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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. International Report

verfasst von : Pranvera Këllezi

Erschienen in: Compatibility of Transactional Resolutions of Antitrust Proceedings with Due Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP Rights

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Transactional resolutions are becoming an increasingly important part of antitrust proceedings. Contributions from 16 jurisdictions confirm such a trend.

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Nächstes Kapitel Australia

The following national groups submitted a contribution on this topic: Australia (B. Jedličková, J. Clarke, and S. Bhojani), Austria (G. Fussenegger), Belgium (J. Auwerx), Brazil (J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker), Czech Republic (J. Kindl and M. Petr), France (D. Bosco), Germany (E. Bueren), Hungary (A. Keller), Italy (A. Camusso), Japan (I. Hayashi, report not published), Poland (A. Stawicki, B. Turno, T. Feliszewski, K. Kanton, and K. Karasiewicz), Serbia (D. Ognjenovic), Spain (J. Suderow and A. A. Garzaro), Sweden (H. Andersson), Switzerland (D. Emch, D. Neuenschwander, and A. Burkhard), the United States of America (E. E. Varanini).

Settlements of private actions are outside the scope of this study.

See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.1.

In some countries, negotiated merger remedies have preceded settlements in the field of agreements and abuse of dominant positions; see A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.2.

In some jurisdictions, the majority of proceedings are resolved following a transactional mechanism. In Germany, in the period between 2007 and 2011, around 80 % of proceedings were resolved through settlements (E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.4). In Austria, all cartel cases since 2012 have been concluded by settlements (G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.1). In France, around 30 % of all decisions are resolved through commitment (D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.2). See, however, D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.1.1, where transactional resolutions are not used often.

See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.1; J. Suderow and A. A. Garzaro, Spain, Sect. 13.1.2.

Transactional resolution of antitrust proceedings has not, however, reduced the length of proceedings in Belgium (J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.4). In other countries such as Brazil, transactional resolutions have considerably reduced the length of the proceedings (see J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.1).

See, for instance, J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.1; E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.

See D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.1.

See J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.1.

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.1.

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.5.

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.3.

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sects. 2.2.3 and 2.2.4; see also E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sects. 2.2.3 and 2.2.4; E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.

A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.1; A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.1.

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.2; A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.1.

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.2.

See, for instance, M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.4.3.

See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.4.3.

See A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.1; A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.5.

See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.

See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.

See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sects. 16.4.2 and 16.4.3; E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.

See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.4.

See, for instance, B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.7.

See, for instance, G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2.1, A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.1.

See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.1.

See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.

See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.1.

See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.4.2.6.

See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.

A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.5.

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.5.

See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.

See D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.3.1.

J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.2.1.

See H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.3.

D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.2.

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.2: when submitting undertakings, companies acknowledge simply the potential risk of breaching competition law.

See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.4.

J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.2.1.

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.5: plea bargains are “negotiated agreement[s] between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, [usually] a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of other charges.”

See D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.1. Only hardcore horizontal and vertical cartels and abuse of dominant positions are subject to fines in Switzerland; agreements restricting competition by their effect are subject to sanctions in case of non-compliance with an existing prohibition decision.

See, for instance, D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.2.

In Europe, known as independent administrative authorities.

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.

See, for instance, G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2; see also the guidelines in Spain, J. Suderow and A. A. Garzaro, Sects. 13.2.4 and 13.2.5.

See Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, right to good administration.

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.2.

See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.3.

See discussion of E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.4.2.6; see also J. Suderow and A. A. Garzaro, Spain, Sect. 13.4.

See E. Bueren, Germany, section “Rights of Defence and Procedural Rights”.

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.6.

Art. 90(2) of the Austrian Constitutional Law.

With regard to the principle of presumption of innocence: Austria (5 Ob 154/07v).

In Serbia, abuse of dominant position is a criminal offence provided for in the criminal code.

See decision of the Austrian Cartel Supreme Court of 11 October 2006, 16Ok7/06, G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.3.1. J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.3.1.

See, for instance, J. Suderow and A. A. Garzaro, Spain, Sect. 13.3.3 (leniency applications).

See the discussion in Germany concerning leniency applicants, E. Bueren, section “Rights of Defence and Procedural Rights”.

See J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.3.1.

See the discussion in Germany regarding leniency applications, E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.1.

See also in Germany, this is not covered by the prohibition of granting advantages not envisaged by statute; see E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.3.2. See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.4, for whom the more companies benefit from the cooperation, the less relevant the right against self-incrimination becomes.

J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.

See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.

See J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.2.1.4.

See in Italy, A. Camusso, Sect. 10.2.3.1.

See A Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.1.

M. Israel, United Kingdom, 16.2.1; D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.1.1.

D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.1.1.

