Introduction: Imagining “Europe” in Times of War and Crises: Youth Perceptions of European Integration in its Periphery

The crisis of the European project is not a new phenomenon. Throughout its existence, the EU has gone from crisis to crisis. Nonetheless, this time, the crisis seems more serious, some even believe definitive. The sentiment is spreading that the EU project came to an end not only because of deep divisions between the EU member states at instances such as refugee crisis and Brexit but also it is no longer appearing as an alluring project for the countries which are not central engines of the EU integration. Indeed, from the time of 2008 economic crises, through the migration and refugee crisis in Europe, up to the Trumpism era in the US, we observed increased protectionist and separatist practices across the globe. The coronavirus pandemic and associated restrictions accelerated this trend. Brexit has become the symbol of disintegration and isolationism (Riedel 2023: 298). The so-called “migrant crisis”, has demonstrated that the degree of integration and solidarity among EU members is not as deep and complete as expected, bolstering the already existing economic and socio-political crises (Prodromidou et al. 2019: 7). Reluctance to share sovereignty has become evident especially among the post-2004 EU member states. Similarly, after the Eurozone Crises in 2008 and 2009, the Western Balkans now constituted an outer ring of that marginalised and discredited zone of governance failure, and was viewed through similar lenses in Brussels and the ‘north’ (Bechev 2012). Crises already existed before within the European integration, but they were integral to a cyclical process of EU integration, where every crisis spurred new agreements advancing cooperation among member states (Scipioni 2017: 1357; Jones et al. 2016: 1017). However, while prior crises facilitated integration, current crises are seen as a threat to the existence of the EU, as different Member States are now on the path of re-nationalising their policies (Brekke and Staver 2018; Reichwein 2018: 85). This has in turn led to a demise in the credibility of the EU, its fundamental principles like solidarity among its member states as well as its institutions (Prodromidou et al. 2019: 7). All in all, it had even been claimed by some commentators that these developments lead to the questioning of the EU integration, or even its reversal to disintegration (Murray and Longo 2018; Jones 2018).

The question of how this tendency towards disintegration is perceived across Europe is a significant question to be deciphered. “Bruised by the Eurozone and refugee crises”, large parts of the public in Europe have come to doubt the sustainability of the EU (de Vries 2018: 13). Increased politicization of European integration, combined with challenges from extreme right or left parties to the moderate positions of mainstream political parties have ushered a period of “constraining dissensus” affecting all aspects of the European project (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

The picture gets even more complicated when one focuses on the perception of the EU project in its “periphery”. As it will be elaborated below, the “periphery” of the EU for the very aims of this volume entails candidate, potential candidate and neighbourhood countries as well as rather new EU member countries. “Centre-periphery” dichotomy in this respect is both spatial in the sense that most of the candidate and neighbourhood countries of the EU are geographically far away from Brussels as well as structural in terms of regional disparities and economic asymmetries between core “Europe” and its periphery. If we refer to the famous “bicycle metaphor” which suggested (in terms of the EU project) the need to move forward in order to avoid falling off, “periphery” is located at the back seat of the tandem. Even if the tandem ride is still on, the person at the back seat might be not perceiving the social reality as one does in front.

To start with, the economic and financial crises of 2008 and 2009 has severely undermined the main supposed advantages of EU integration—economic development and prosperity—and thus intertwined with and reinforced lingering negative attitudes towards “Europe” in the Western Balkans. The difficulty in providing a solution to the problem of refugees stuck in the region throughout 2015 further reinforced a sense of frustration towards the EU (Belloni 2016: 531). Economic ties to the Union and the unprecedented number of migrants taking “the Balkan route” have recently been the key issues that affected the Balkan countries on the periphery of the EU (Stojić 2022: 359). In particular, most data on the perceptions by the public opinion in the Western Balkans show sharp division between Albania and Kosovo on the one hand, which have high hopes and expectations of the membership in the EU, and the rest of the Western Balkans in which the main attitude is one of EU-indifferentism and confusion, if not open scepticism (Jovic 2018: 15). In, Georgia, on the other hand, general public perception is rather evaluating the EU in relation to the war in South Ossetia and especially in Abkhazia (and the lack of its involvement in the resolution of the conflicts), a more different reification of “crisis” parlance (Laitadze 2022: 14). The fact that there was significant humanitarian aid coming from Europe went virtually unnoticed, as it was totally overwritten by the sheer misery of the lost wars, the casualties, and the influx of internally displaced persons from the two occupied regions (Laitadze 2022:14). Similarly, in the Romanian public discourse throughout the refugee crisis and Brexit referendum, the EU was used as a source of division which increased polarisation between opposing national political agendas, which was intertwined with the evolution of the Romanians’ trust in the EU which reached its lowest point in the last decade at the end of 2017 (Troncota and Loy 2018: 207). Those two crises managed to “bring the EU in the polity”-so citizens in Romania started to express more visible opinions about EU affairs (Troncota and Loy 2018: 208). The Turkish case, in this regard, is outstanding in terms of the long durée of its relations with the EU integration as well as the multifarious public perceptions attached to it throughout history. ‘Europe’ has been perceived as the target to be reached, and, indeed, the way itself to this target starting from the nineteenth century in Turkish political landscape. Since then, the choice for Türkiye’s European orientation has derived from a deep-rooted state tradition, referring to both a careful perception of the Turkish foreign policy options and an emotional attachment to the idea of being among the “European” (Alpan 2014: 68). The EU integration which has been such a significant anchor in Turkish politics did not seem to lose its legitimacy, credibility and coherence after Brexit as it still emerged as the most significant foreign policy option (Alpan and Şenyuva 2020: 46).

