Individual Autonomy and Local-Level Solidarity in Africa

Come election time, many localities in Africa seem to speak with one voice. Vote totals often suggest near-unanimity within villages and neighborhoods, even when national-level results demonstrate greater competitiveness. However, there is substantial variation in the electoral solidarity of local communities, with some demonstrating significantly less cohesion than others. Few if any scholars have tried to explain this variation. I theorize that solidarity levels are largely a function of community members' abilities to act autonomously. Namely, communities will be more likely to vote en bloc when residents are less able to resist pressures from local elites, who often act as brokers for national politicians, due to elite-empowering land-tenure regimes, poverty, and information scarcity. I test this theory with data from Uganda, which displays significant variation in local-level electoral solidarity. I find that electoral solidarity is lower in communities where freehold land arrangements are more common, living standards are higher, and mass media (i.e., radio signals) are more accessible.