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The Review of International Organizations

Erschienen in:

01.06.2015

Information revelation and structural supremacy: The World Trade Organization’s incorporation of environmental policy

verfasst von: Tana Johnson

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 2/2015

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Abstract

The international trade regime offers various instruments by which states can pursue environmental policies, even at the expense of freer trade. Why - and what are the implications? This article traces environmental instruments to pressures on governments when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was designed in the early 1990s: environment-related trade disputes were on the rise, environmentalists were concerned even with regional trade agreements, and countries from the North and the South clashed over the possibility of green-protectionism. Today, WTO-permissible environmental instruments share key features: 1) information-revealing conditions compel states to divulge private information in order to maintain trade-restricting environmental measures, and 2) that information is funneled through the trade regime’s formal dispute settlement mechanism, endowing WTO rules and officials with structural supremacy over areas of international law that lack such mechanisms of their own. An illustration from the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement shows how this works in practice, putting trade law experts in the delicate position of adjudicating in matters beyond their area of expertise. Examining this advances knowledge in political science, law, and policy: about dispute settlement, institutional design, and information-provision in international organizations.

Vorheriger Artikel Balancing law and politics: Judicial incentives in WTO dispute settlement

Nächster Artikel When do international economic agreements allow countries to pay to breach?

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World Trade Organization. “Chronological List of Disputes.” Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm

Structural supremacy of international trade law does not mean that environmental law or other forms of international law are powerless. For example, some multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) undermine core WTO obligations by “committing states to issue-specific trade restrictions that necessarily discriminate among countries.” Moreover, at the nexus of trade and environmental policy, the WTO “sacrifices its influence on the content of decisions on trade restrictions as instruments of international environmental policymaking, if certain general conditions are met” (Gehring 2012, 288, 245).

An “information-revealing” provision requires an actor to provide otherwise private information – that is, anything that is not common knowledge to all actors – to gain or retain some advantage or privilege (Elhauge 2002, 2165; Myerson 1997, 64). On the related concept of “regulation by revelation” in domestic or international politics, see Florini (1998). On the broader move toward “transparency” in environmental governance, see Gupta (2008); Mason (2008), and Mitchell (1998).

In a strict international legal sense, states cannot be criminally liable. Here, “incriminating” is meant only in a generic sense: providing evidence of involvement in a fault.

Public Citizen. “Why the WTO Is the Big Kid on the Seesaw.” Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds443_e.htm#top

States consciously crafted information-revealing provisions and a robust dispute settlement mechanism, but the international trade regime’s subsequent structural supremacy was not necessarily intended. Rather, it arises amidst relatively uncoordinated choices to endow some regimes, but not others, with a robust dispute settlement mechanism.

For instance, the GATT mechanism resolved cases slowly, if at all. Moreover, its rulings could be adopted only by consensus among GATT member-governments, thereby empowering any individual member – even the “losing” party to the dispute – to block a ruling. And because losing parties could simply block a ruling unilaterally, there was little point in establishing an appeals process.

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes: Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994). Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm

Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Agreement. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A8#selected_agreement

Information may be more private for some governments than others. Non-democracies or other relatively non-transparent governments may have the most at stake in private information, but even relatively transparent governments (many of which are active in WTO disputes) attempt to keep information private. For instance, a Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) request could reveal private information of the U.S. government – yet such requests can be made only by U.S. citizens, can be denied, and can take years even if not denied. Private information also exists in the European Union, which has opted to keep its rule-making process somewhat opaque in order to protect EU policy from lobbying and interference by domestic interest groups (Strauss et al. 2008).

GATT jurisprudence establishes that this proceeds in two steps (World Trade Organization 1998c, paragraph 120). First the respondent government must demonstrate that the objective of its trade-restrictive measure matches one of those legitimated in the sub-paragraphs of Article XX and explain how the challenged measure relates or is necessary to its national program. If that step is satisfied, then second, the respondent must demonstrate that its trade-restrictive measure satisfies the three conditions laid out in the article’s chapeau.

As additional examples: Article 63 of the TRIPs Agreement stipulates that states must be prepared to supply information about the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement, and prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights – including relevant information from specific judicial decisions, administrative rulings, or bilateral agreements. Meanwhile, Article IX of the GATS instructs states to readily provide non-confidential information about anti-competitive business practices and to follow with confidential information after appropriate safeguards for the information have been arranged.

This would not happen with either element alone. Without GATT Article XX and the new agreements annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement, the dispute settlement mechanism would have little guidance on what sort of private information states must reveal in order to maintain a purportedly environmental trade restriction. And without the dispute settlement mechanism, the agreements would indicate the sort of information a state should be amassing in order to construct a permissible trade-restricting environmental policy, but when a state does not actually do so there would not be an institutionalized way to discover, stop, and punish the misbehavior.

Environment; Disputes 7. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis07_e.htm

Environment: Disputes 8. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm

World Trade Organization (1998c, d).

For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes: Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 3.2. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm

Some states, particularly lower-income countries, do not share any information but simply become adopters of international standards that are developed from information provided by other states.

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 3.3. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm This contrasts with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which does not require scientific risk assessment (Marceau and Trachtman 2002; Young 2005).

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15. Available at: http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163

First, the assessment does not need to quantify a particular magnitude of risk but merely needs to establish that some risk exists. Second, it does not need to be done by the trade-restricting government directly but could come from international organizations, other governments, and so on. Third, it does not need to be based on majority scientific opinion but simply needs to reflect a significant minority of studies (World Trade Organization 1998a, Paragraphs 186, 190, 194).

In some instances, the adjudicatory bodies have incorporated other international law to which all of the Members of the WTO have consented, and they will perhaps consider other international treaties to which all of the disputing parties have consented. However, they generally have not viewed a state’s other treaty obligations as an affirmative defense when judging whether there has been a violation of international trade rules (World Trade Organization 2005).

Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm

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Environment: Disputes 1. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis01_e.htm; Environment: Disputes 2. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis02_e.htm

Environment: Disputes 3. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm

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Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm A high-ranking employee in the GATT Secretariat confirms that the explicitly environmental language was intended to ease environmentalists’ concerns about the aims of the proposed organization (Croome 1995, 360-361).

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Titel: Information revelation and structural supremacy: The World Trade Organization’s incorporation of environmental policy
verfasst von: Tana Johnson
Publikationsdatum: 01.06.2015
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 2/2015
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-015-9215-y

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