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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Introduction

verfasst von : Maksym Ivanyna, Alex Mourmouras, Peter Rangazas

Erschienen in: The Macroeconomics of Corruption

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

It is clear that the government is needed to lay the foundation for economic development. Development cannot occur without a public infrastructure that establishes and facilitates markets via the provision of national defense, a transportation system, legal protection of private property and marketable ideas, education and basic research, and a stable currency. In the early stages of development, governments also establish the first banks and corporations, often in partnership with private owners. The fundamental issue of public sector economics is how to constrain the government to provide these goods and services in a way that benefits most citizens rather than the private interests of politicians and the relatively small groups of their most important supporters.

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Nächstes Kapitel Two-Period Model of Government Investment Government investments

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Titel: Introduction
verfasst von: Maksym Ivanyna
Alex Mourmouras
Peter Rangazas
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Macroeconomics of Corruption
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-67556-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-67557-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67557-8_1