See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.1 (case Robert Wiseman Dairies).

See D. Bosco, France.

See, for example, Austria, Sect. 3.3.2; A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.2.2.2.

J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.

J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.2.1.

J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sects. 4.2.2.1 et seq.

E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.

See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.2.

M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.

See D. Bosco, France.

M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.2.

J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.2.

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.1.

D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.2.1.

See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.4, reporting that cooperation allegedly has influenced the trend by increasing the basic amount of the fine and not by reducing the actual level of fine paid by companies.

See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2.

See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2; see also Article 29 of the Swiss Competition Act: “If the Secretariat considers that a restraint of competition is unlawful, it may propose an amicable settlement to the undertakings involved concerning ways to eliminate the restraint” (emphasis added).

See D. Bosco, France.

This is the case, for instance, in Belgium and in Germany.

E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.2 regarding settlements.

In Belgium, it is not clear whether the parties will have access to full file.

E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.2 regarding settlements.

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.1, Article 24 of the Italian Constitution.

D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.4.5.

H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.4.3.

D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.2.1.

100

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.11.

101

See, for instance, A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.3.

102

J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.2.

103

See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2; D. Emch et al., Switzerland.

104

D. Bosco, France.

105

J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.

106

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.6.

107

E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.

108

See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.

109

J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.2.1.2.

110

D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.2.3.

111

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.1.

112

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.

113

A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.1.

114

See the case of France. By contrast, in the EU, companies are allowed to offer commitments at any stage of the procedure, even after having received a statement of objections.

115

See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3, citing a court judgment in U.S. (SEC) v. Citigroup Global Markets (Citigroup Global Markets II), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2nd Cir. 2014).

116

See, for instance, the requirement regarding settlements in Germany, where admission should be backed by sufficient other evidence, inspired by criminal procedural principal (E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.5).

117

E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.3.

118

M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.

119

See, for instance, B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.2.3, where there is a perception that transactional resolutions do not alter the burden and standard of proof.

120

See, for instance, J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.2.5.1; M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3, p. 414.

121

For instance, Belgium, Serbia, and Hungary. This was the case in Germany; however, it seems that currently it is considered that admission of infringement may not be used (e.g., as evidence) if such statement is withdrawn, this for both criminal and administrative procedures (E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.5, footnote 59).

122

See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.2.5.1. Other measures are taken on a case-by-case basis.

123

See, for instance, France.

124

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.4.

125

See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.3.

126

ATF 139 I 72, Publigroupe.

127

D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.4.3.

128

On the importance of confidentiality, see E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.4.

129

For instance, in Belgium (see Sects. 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.7).

130

E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.4.2.5.

131

D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.1.3.

132

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 5.2.1.2.

133

D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.3.5.

134

See in Germany, E. Bueren, Sect. 8.4.2.5.

135

M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.

136

M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.

137

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.

138

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.

139

Ibidem.

140

D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.1.3, A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.2.5.

141

A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.2.5.

142

See Germany regarding settlement procedures, E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.5.

143

See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.2.5.6.

144

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sects. 10.2.3.1 and 10.2.3.3.

145

A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.2.2.5.

146

D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.4.7.

147

See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.3.

148

See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.

149

Not all settlements are subject to court review. The FTC may conduct civil antitrust settlements (consent decrees), which do not require an approval from the Court (see E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.7).

150

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.

151

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.6.

152

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.6.

153

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.8.

154

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.8.

155

See, in general, E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.

156

In Austria, the Cartel Court may freely reject the request of the authority for a settlement. Under general procedural rules, statements of the company on facts and the acknowledgment of the infringement are subject to the free appraisal of the evidence by the Cartel Court, which results in uncertainty for companies under investigation.

157

G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2.3.

158

G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.4.5.

159

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.1.

160

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.1.2.

161

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.1.2.

162

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sects. 2.2.1 and 2.2.3.

163

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.2.

164

H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.1.

165

H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.2.

166

D. Bosco, France.

167

D. Bosco, France.

168

D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.3.7.

169

D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.3.

170

ATF 139 I 72, Publigroupe.

171

H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.4.3.

172

See, for instance, A. Camusso, Italy, 10.2.2.1.

173

See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.2.1.

174

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.2.1.

175

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.7.

176

See, for instance, United States of America, Sweden, Switzerland, and Serbia.

177

E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.5.

178

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.

179

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.3.

180

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.3.

181

See A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.4, for examples of over-intervention.

182

A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.1.

183

D. Bosco, France.

184

M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.2.

185

B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.2.1.

Titel: International Report
verfasst von: Pranvera Këllezi
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Compatibility of Transactional Resolutions of Antitrust Proceedings with Due Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP Rights
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27157-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-27158-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27158-3_1

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