We see a similar yet nuanced pattern when it comes to the younger populations’ perception of the EU integration. Much of the empirical evidence to date suggests that younger people are more likely to be positive about European integration (Lauterbach and de Vries 2020: 168). Younger people are socialized in an increasingly integrated Europe (Lauterbach and de Vries 2020; Down and Wilson 2013, 2017), and therefore less ideologically and affectively bound to national institutions and sovereignty (Scherer 2015). They are also characterized by higher levels of education and political sophistication, therefore possibly more post-materialist in their value orientations (Lauterbach and de Vries 2020: 169) (for an opposite view on the close relationship between religiosity and support for EU integration amongst the young population see Nelsen and Guth 2003). High levels of social capital and pro-immigration sentiments also predict Euro-enthusiasm among the youngsters (Nelsen and Guth 2003: 89).

Nevertheless, latest data also show that there is an increasingly notable level of youth support for Eurosceptic parties in Europe (Politico 2017; Guerra 2014; Szczerbiak 2014a). In terms of the success of Poland’s Congress of New Rights at the 2014 EP elections, this is referred to as the “Generation Y” protest vote where young, well-educated, but unemployed, people who cannot have an independent life, but live with their family and “are frustrated that the country has not developed more rapidly, with an apparent ‘glass ceiling’ of vested interests and corrupt networks stifling their opportunities” (Szczerbiak 2014b). Similarly, right-wing Eurosceptic presidential candidate Marine Le Pen was more popular among young voters, those aged between 18 and 24, than Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 French presidential elections. Meanwhile in the 2018 parliamentary elections in Italy, over sixty per cent of millennial voters supported the two main Eurosceptic parties, the League and the Five Star Movement (Lauterbach and de Vries 2020: 169). On a different note, a recent study in Italy also confirms that younger generation see the EU a market-based project rather than a political one, as shaped by the Founding Treaties, with the purpose of “granting the free travel of goods, but not that of people”, mainly due to the EU’s tackling of the refugee crisis (Milan 2020: 253).

Against this background, this volume aims to focus on the perceptions of the EU integration by the young population in its “periphery”. In line with the research questions of the LEAP (“Linking to Europe at the Periphery”) Jean Monnet Network, which aims to explore how the EU integration is taught, learned, experienced and contested at the periphery of the EU, we aim to understand the main contours of the perceptions of the EU integration in the periphery mainly against the background of numerous crises characterising the European project lately. We find scholarly engagement with youth significant as we explore the possibility of change and continuity in the negotiation of past, present, and future by the next generation of leaders and influencers. In this respect, it is a crucial aim of the volume to explore how the young citizens who live in “the periphery” of the EU project evaluate different aspects of the EU integration, which would also help identify the reasons and dynamics of Euroscepticism as a transnational phenomenon. We also argue that such an examination is crucial for advancing the dialogue between the “periphery” and the “centre” (i.e. EU, taken either as an institution or an actor) and between younger generations and the current political actors in the EU. For this aim, the chapters in the volume make use of data generated from focus group meetings with university students aged between 18–30 (which is the age range generally used by the European Social Survey to group young citizens) in Romania, Kosovo, Albania, North Macedonia, Georgia and Türkiye.

In this vein, this introductory chapter is structured as follows: First, “centre-periphery” conceptual framework as well as the question of what the chapters in the volume mean by the “periphery” is elaborated. Second, we proceed to explore the perceptions literature with a particular emphasis on the young population in the “periphery” of the European integration. Thirdly, we discuss the research design as well as the research rationale for the volume. Finally, we present the structure of the book and set the ground for the case studies of the volume.

