Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
The current study attempts to explore significant determinants of institutional quality—economic and political—in the case of non-programme and programme countries. The period of analysis is 1980–2009, as the activity of IMF increased during this time. Results primarily indicate that the military in power significantly reduces institutional quality, while improvement in property rights, openness, aggregate governance and real GDP growth all remain highly important in improving institutional quality, while enhancement in monetary and investment freedom also help and hence need to be focused upon by IMF programmes.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Abbott, P., Andersen, T. B., & Tarp, F. (2010). IMF and economic reform in developing countries. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 50, 17–26. CrossRef
Acemoglu, D. (2006). A simple model of inefficient institutions. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108, 515–546. CrossRef
Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 113, 949–995. CrossRef
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008). Persistence of power, elites, and institutions. American Economic Review, 98, 267–293. CrossRef
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty (1st ed.). New York: Crown Business.
Afonso, A., & Jalles, J. T. (2011). Economic performance and government size. ECB Working Paper Series No. 1399, ECB, Germany.
Alchian, A. A. (1965). Some economics of property rights. Il Politico, 30, 816–829. Reprinted in Economic Forces at Work, A. A. Alchian (ed). (1977) Liberty Fund: Indianapolis; 127–149.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277–297. CrossRef
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at instrumental variables estimation of error-component models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29–51. CrossRef
Aron, J. (2000). Growth and institutions: A review of the evidence. The World Bank Research Observer, 15, 99–135. CrossRef
Arpac, O., Bird, G., & Mandilaras, A. (2008). Stop interrupting: An empirical analysis of the implementation of IMF programs. World Development, 36, 1493–1513. CrossRef
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. (2005). IMF programmes: Who is chosen and what are the effects? Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1245–1269. CrossRef
Bird, G. (2001). IMF programmes: Do they work? Can they be made to work better? World Development, 29, 1849–1865. CrossRef
Bird, G. (2007). The IMF: A bird’s eye view of its role and operations. Journal of Economic Surveys, 21, 683–745. CrossRef
Bird, G., & Willett, T. (2004). IMF conditionality, implementation and the new political economy of ownership. Comparative Economic Studies, 46, 423–450. CrossRef
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115–143. CrossRef
Buira, A. (1983). IMF financial programs and conditionality. Journal of Development Economics, 12, 111–136. CrossRef
Butkiewicz, J. L., & Yanikkaya, H. (2005). The effects of IMF and World Bank lending on long-run economic growth: An empirical analysis. World Development, 33, 371–391. CrossRef
Coase, R. (1992). The institutional structure of production. The American Economic Review, 82, 713–719.
Dahlman, C. J. (1979). The problem of externality. Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 141–162. CrossRef
Easterly, W. (2002). The elusive quest for growth. Economists’ adventures and misadventures in the tropics (1st ed.). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Eggertsson, T. (1996). A note on the economics of institutions. In L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsson, & D. C. North (Eds.), Empirical studies in institutional change (1st ed., pp. 6–24). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Evrensel, A. Y. (2002). Effectiveness of IMF-supported stabilization programmes in developing countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 21, 565–587. CrossRef
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83–116. CrossRef
Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. Econometrica, 50, 1029–1054. CrossRef
Haque, N. ul., & Khan, M. S. (1998). Do IMF-supported programs work? A survey of the cross-country empirical evidence. IMF Working Paper No. 98-169, IMF, Washington, DC.
Harriss, J., Hunter, J., & Lewis, C. M. (1995). The new institutional economics and third world (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
IMF. (2005). Building institutions. In World economic outlook, building institutions, world economic and financial surveys (pp. 125–60). Washington, DC: IMF.
Independent Evaluation Office. (2002). Report on prolonged use of IMF resources. Washington, DC: IMF.
Independent Evaluation Office. (2007). An IEO evaluation of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs. Washington, DC: IMF.
Joskow, P. L. (2008). Introduction to new institutional economics: A report card. In E. Brousseau & J.-M. Glachant (Eds.), New institutional economics: A guidebook (1st ed., pp. 1–19). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
Joyce, J. P. (1992). The economic characteristics of IMF program countries. Economic Letters, 38, 237–242. CrossRef
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: Methodology and analytical issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Kuncic, A. (2014). Institutional quality dataset. Journal of Institutional Economics, 10, 135–161. CrossRef
Lin, J. Y., & Nugent, J. B. (1995). Institutions and economic development. In J. Behrman & T. N. Srinivasan (Eds.), Handbook of development economics (2nd ed.). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2011). Polity IV Project: Dataset users’ manual. Arlington: Polity IV Project.
Milgrom, P., North, D., & Weingast, B. (1990). The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The Medieval Law Merchant. Economics & Politics, 2, 1–23. CrossRef
Mill, J. S. (1861). Considerations on representative government (1st ed.). London: Parker, Son, & Bourn. Retrieved 20 June 2014. Via Google Books.
Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations (2nd ed.). London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance (1st ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
North, D. (1994). Institutional change: A framework of analysis. St. Louis: Washington University. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6041. Accessed 01 Nov 2013.
Nsouli, S. M., Atoian, R., & Mourmouras, A. (2004). Institutions, program implementation, and macroeconomic performance. IMF Working Paper No. 04-184, IMF, Washington, DC.
Rodrik, D. (2000). Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them. NBER Working Paper No. 7540, NBER, Cambridge.
Rodrik, D. (2007). Getting institutions right. In D. Rodrik (Ed.), One economics, many recipes: Globalization, institutions, and economic growth (pp. 184–192). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2002). Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper Series No. 3643, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Roodman, D. (2007). A short note on the theme of too many instruments. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 125, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.
Roodman, D. (2009). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. Stata Journal, 9, 86–136.
Shirley, M. M. (Ed.). (2008). Institutions and development. In C. Menard & M. M. Shirley (Eds.), Handbook of new institutional economics (1st ed., pp. 611–638). New York: Springer.
Smith, A. (1976). In R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner (Eds.), An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press (Liberty Classics reprint, 1981). Originally: London (1776).
Stiglitz, J. E. (2001). Failure of the fund: Rethinking the IMF response. Harvard International Review, 23, 14–18.
Ugur, M. (2010). Institutions and economic performance: A review of the theory and evidence. MPRA Paper 25909, University Library of Munich, Munich. Available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25909/. Accessed 10 Nov 2013.
Vreeland, J. (2006). IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies. Review of International Organizations, 1, 359–378. CrossRef
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism (1st ed.). New York: Free Press.
- Institutional Determinants: A Case Study of IMF Programme and Non-programme Countries
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, digitale Transformation/© Maksym Yemelyanov | Fotolia