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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Interest Group Communication Strategies

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Abstract

In this chapter, I test the formal model empirically. I analyze the decision to mobilize and the decision to send public or private messages. I can demonstrate that the decision to send public messages depends on the distance to the expected policy outcome, while the decision to send private messages depends on the distance to the constraining actor. This is based on an identification strategy which uses the fact that the German political system functions as if the relevant decision-makers are exogenously assigned to issues based on the constitution.

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1
The bargaining range is sometimes also called the core.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Interest Group Communication Strategies
verfasst von
Sebastian Koehler
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97055-4_6