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Journal of Business Ethics

Erschienen in:

26.09.2014

Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?

verfasst von: Lars Helge Haß, Sofia Johan, Denis Schweizer

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Ausgabe 4/2016

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between performance persistence and corporate governance (as proxied for by board characteristics and shareholder structure). We document systematic differences in performance persistence across listed companies in China during 2001–2011, and empirically demonstrate that firms with better corporate governance show higher performance persistence. The results are robust over both the short and long terms. We also find that performance persistence is an important factor in refinancing, and it can lower companies’ costs of borrowing. Overall, our findings offer important implications for business ethics, as we demonstrate how corporate governance can lower companies’ costs of debt.

Vorheriger Artikel Ownership Structure and Insider Trading: Evidence from China

Nächster Artikel Donate Money, but Whose? An Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights, Agency Problems, and Corporate Philanthropy in China

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The 1993 Corporate Law in China has been amended three times (in 1999, 2004, and 2005), strengthening supervisory board functions, such as monitoring, each time. It is scheduled to be amended again in 2014 (see Ding et al. 2010, for more details). To accommodate these changes, we include fixed effects by year in the multivariate regressions.

We exclude firms with negative book equity and firms with industry code 0001 (financial firms).

Note that, by including year fixed effects in our regressions, we implicitly control for changes in the risk-free rate.

The tables are available from the authors upon request.

These tables are also available from the authors upon request.

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Titel: Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?
verfasst von: Lars Helge Haß
Sofia Johan
Denis Schweizer
Publikationsdatum: 26.09.2014
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe 4/2016
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2385-3

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