International Climate Agreements under Review

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Frontmatter

2. Chapter 1. Introduction

   Anja Zenker

   Abstract

   Given its serious, ubiquitous, long-term, and partially irreversible effects, global warming has undoubtedly become one of the political key challenges of the 21st century. As transboundary pollution problems need to be addressed collectively by the states involved, combating climate change requires cooperation on a global scale. However, years of negotiation experience under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) has demonstrated that, if it concerns the provision of a global public good, instead of achieving consensus on collective action, a persistent negotiation deadlock between key actors is a likely outcome.

3. Chapter 2. Review of the Literature

   Anja Zenker

   Abstract

   For the understanding of the game-theoretic modeling framework, it is essential to recap the specifics of the subject matter and the negotiation situation from which IEAs typically evolve.

4. Chapter 3. Climate-Trade Coalition with a National Consumer ETS

   Anja Zenker

   Abstract

   In this chapter, a model is built up in the tradition of a strategic trade theory which includes the environment in form of an unwanted by-product (greenhouse gas emissions) modeled as a global public bad. Its basic framework goes back to Eichner/Pethig (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015a, 2015b) which has been extended by Kuhn/Pestow/Zenker (2015, 2017, 2019) for analyzing the effects of issue linkage. There is a multi-stage Stackelberg leader-follower framework comprising a multi-sectoral international market stage as well as a policy stage on which countries strategically can employ trade measures like tariffs as well as environmental measures like emissions caps.

5. Chapter 4. Climate-Trade Coalition with a National Producer ETS

   Anja Zenker

   Abstract

   Although one may argue that, in case of a negative environmental consumption externality, only an emission trading scheme requiring consumers to buy emission permits on the market would strictly comply with the polluter-pays principle, it might be more reasonable to adopt an upstream rather than a downstream approach. The main advantage would be the easy identification and control of the entities obliged as well as the reduced administrative burden (Wackerbauer, 2003, p. 8 and Kreuter-Kirchhof, 2005, p. 478). Moreover, producers are often able to pass on to the consumers a part of the economic burden resulting from this kind of environmental policy instrument.

6. Chapter 5. Compatibility with the WTO Framework

   Anja Zenker

   Abstract

   An issue often raised by economists concerns the consistency of trade-related incentive mechanisms in IEAs with the legal framework of the WTO (Limão, 2007, pp. 849-850, Ederington, 2010, pp. 92-93, 97, Das, 2015, pp. 24-25 and many others). Their argument is that trade sanctions such as border-tax adjustments (BTAs) and plurilateral types of regional trade integration are by their very nature discriminatory and, hence, they would violate the common status of Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment stipulated by GATT Art. I and para. 1 of GATS Art. II. This clause according to which any trade advantage granted by a WTO member to another country shall be provided to any other WTO member, constitutes the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination for multilateral trade liberalization within the WTO (UNESCAP, 2008, pp. 217-218).

7. Chapter 6. Conclusions

   Anja Zenker

   Abstract

   Even though the 2015 Paris Agreement has been commonly said to be a success for providing a framework for international action on climate change in the post-2020 period, it does not solve the underlying incentive problem of international cooperation on transboundary pollution issues. Instead, the newly introduced ’pledge and review’ process resulting from the UNFCCC’s move towards a bottom-up approach could in fact be understood as a coordination mechanism for individually rational climate strategies. Climate Action Tracker Partners (2018) have shown that those national pledges are - at least according to the status quo - insufficient to prevent a considerable increase in the average global temperature.

8. Backmatter