The concepts of “centre” and “periphery” have been employed in literature with different meanings and purposes, but not always clear nor elaborate. “Geographical centres and their peripheries have often been established on the basis of the cultural, economic or political predominance of the former and the subsidiary role of the latter” (Gavroglu et al. 2008: 154). The terms were largely used by development economists in the 1950s and 1960s. They played an important role in Immanuel Wallerstein’s model of world economy and the rise of capitalism and in various Marxist analyses of imperialism. Wallerstein argued that divided the world into four groups of states: core, semi-peripheries, peripheries and external areas (Wallerstein 1979). On a different note, for Rokkan, “centre-periphery” relations should be understood within the context of the political system building, with a particular focus on state formation and nation-building (cited in Flora et al. 1999). For Rokkan, territorial “centres” come in three different types -military-administrative, economic and cultural- making them “privileged locations” within the territory (cited in Flora et al. 1999: 110). The key characteristics of peripheries are, on the other hand, “distance, difference, and dependence”, which are “..located at some distance from the dominant centre or centres”. They possess “some minimum level and sense of separate identity”; and they depend on the centre “in political decision-making, in cultural standardization, and in economic life’” (cited in Flora et al. 1999: 115).

Within the context of European Studies, the notions of “centre” and periphery” had also been used frequently in order to denote for socio-economic inequalities between countries and regions and the polarisation between dynamic, growing metropolitan areas and rural or old industrial regions experiencing processes of shrinkage and decline (Kühn 2015: 367). The Territorial Agenda 2020 of the European Union (EU) had been frequently cited as it stated explicitly that “the core-periphery division is still present” and that it is important “to avoid polarization between capitals, metropolitan areas and medium-sized towns on the national scale” (Kühn 2015: 368). Similarly, for Featherstone and Kazamias, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region could be identified as an EU “periphery” in terms of a number of predominant traits, which include, “economic inequality”, “the historically distinctive mode of the region’s economic development”, “financial dependence on EU aid”, and “the lesser bargaining strength of the ‘south’ in EU treaty negotiations” (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 2). Similarly, power asymmetries between the dominant EU member states and the Central Eastern European states have often been noted, as have their cultural distinctness and relative economic backwardness (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 2). In particular, in terms of political power, “centre” and “periphery” can be defined by their spatial position and political interests. “The ‘centre’ is identified as the core location of military, economic, and cultural power, the place of political decisions and the policy-making process, and the seat of the ruling class, whereas the ‘periphery’ is the territory subordinate to the military, economic, and cultural power of the centre, the place at a distance from the policy-making process, and the population dependent on political decisions” (Pisciotta 2016: 197). In this respect, this asymmetry should be understood, within the context of the EU, as a significant component of the decisions made during meetings of the European Council and the Council of the European Union, as well as on the agenda of the activities of the European Commission (Duszczyk 2016: 251). Actually, the term “Europeanization” implicitly presupposes the existence of a “centre” dictating what to do and how to change to the “periphery”. It “entails a determination by ‘core’ European states as to which states on the ‘periphery’ deserve membership in the European society based on how much they live up to European rules or values that Europe holds dear” (Jones and Subotic 2011: 545). Similarly, Goetz uses the term, “clustered Europeanization” in order to point to the territorial differentiation and modal patterns of Europeanization within Europe (Goetz 2006: 4).

However, the dichotomous “centre-periphery” conception could prove incapable of capturing many salient features of the social reality. “Often there are centres and peripheries, depending on the subject one is discussing, which can be both centre and periphery; over time, a centre may change into a periphery, and vice-versa” (Gavroglu et al. 2008: 155). Moreover, a single country may contain both centres and peripheries, thereby making purely national distinctions of dubious use. Finally, “centre-periphery” dichotomy explicitly presupposes and reproduces the hierarchical relationship between the “centre” and “periphery”. Instead, as Makarchev put it, various other concepts such as “marginality” can be used as an analytical tool to uncover complexities of centre-periphery relations in Europe and to challenge the secondary role and status in relations of domination imposed upon the “periphery” (Makarychev 2017). “Margins might be discussed as subjects of their own, possessing not only their identities, but also their ability to re-signify their geographical remoteness from power centres, produce authentic cultural messages and thus contribute to the social construction of non-binary logics of inclusion” (Makarychev 2017: 1).

