

Herman B (2002) Bootstrapping. In: Buss S, Overton L (eds) Contours of agency. MIT, Cambridge, MA

Hexmoor H, Castelfranchi C, Falcone R (2003) A prospectus on agent autonomy. In: Hexmoor H (ed) Agent autonomy. Kluwer, Boston

Holland O (2003) Machine consciousness. Special issue of J Conscious Stud 10(4/5)

Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tversky A (eds) (1982) Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Kane R (1996) The significance of free will. Oxford University Press, New York

Kelsen H (1967) Pure theory of law (Knight M, Trans.). University of California Press, Berkeley

Knobe J (2003) Intentional action in folk psychology: an experimental investigation. Philos Psychol 16(2):309–324CrossRef

Lakoff G (1987) Women, fire and dangerous things: what categories reveal about the mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Malle B, Knobe J (1997) The folk concept of intentionality. J Exp Soc Psychol 33:101–121CrossRef

Malle B, Nelson S (2003) Judging mens rea: the tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of intentionality. Behav Sci Law 21:563–580CrossRef

Morse S (2004) New neuroscience, old problems. Neuroscience and the Law. Dana Press, New York

Morse S (2004a) Reason, results, and criminal responsibility. Univ Ill Law Rev 2004(2):363–444

Nadelhoffer T (2005) Skill, luck, control, and intentional action. Philos Psychol 18(3):341–352CrossRef

Note (1987) The personification of the business corporation in American law. Univ Chic Law Rev 54:1441CrossRef

Pollock J (2006) Thinking about acting: logical foundations for rational decision making. Oxford University Press, New York

Raz J (1975) Practical reason and norms. Hutchinson, London

Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006) American Law Institute, St. Paul, MN

Rivaud M (1992) Comment: toward a general theory of constitutional personhood: a theory of constitutional personhood for transgenic humanoid species. UCLA Law Rev 39:1425

Rorty A (1976) The identity of persons. University of California Press, Berkeley

Schauer F (2004) The limited domain of law. Va Law Rev 90:1909–1955CrossRef

Searle J (1980) Minds, brains and programs. Behav Brain Sci 3:417CrossRef

Searle J (1999) Mind, language and Society. Basic Books, New York

Sloman A, Croucher M (1981) Why robots will have emotions. In: Proceedings of the IJCAI, Vancouver

Solum L (1992) Legal personhood for artificial intelligences. North Carol Law Rev 70:1231

Strawson P (1959) Individuals. Methuen, London

van Inwagen P (1983) An essay on free will. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Wallach W (2004) Artificial morality: bounded rationality, bounded morality and emotions. In: Smit I, Lasker G (eds) Cognitive, emotive and ethical aspects of decision making in humans and artificial intelligence, vol I. IIAS, Windsor, Canada

Werhane P (1985) Persons, rights and corporations. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs

Wolff RP (1998) In defense of anarchism. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles (Original work published 1970)

Titel: Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person
verfasst von: David J. Calverley
Publikationsdatum: 01.04.2008
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Erschienen in: AI & SOCIETY / Ausgabe 4/2008
Print ISSN: 0951-5666
Elektronische ISSN: 1435-5655
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-007-0092-7

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Springer Professional "Technik"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 4/2008

Computing machinery and morality

Ethical robots: the future can heed us

Machine morality: bottom-up and top-down approaches for modelling human moral faculties

Special issue on ethics and artificial agents

Implementing moral decision making faculties in computers and robots

Ethics and consciousness in artificial agents