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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. International Environmental Problems

verfasst von : Wolfgang Buchholz, Dirk Rübbelke

Erschienen in: Foundations of Environmental Economics

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter, different types of international environmental problems are analyzed from the perspective of elementary game theory. For the case of reciprocal environmental spillovers, as foremost climate change, the basic strategic interactions between countries are described in a simple binary game model. It is shown that different game types may occur and how the type of the game may be transformed if, e.g., the abatement costs are changing or fairness motivations become relevant for the countries. It is moreover explained how in repeated games international cooperation can be stabilized by means of various threat strategies. Finally, factors are highlighted that are favorable for making international cooperation on environmental problems successful in the real world.

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Titel: International Environmental Problems
verfasst von: Wolfgang Buchholz
Dirk Rübbelke
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Foundations of Environmental Economics
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16267-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-16268-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16268-9_5

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