Despite such difficulties, such a division remains useful and suggestive, and we shall use it in this volume from a critical perspective. As the general aim of the volume is to increase communication of two ends of the “centre-periphery” dipole, we use this dichotomy within brackets. In this respect, “centre-periphery” cleavage will be interpreted in terms of three different dimensions in this volume. Firstly, we aim to understand whether the EU integration perceptions of young population in the case countries are shaped through a “centre-periphery” perspective. The second dimension refers to the extent to which two ends of the spectrum are influenced differently by the above-mentioned crises attached to the EU integration. Therefore, the chapters of the volume aim to decipher whether perceptions and depictions of the EU crises in the focused countries reiterate the “centre-periphery” dichotomy. Last, but not least, we explore whether a “centre-periphery” perspective is relevant to the perception of the future of the EU integration by the young population in the focused countries. This could be a question relevant to the prospective EU membership of the country in question or the future of the EU project altogether. Therefore, we aim to understand how the EU integration is perceived in the “periphery” with a particular emphasis on the multiple crises and the future of the EU integration.

Perceptions and images serve as “road maps” and “focal points”, telling external observers how to define a certain situation and giving them clues as how to relate to their environment (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Perceptions can affect an actor’s decision-making: they may influence the diagnosis of the situation and lead the actor to favour certain types of actions (Chaban et al. 2019; Cottam 1992). What actors hope and expect from the EU can be identified by analysing their perceptions of the EU and how these fit into broader narratives and images about the EU (Chaban et al. 2019: 236). At a more abstract level, the meaning attached to “Europe” and the EU is shaped by major political events, relationship with other states in the system and perceived closeness or distance from the European centre (Jones and Subotic 2011: 544). “What Europe means is the result of state political histories, national memories of the past, the perceived role of friend or foe that Europe has played in the region and the way in which Europe constructed the states as insiders or outsiders and attempted to ‘civilize’ them into a European community” (Jones and Subotic 2011: 545).

In this vein, the perception of the EU in its neighbourhood sparked particular attention especially after the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 in the literature and within the context of EU’s external relations (see Bachmann and Müller 2015; Pardo 2015; Chaban et al. 2018). The main claim was basically that perception studies has long been “too self-absorbed, looking at Europe through European eyes in a well-shaped European mirror” (Mayer 2008: 8). “Studying perceptions of the EU in the eyes of third countries shifts the focus from the EU, and gives a voice to the targeted ‘objects’ of Brussels’ various initiatives” (Arynov 2022: 43). This is further important in terms of the young population as youth as a sensitive and affectionate participant of social life may feel system tension to a greater extent. It is probable that youth’s reactions to system dysfunctions are more sudden and become conspicuous earlier (Parsons 1964; Adnanes 2007; Della Porta 2019).

As mentioned above, the research activity in each chapter will employ focus group meetings to identify the perception of the EU integration in the “periphery” by the young population. The use of focus groups, i.e. a group of 6 to 10 people who would spend 60 to 90 minutes to voice their opinions on a particular subject, as a part of the research design have the potential to generate data that may not surface in individual interviews or survey research. We believe that the best way to communicate with the young citizens is to constitute a warm environment where they will be comfortable for speaking to each other. The focus group researchers in each chapter will employ a purposive sampling and will approach the participants themselves. The basic aim here is to create a heterogeneous group paying attention to socio-economic, age and gender balance (All participants will be university students but their age and degree they are seeking may differ). The distribution of the participants in terms of age, gender and geography is listed in the Annex part in each chapter.

Nevertheless, as a guiding principle, the questions will bring together three blocks of enquiries:Nevertheless, the notion of “perception” is quite vague. How do we recognise perceptions when we see one? How do we measure them? These are burning questions of the perception literature as well as this volume. If the perceptions are all about “subjective or psychological cognition of the observer rather than the objective reflection of the object that is being observed”, how are we going to make sense of them? (Shiming 2010: 269). Research in this volume aims to explore qualitatively the perceptions about the EU integration of the young population rather than measure them quantitatively. The aim is to decipher how certain categorisations are used by the young population to make sense of the complex reality (i.e. EU integration in this regard). The nature of focus group questions also complements this qualitative design: The aim is to pose broad, unobtrusive and non-directive questions to the participants to avoid leading participants towards certain stereotypes and biased positions. The volume aims to sketch out the most relevant issues which are considered to form the youth perceptions of the EU integration, which we call “thematic dimensions²”, namely the economic, security and political dimensions.

