8. International Isolation and the Search for New Friends

The concept of a development mainstream is used here to denote the approaches shared by the members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It is exemplified by the DAC’s support for the principles of the Paris Declaration which govern donor-recipient country relations, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach to poverty reduction and debt relief, and above all the importance attached to ‘good governance’ principles in the development equation. In addition to the purchase within the Western aid community that these principles enjoy, there is the fact that the vast majority of developing countries also subscribe to them, as evidenced by the large numbers of signatories to the Paris Declaration and its subsequent iterations, as well as those who chose to apply for various Western-led international debt relief initiatives.

Particular venom was reserved for neighbouring Botswana, whose leadership consistently expressed concerns about the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe, and the effects it was having on Botswana in terms of the movement of Zimbabwean refugees into the country. In the particularly tense aftermath of the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe, Botswana called for SADC to isolate Mugabe. Harare responded by accusing Botswana of providing military training to elements of the MDC-T on its territory with the intention of destabilising Zimbabwe.

PRSPs were to contain country-specific poverty eradication targets, a sound macroeconomic framework meant to trigger both growth and poverty reduction, and commitments to a range of public sector reforms such as in Public Financial Management systems and regulatory frameworks.

Agreed at the UN Millennium Summit 2000, the MDGs were a comprehensive set of 8 development goals agreed to by all member states and subscribed to by the major international development institutions. The first goal was that of reducing by half the global levels of extreme poverty by 2015.

For a detailed examination of the economic aspects of Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC conflict, and comprehensive analysis of the Zimbabwean actors involved and their institutional and corporate links see Nest (2001).

Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement allows for Fund missions to member countries to collect data and discuss policies with national authorities. On the basis of these findings the missions prepare a report for the consideration of the Executive Board which is then shared with the country authorities.

It is noteworthy that the table of economic indicators in the PIN projected a negative real GDP growth rate of −5.5 percent for 2000, a collapse in gross reserves from US$882 million in 1995 to US$198 million in 2000, while Zimbabwe’s debt service as a percentage of exports was to increase from 19 percent in 1995 to an estimated 29 percent for 2000.

This meant that Zimbabwe would no longer be able to appoint a representative to the IMF Board of Governors, participate in the election of an Executive Director to the IMF’s Board of Directors, or cast a vote in IMF policy decisions.

The AfDB document notes that the institution sent five missions to Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2007 to discuss the country’s arrears, all to no avail despite specific and repeated Government undertakings to deal with its outstanding obligations.

The World Bank’s ‘partners’ include, amongst others, bilateral donors and other IFIs, all of whom would have closely monitored the Bank’s lending programme in Zimbabwe, and on the assumption that due diligence had been exercised by the Bank responded positively to the signalling effect of the approval of new World Bank credits to Zimbabwe in terms of their own programmes.

The HIPC, launched in 1996 and subsequently modified in 1999, aimed to provide low-income countries with substantial debt relief subject to them meeting a number of eligibility criteria. These were that a country’s external debt levels were judged to be above sustainability levels. The latter were set in 1996 as a ratio of external debt to exports above a threshold of 250 percent, while the ratio of debt to government revenue was set at 280 percent. These ratios were subsequently lowered in 1999 to 150 percent and 250 percent respectively in order to facilitate the access of more countries to the programme. In addition to these debt sustainability criteria, countries had to meet a number of other conditions. These included the adoption of an adjustment and reform programme supported by the World Bank and IMF, demonstration of a track record of macroeconomic stability (again determined by the BWIs), the designing of a PRSP which met World Bank and IMF quality standards, a commitment to use resources freed up by debt relief for poverty reduction purposes, as well as reaching an arrears clearance agreement with the BWIs and other multilateral creditors.

International debt relief under HIPC was taken one step further in 2005, when in the form of the MDRI the G-8 countries proposed that the IMF, World Bank and the AfDB cancel 100 percent of their debt claims on those low-income countries that had met HIPC criteria. The initiative was specifically cast in terms of assisting those countries to free up resources that might have been expended to support debt servicing on national efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

So, for example, post-completion point countries had an average debt to exports ratio of 63 percent in contrast to those HIPCs which had not yet received any debt relief and had average debt to export ratios of 200 percent (IDA and IMF 2008, 37–38).

In general terms these BIPPAs followed the standard pattern of Bilateral Investment Treaties, laying out a series of undertakings between two countries to reciprocally promote and protect investments of their nationals and companies in their respective jurisdictions. All contain provisions on expropriation and nationalisation which is lawful, but certain conditions must be met such as the payment of compensation which is usually required in its standard formulation to be ‘prompt, adequate and effective’. It was particularly in regard to this last requirement that Zimbabwe was seen to be most remiss, and therefore in violation of its international treaty obligations by the West.

This provision was a clear sign that Western capitals were concerned by the fact that as the crisis deepened in Zimbabwe, the role of the ‘securocrats’ in government decision-making processes became increasingly evident.

The Cotonou Agreement is a treaty signed between the EU (European Union) and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) group of countries which came into force in 2003. In contrast to its predecessors, the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions which had previously governed EU-ACP trade and development cooperation, the Cotonou Agreement emphasised the importance of ‘good governance’ as fundamental to relations between both groups of countries. Article 96 stated that violations of these good governance principles would lead to the suspension of development cooperation between the EU and the ACP country in question (EU-ACP 2000).

The observers report noted that “the Presidential election in Zimbabwe was marred by a high level of politically motivated violence and intimidation, which preceded the poll…it is our view that most of these were perpetrated by members/supporters of the ruling party against members/supporters of the opposition…conditions in Zimbabwe did not allow for a free expression of will by the electors” (Commonwealth Secretariat 2003, 43).

Amongst the key principles adopted by the Commonwealth Heads of State at the Commonwealth summit, held ironically in Harare in 1991, was that of an “individual’s inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in framing the society in which he or she lives” (Commonwealth Secretariat 1991, 1).

Even the UN was, however, on occasion, added to the list of external agents plotting regime change. So, for example, in the wake of the visit of the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in 2005, and the negative report that he produced on the overall humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe and in particular the lack of progress in terms of government assistance to those affected by Operation Murambatsvina, Mugabe stated in the course of ZANU-PF party conference: “You can see how they raise this, so that the rest of the international community can say human rights are being violated, people are suffering in the hope that the United Nations can support the British in their evil campaign to try and have control here…I’m going to tell the Secretary General not to send us men, or women, who are not his own but agents of the British” (Zim Online 2005).

It is worthwhile noting that in the context of the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s and 1970s, when both Moscow and Beijing competed for ideological leadership of Third World liberation movements, ZANU had followed Beijing’s line, most particularly its Maoist prescriptions on guerrilla warfare, and received both training and armaments from the PRC.

So, for example, in contrast to OECD-DAC members the Chinese include the construction of sports facilities and military assistance in their external assistance figures, and also exclude debt relief and administrative costs of these programmes from their figures, again in contrast to standard OECD-DAC practice. For an excellent overview of the definitional differences see Bräutigam (2011).

For example, Emmerson Mnangagwa, current President of Zimbabwe, was trained in China in the 1960s.