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The Annals of Regional Science

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26.06.2023 | Original Paper

Inter-municipal cooperation and public employment: evidence from French municipalities

verfasst von: Touria Jaaidane, Sophie Larribeau, Matthieu Leprince

Erschienen in: The Annals of Regional Science | Ausgabe 3/2024

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Abstract

Der Artikel untersucht die Auswirkungen der interkommunalen Zusammenarbeit auf die Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Dienst anhand eines ausgewogenen Panel-Datensatzes französischer Gemeinden zwischen 2002 und 2008. Sie konzentriert sich auf die Zeit, als die interkommunale Zusammenarbeit gefördert wurde, und untersucht, wie sich der Beitritt solcher Organisationen auf das Beschäftigungsniveau in den Kommunen auswirkt. Die Studie verwendet ein Konzept für eine Veranstaltungsstudie, um die kausalen Auswirkungen des Beitritts zu einem Gremium für interkommunale Zusammenarbeit (IMC) zu messen, und zeigt, dass Zusammenarbeit zu Personalabbau auf kommunaler Ebene führt. Darüber hinaus stellt sie fest, dass die Beziehung zwischen IMC und kommunaler Beschäftigung für Kommunen mit kurzer Erfahrung in der Zusammenarbeit komplementär ist, aber diejenigen mit längerer Erfahrung ersetzt. Die Studie unterstreicht auch die Rolle der Arbeitslosigkeit bei der Beeinflussung kommunaler Einstellungspraktiken innerhalb von IMCs und zeigt, dass Bürgermeister in IMCs mehr Menschen einstellen, wenn die Arbeitslosigkeit vor Ort höher ist. Diese umfassende Analyse bietet wertvolle Einblicke in die Dynamik öffentlicher Beschäftigung im Rahmen interkommunaler Zusammenarbeit.

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Vorheriger Artikel Correction: Do businesses vote with their feet to access credit: local financial structure and business relocation

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To avoid any confusion, we call municipal employment the number of public employees working for the municipality.

The wage bill represented around 50% of the current expenditure over the period.

Unfortunately, we are unable to take into account this reform. Our dataset covering the 2002–2008 period is constrained by the annual survey on municipal employment that ended in 2008.

Municipalities remain responsible for those competencies that have not been transferred.

Our data do not allow us to distinguish between them: we only have their net result, i.e. the employment levels, respectively for the municipalities and the IMCs.

We consider total municipal employment. Neither the distinction of employees according to their status (civil servant or not) nor the allocation of employees across services are possible with our data.

The municipal tax capacity is defined as the tax revenues that could be obtained out of the local tax bases if the national average tax rates were applied in the municipality.

We implicitly assume a classical median voter framework (see Downs 1957) where the median voter is a household occupying a house subject to the residence tax.

Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.

We exploit the 1999 and 2006 legal municipal population variables and generate the annual data thanks to a linear interpolation from 2002 to 2005 and use the legal census population figures from 2006 to 2008.

Direction de l’Animation de la Recherche et des Etudes et des Statistiques, Ministère du Travail.

Direction Générale des Finances Publiques.

Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales.

We have also lost observations because of a lack of information and/or abnormal values (overseas municipalities were excluded).

Municipalities that entered in 2002 or before are excluded from the analysis since there is no available data on their period of entry. Moreover, municipalities that entered in 2008 are also excluded as they are not numerous enough.

Unfortunately, for data availability reasons, we can not study the effect of entry beyond five years after the entry.

We use the 2010 partition (INSEE) providing information for 304 EZs in Metropolitan France.

In other words, two EZs are separate in the sense that there are no flows of workers between them.

We consider four categories for IMC population size: under 5000; between 5000 and 10,000; between 10,000 and 20,000 and over 20,000 inhabitants.

More precisely, within the département of the main IMC town, since an IMC can spread over several départements.

To justify the use of averages on similar neighbors, we mention that this approach is frequently adopted by the French administration in respect of local public finance policies.

The number of neighbors is variable across IMCs since the départements are heterogenous for different reasons. The number of EZs and IMCs vary across départements as well as IMC population size and tax regime. If no neighbor satisfying the 3 criteria is found for a given IMC, the rule is relaxed to allow for 2 criteria. In such a case, we choose as neighbors IMCs in the same département that have the same fiscal regime.

Clustering at the IMC and EZ levels produces the same results.

Cragg-Donald Wald F=33.60 and Stock-Yoko 10% critical value =13.43.

First stage regression for w is given in Table 9 in “Appendix 7.3”.

Note that in the model (1) where I is not instrumented, this effect turns out to be significantly negative. The interpretation is that the reverse causality gives the original FE-OLS parameter sign and fixing it gives the opposite sign.

In model (3), the same result holds except for municipalities with low IMC employment level which effect is insignificant.

See Hines and Thaler (1995) and Baskaran (2016) among others.

As another robustness check, we test for a specification where the IMC workers are apportioned to municipalities according to their population. This can be justified since a worker in an IMC might be shared by all the municipalities that belong to that IMC. The results are presented in the “Appendix 7.4”.

See Jaaidane (2010) and Clark and Milcent (2011).

A municipality that hires highly skilled personnel under private employment contracts is likely to have a larger annual wage than a municipality which has low skilled employees on public employment contracts.

Lagged values of endogenous variables are commonly used as instruments, but serious concerns have been raised about their validity (Angrist and Krueger 2001).

Two EZs are considered as close when they share a common border.

This can be explained by the fact that the weight is on average equal to 17%.

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Titel: Inter-municipal cooperation and public employment: evidence from French municipalities
verfasst von: Touria Jaaidane
Sophie Larribeau
Matthieu Leprince
Publikationsdatum: 26.06.2023
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: The Annals of Regional Science / Ausgabe 3/2024
Print ISSN: 0570-1864
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-0592
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-023-01232-3

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