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Erschienen in:
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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Introduction: Economic Analysis and Civil Wars

verfasst von : Nicos Christodoulakis

Erschienen in: An Economic Analysis of Conflicts

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The Introduction examines the main channels that interconnect economics and civil wars, both in influencing the causes of conflict and affecting its outcome. It also examines how economic theory and econometric analysis can help model the dynamics of conflict and thus estimate its patterns and consequences.

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Fußnoten
1
Instructing modern revolutionaries, Che Guevara (1961, Ch. 3) advocated that “it is absolutely correct and advisable to carry out sabotage against a power plant. … [T]his is entirely justified by the paralysis of the life of the region.”
 
2
This kind of risk applies in conflicts where the opponents truly seek for a face-saving compromise. In cases where an aggressive ideology is dominant, compromising signals are likely to be ignored deliberately.
 
3
The remark was made by R. L. Helmbold in Munich and quoted by Wallis (1968).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Introduction: Economic Analysis and Civil Wars
verfasst von
Nicos Christodoulakis
Copyright-Jahr
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32261-2_1