Even though the application of focus groups has been extensive in social sciences, there are no clear guidelines for the application of the technique. Moreover, conducting multi-sited transnational research in social sciences is a challenging task in itself. Nevertheless, the data generated by the focus groups provide insights into “the process of constructing and negotiating shared meaning, using people’s natural vocabulary” from a comparative perspective (Gamson 1992, p. 17). As a qualitative procedure, focus groups cannot claim to rival public opinion studies in producing representative results that could easily be generalized. They do, however, provide two kinds of added value: First, they make it possible to assess the saliency of various aspects of European integration in a setting that is only loosely structured by the researcher and gives more room to the issues raised by the participants themselves; and second, they allow for an inductive study of the participants’ EU-related arguments and evaluations which can pay close attention to the language that is employed and the interactive dynamics that unfold (Hurrelmann et al. 2015: 48).

This volume demonstrates the importance of researching distinct national contexts comparatively to better understand how the EU integration is perceived away from the immediate geographies of the EU “centre”. There are at least three significant contributions of this endeavour. First, the main impact of the focus group meetings will be in terms of enhancing knowledge on how the EU is seen by the young citizens in seven countries, which would in the long run contribute to the promotion of the EU integration in Europe and elsewhere. The dire conditions of the multiple crises elaborated above as well as the challenges identified during the focus group interviews need to be taken into consideration which is crucial for the future of the EU integration. Secondly, the research at hand aims to provide agency to the so-called “periphery”, which would then go beyond being the mere recipient of what is dictated by the “centre”. There is a long-standing tension in the literature over “who speaks for Europe,” a question originally posed by Henry Kissinger. However, the question of who Europe is speaking to is equally crucial. Thirdly, the EU has consistently seen debates on the merits and potential pitfalls of a more coordinated approach to foreign and security policy, with some authors— such as Jan Zielonka—calling for greater polyphony in how the EU speaks with others (Zielonka 2014). During the recent years, the notion of “differentiated integration” had been widely debated which capsulates “the multiple forms of European integration” (Andersen and Sitter 2006: 4) as it reflects the particularities of a system that allows for a variety of forms of cooperation and/or integration (Turhan 2017: 1). If the future of the EU integration will increasingly be characterised by differentiated integration, what Chaban et al. call “smart differentiation” of EU foreign policy may make sense in particular regions, the post-Soviet space and the Western Balkans being two of them (Chaban et al. 2021: 300) and the EU should develop a more context-sensitive communication strategy in these regions.

Following the introduction by Alpan and Hoti, Chapter “Romania’s Paradox”: Youth Perceptions of EU’s Identity and Legitimacy During Poly-crisis” by Ionita, Petre and Ispas shed light to the question of how European values are transmitted to and internalized by young people, susceptible to Eurosceptic tendencies, facilitated by the mainstream media and a poorly conducted communication from national authorities in Romania, a country which one of the most pro-EU member states. The perception of the EU integration among the young population in Kosovo is also the focus of Chapter “Reflections on Emerging Perspectives: Kosovan Youth Narratives and their Path toward EU Integration” by Hoti and Thaci. The authors focus on how the EU integration shapes the role of students and young people who have strong opinions on the current situation and future of their nation regarding the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo as well as the relations between the EU and their country. Luli in Chapter “Albanian Youth Perceptions on the EU Accession Path—Amidst Expectations and Discontent: Exploring the Breeding Ground of Euro (Scepticism)” focuses on the reasons driving growing Euroscepticism and latest sources of discontent and pessimism among youth in Albania. Her analysis aims to sketch the experiences and opinions of the younger generation as well as the sources of their insecurities and resentment, and their prediction on the continuous EU integration process with regard to their own country. Chapter “A Dream or a Dread? Perceptions of the North Macedonian Youth on European Integration” scrutinises the approaches to the European integration among students in North Macedonia with a particular focus on the notion of “state capture” in the country. Chapter “Contesting or Supporting? EU Integration Project and Georgian Youth” goes to the heart of the construction of the European identity by the Georgian youth. Gvalia is tackling with this query mainly by questioning whether the EU integration is viewed by the young population in Georgia as the guarantee of the country’s political, economic and social modernization especially after the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Chapter “Exploring Turkish Youth Perceptions of the European Project: A Periphery Perspective” is devoted to the Turkish case, where Bedir and Şenyuva assess how young informed citizens in Türkiye evaluate the different aspects of the EU integration. They present the conceptual framework by revisiting the literature on being the “periphery” of the EU integration as well as sketching out the economic, security and political dimensions of the EU perceptions of young population in a country whose prolonged relation with the EU is full of ebbs and flows. Last, but not least, Alpan and Hoti in Chapter “Conclusion: The Periphery’s Agency and Recommendations for the EU’s Approach to the Young Population in the Periphery” will elaborate on how the perceptions in the “periphery” by the young population is vital for the future of the EU integration. This concluding chapter also brings together the research results from the case studies of the volume as well as recommendations for the policy-makers who have a say on the future of the European project.