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Erschienen in: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 2/2013

01.03.2013 | Original Empirical Research

Incumbents’ defense strategies: a comparison of deterrence and shakeout strategy based on evolutionary game theory

verfasst von: Christian Homburg, Andreas Fürst, Thomas Ehrmann, Eugen Scheinker

Erschienen in: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science | Ausgabe 2/2013

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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how an established firm can successfully defend its market against current and future competitors. Previous studies on this issue are surprisingly scarce and typically concentrate on only a single generic defense strategy. Thus, little is known about the degree and the manner in which different generic defense strategies, such as a deterrence strategy (pursued before competitor market entry) and a shakeout strategy (pursued after competitor market entry), differ in effectiveness and efficiency and about the corresponding role of product and market conditions. As these strategies tend to be costly, an established firm must decide which of these strategies to focus its scarce resources on. Drawing on evolutionary game theory and an empirical calibration and validation study, this paper seeks to fill these research gaps. While both strategies turn out to be viable options for market defense, the authors find that in general, a shakeout strategy tends to be superior to a deterrence strategy. However, the authors also identify product and market conditions under which an established firm is better off focusing on a deterrence strategy. In methodological respects, the paper contributes to the marketing discipline by introducing evolutionary game theory, which has not been used previously for analyzing marketing issues, as well as an evolutionary approach to research on market defense.

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Fußnoten
1
The need to focus on one of these strategies mainly arises due to established firms’ resource constraints. However, theoretically, these strategies could also be used consecutively and thus are not entirely mutually exclusive.
 
2
This assumption is a reasonable premise, because in this case, the incumbent lacks sufficient strength to withstand competitive forces and thus to ensure its survival in the long run (Gatignon et al. 1997; Porter 1985). For such a situation, research in economics and industrial organization (Agrarwal and Gort 1996), in organization theory (Madsen and Walker 2007), as well as in marketing and strategic management (Aaker 1988; Karakaya 2000) predicts or recommends an established firm’s market exit in the long run.
 
3
In the long run (i.e., when considering multiple periods), the probability that the product still exists after n periods is described by the probability distribution of the number n of Bernoulli trials (with (1 – P) as “success” probability). The convolution of n independent Bernoulli trials is given by the geometric distribution, which reflects the probability distribution of the number b of Bernoulli trials required to get one “success” (in our study: the end of the PLC). Overall, the expected value of a geometrically distributed variable b (in our study: the expected length of the PLC) is 1 divided by the corresponding ‘success’ probability (1 – P) (for mathematical details, see Freedman et al. 1998).
 
4
It is worth mentioning that unlike “monopoly markets” (markets without competitors), our study’s notion of “oligopoly markets” refers to markets with competitors. As this distinction does not account for the specific number of competitors, our use of “oligopoly markets” somewhat differs from the common understanding of this term as markets with only few competitors.
 
5
These probabilities also account for differences in firm-level capabilities between the incumbent and (current and future) competitors (Ramaswami et al. 2009). Specifically, higher levels of incumbent capabilities are associated with a lower probability of failed competitor deterrence η and a higher probability of successful competitor shakeout ρ and of successful competitor influencing σ (Jayachandran and Varadarajan 2006) Analogous, higher levels of competitor capabilities go along with a higher probability of failed competitor deterrence η and a lower probability of successful competitor shakeout ρ and of successful competitor influencing σ.
 
6
This approach is similar to approaches of a significant number of studies in the fields of population ecology and population genetics (e.g., Caswell 2001; Cushing et al. 1996; Ginzburg 1986; Henson 1998; Parayre and Hurry 2001; van Boven and Weissing 2004), analyzing the conditions under which organisms emerge, grow, and die. In the context of incumbents’ defense strategies, the long-term growth rate of a firm’s total number of markets λ is a suitable parameter for identifying the optimal amount of investment (which maximizes the probability of long-term survival), as it is a good indicator for the firm’s ability to defend its markets against current and future competitors (i.e., for the firm’s environmental fitness). Also, this rate is closely and inherently associated with a firm’s long-term survival (i.e., the higher the long-term growth rate, the more likely is a firm to survive in the long run). In this context, it needs to be mentioned that in our model, by means of the normalization factor ζ, the long-term growth rate λ equals 1 (in case of the optimal amount of investment) and is otherwise less than 1 (in case of a suboptimal amount of investment) (for details, see Appendix A). Hence, the optimal amount of investment enables the firm to defend its markets against current and future competitors, thus preventing the firm’s number of markets from decreasing in the long run and thus securing long-term survival. By contrast, in case of a suboptimal amount of investment, the firm is not able to defend its markets against current and future competitors, which results in a reduction of the firm’s number of markets in the long run and thus in a serious threat to long-term survival.
 
