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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Introduction

verfasst von : Adrián Albala, Josep Maria Reniu

Erschienen in: Coalition Politics and Federalism

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The aim of this book is not to provide an updated theory on federalism, or on political behaviour in federal polities as a whole. We also do not seek to challenge the existing literature of coalition theories as applied to political science. Nonetheless, our goal in this volume is far from unambitious and irrelevant. We focus, rather, on a more prosaic, yet still original, objective.

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Nächstes Kapitel The Missing Piece: Introducing the 4th Generation of Coalition Theories

Subnational units have been called ‘states’, ‘provinces’, ‘landers’, ‘departments’, among other terms.

Negative values are usually expressed as a shared rejection of a third political actor.

An example of this is the second May administration in the UK, in which the DUP brings its support without sharing executive responsibility.

Ministers ‘d’ouverture’ (of openness) was a term used under Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency in France, which was marked by the co-optation of various personalities in the Socialist Party and civil society without the backing of their parties. We do not exclude every cabinet that includes independent ministers: instead, we simply not consider independents to be distinct partisan ‘coalition partners’. Another example of this was Brazil’s Collor de Mello cabinet (1990–1992).

There is a third literature in political science that uses the notion of congruence, which is inspired by George Tsebelis’s (2002) works on nested games. In this literature, congruence/incongruence between sources of power (mostly among the two houses of congresses) is used as an indicator of the presence of veto players.

One interesting consideration is that this kind of exceptional coalition is more likely to occur under parliamentary regimes than presidential or semi-presidential ones due to the ‘cleaving effect’ of presidential elections (Albala 2016). Also, the lack of studies in a comparative perspective about this topic is quite surprising.

Along with fiscal autonomy.

Recently, the literature has registered an increase in the production of studies dealing with subnational politics under Latin American presidential regimes (Suárez-Cao and Freidenberg 2013; Gibson and Suarez-Cao 2010; Eaton 2008; Faletti 2010; Suarez-Cao et al. 2017). Most of these studies, however, have only dealt indirectly (at best) with the issue of coalition politics, with the exception of Olmeda and Suarez-Cao (2017).

Indeed, Belgium is composed of three units (Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels). The party system is identical in the Walloon and Flemish regions, and the federal cabinet is required to nominate parties from both sides to form a government. Finally, elections are not national but regional. This reduces parties’ ability to form vertical coalitions (for more details, see Deschouwer 2009).

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Titel: Introduction
verfasst von: Adrián Albala
Josep Maria Reniu
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Coalition Politics and Federalism
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75099-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-75100-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75100-9_1