7
Although we believed that collecting data from one carefully selected key informant per firm would be sufficient, we performed a test for possible informant bias. For this purpose, we asked each respondent to name another executive within their firm who is also strongly involved in market defense activities. 213 managers agreed to provide the requested information. Subsequently, we contacted the potential secondary informants by telephone and asked them to participate in an interview (to complete a shortened version of the questionnaire). This resulted in a total of 115 responses of secondary informants. After discarding 11 questionnaires of inappropriate respondents (Kumar et al. 1993), we compared the responses of the primary and secondary informant of each firm on a subset of 11 items of our original questionnaire. Inter-informant correlations range between 0.62 and 0.74 and are all highly significant (p < 0.01). This result provides further confidence in using the primary responses and that respondents had a similar interpretation of the key terms in mind when answering the questionnaire.
 
8
To validate our model’s appropriateness for providing managerial recommendations, we asked managers in our survey to rate their firm’s actual amount of investment in different generic defense strategies and their firm’s respective market defense success. As responses on both amount of investment and success were obtained from the same source (the same manager), these responses may be subject to common-method variance. Although this issue affects only our empirical validation of model appropriateness, not our empirical calibration of model parameters and resulting findings with respect to our research questions, we nevertheless performed a corresponding test. For this purpose, we again performed the empirical validation procedure, this time also drawing on the responses of the secondary informant. Specifically, in a first step, we carried out the procedure using the responses on amount of investment of the secondary informant and the responses on success of the primary informant. In a second step, we carried out the procedure using the responses on amount of investment of the primary informant and the responses on success of the second informant. In both cases, the findings closely parallel the findings reported in Table 2, indicating that common-method bias is not a notable problem in our study.
 
9
This is based on the fact that a value of 3 (proportional) corresponds to q = 1 and of 5 (strongly decreasing) to q ≈ 0 (in a positive range). Hence, 4.09 corresponds to q ≈ 0.50 (rounded to ensure the solvability of the model).
 
10
To further check the robustness of our findings, we examined the interrelation between the probability of deterrence and shakeout. Results show that with an increasing probability of successful shakeout, the optimal amount of deterrence investment declines. Analogously, an increasing probability of successful deterrence reduces the optimal amount of shakeout investment. These results are entirely consistent with those presented before.
 
11
To illustrate the use of these two strategies, two examples from business practice are provided on the basis of information retrieved from qualitative interviews with executives from these companies. The first example relates to a large manufacturer of electronic devices (characterized by a short PLC at the category level) that repeatedly faces market entry of smaller competitors. Although these competitors typically do not endanger the firm’s long-term survival in the market, they nevertheless depress its future profits (which are also limited due to the short PLC). For market defense purposes, the firm relies heavily on competitor shakeout. Specifically, it invests heavily in retaliatory activities targeted at new entrants, such as carrying out comparative advertising, initiating price wars, and otherwise enticing customers away from these new competitors. So far, these activities considerably weakened most entrants, so that the firm frequently managed to squeeze out these competitors, contributing to its image as a fierce competitor. The second example refers to a small mechanical engineering company that produces printing machines (characterized by a long PLC at the category level) which constantly fears market entry of competitors that tend to be significantly larger in terms of number of employees and annual revenues. To secure long-term future profits and to prevent these powerful entrants from endangering this company’s long-term survival in the market, the firm concentrates on competitor deterrence. Specifically, it invests heavily in building and maintaining competitor barriers to entry, for example, through creating a strong, favorable brand image, entertaining close business relationships with the biggest customers in the market, and blocking access to suppliers of key components by means of exclusivity contracts. As a result, the firm so far successfully discouraged potential competitors from market entry.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Incumbents’ defense strategies: a comparison of deterrence and shakeout strategy based on evolutionary game theory
verfasst von
Christian Homburg
Andreas Fürst
Thomas Ehrmann
Eugen Scheinker
Publikationsdatum
01.03.2013
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science / Ausgabe 2/2013
Print ISSN: 0092-0703
Elektronische ISSN: 1552-7824
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-011-0299-5

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