We present the results of the survey in the order of the research questions.
3.1 First research question: do any significant differences exist between the proportion of Hungarian students and the proportion of Italian students who identify with liberal democratic values?
The results reported in Table
2, show that the Hungarian students marked answers corresponding to liberal democratic values 6.78 times, on average, while the Italian students chose such answers 7.75 times on average. Hungarian students chose both right-wing and left-wing populist answers more frequently than their Italian counterparts did. The frequency of answers indicating self-interested motives was minimal in both countries. In both countries, left-wing populist replies were more frequent than right-wing populist replies.
Table 2
Frequencies of the target variables.
Source: Authors’ own compilation
Mean (HU) | 6.78 | 1.16 | 1.85 | 0.19 | 4.98 | 2.17 | 7.15 |
Mean (IT) | 7.75 | 0.70 | 1.28 | 0.25 | 5.45 | 1.50 | 6.96 |
Median (HU) | 7 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 7 |
Median (IT) | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 7 |
Min (HU) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Min (IT) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
Max (HU) | 10 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 10 |
Max (IT) | 10 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 10 |
Table 3
Parameter estimates of the ordered logit model on liberal democratic values (TV-LIBDEM).
Source: Authors’ own calculation
Threshold | [TV-LIBDEM = 1]a | − 4.662 | 1.468 | 10.079 | 1 | 0.001 | − 7.540 | − 1.784 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 2] | − 3.153 | 1.378 | 5.235 | 1 | 0.022 | − 5.854 | − 0.452 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 3] | − 2.488 | 1.365 | 3.323 | 1 | 0.068 | − 5.164 | 0.187 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 4] | − 1.931 | 1.359 | 2.019 | 1 | 0.155 | − 4.595 | 0.733 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 5] | − 1.485 | 1.356 | 1.199 | 1 | 0.274 | − 4.143 | 1.173 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 6] | − 0.885 | 1.354 | 0.428 | 1 | 0.513 | − 3.539 | 1.768 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 7] | − 0.187 | 1.353 | 0.019 | 1 | 0.890 | − 2.839 | 2.465 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 8] | 0.742 | 1.354 | 0.301 | 1 | 0.584 | − 1.911 | 3.396 |
[TV-LIBDEM = 9] | 1.894 | 1.360 | 1.940 | 1 | 0.164 | − 0.771 | 4.559 |
Location | Citizenship_ITb | 0.800 | 0.234 | 11.680 | 1 | 0.001 | 0.341 | 1.260 |
Agec | − 0.19 | 0.061 | 0.098 | 1 | 0.754 | − 0.139 | 0.101 |
Gender_Fd | 0.26 | 0.221 | 0.014 | 1 | 0.906 | − 0.407 | 0.459 |
Although Hungary already is seen as an autocracy
7 (Lührmann et al.
2020; Kornai
2016; Repucci
2020), many respondents chose statements corresponding to liberal democratic values.
We estimated ordered logit models to determine whether or not the distributions of the two groups (Hungarian and Italian students) regarding the target variables were identical (Table
3).
We found that, compared with Hungarian students, Italian students are more likely to identify with liberal democratic values (1% significance level). We found no statistically significant difference between age groups and genders when controlling for the other variables.
Looking at Table
4, we can conclude that,
compared with Hungarian students, Italian students are less likely to be open to right-wing populist values. The result is statistically significant at the 5% level. No statistically significant differences can be seen between age groups or genders (controlling for all other variables).
Table 4
Parameter estimates of the ordered logit model on right-wing populist values (TV-RWP).
Source: Authors’ own calculation
Threshold | [TV-RWP = 0] | 1.003 | 1.441 | 0.485 | 1 | 0.486 | − 1.820 | 3.827 |
[TV-RWP = 1] | 2.146 | 1.446 | 2.205 | 1 | 0.138 | − 0.687 | 4.980 |
[TV-RWP = 2] | 2.785 | 1.450 | 3.689 | 1 | 0.055 | − 0.57 | 5.627 |
[TV-RWP = 3] | 3.841 | 1.464 | 6.881 | 1 | 0.009 | 0.971 | 6.710 |
[TV-RWP = 4] | 4.707 | 1.492 | 9.959 | 1 | 0.002 | 1.784 | 7.631 |
Location | Citizenship_IT | − 0.512 | 0.249 | 4.218 | 1 | 0.040 | − 1.001 | − 0.023 |
Age | 0.055 | 0.065 | 0.724 | 1 | 0.395 | − 0.072 | 0.183 |
Gender_F | 0.066 | 0.237 | 0.079 | 1 | 0.779 | − 0.397 | 0.530 |
If we look at the target variable regarding left-wing populism, we can state that,
compared with Hungarian students, Italian students are less likely to be open to left-wing populist values (Table
5). The result is statistically significant at the 1% level. No statistically significant differences can be seen between age groups or genders (controlling for all other variables).
Table 5
Parameter estimates of the ordered logit model on left-wing populist values (TV-LWP).
Source: Authors’ own calculation
Threshold | [TV-LWP = 0] | − 1.512 | 1.386 | 1.191 | 1 | 0.275 | − 4.228 | 1.204 |
[TV-LWP = 1] | − 0.017 | 1.382 | 0.000 | 1 | 0.990 | − 2.725 | 2.692 |
[TV-LWP = 2] | 1.283 | 1.384 | 0.859 | 1 | 0.354 | − 1.430 | 3.997 |
[TV-LWP = 3] | 2.469 | 1.395 | 3.135 | 1 | 0.077 | − 0.264 | 5.203 |
[TV-LWP = 4] | 3.677 | 1.429 | 6.621 | 1 | 0.010 | 0.876 | 6.478 |
[TV-LWP = 5] | 4.953 | 1.549 | 10.224 | 1 | 0.001 | 1.917 | 7.988 |
Location | Citizenship_IT | − 0.866 | 0.240 | 13.011 | 1 | 0.000 | − 1.337 | − 0.395 |
Age | 0.014 | 0.063 | 0.052 | 1 | 0.820 | − 0.108 | 0.137 |
Gender_F | − 0.016 | 0.226 | 0.005 | 1 | 0.942 | − 0.459 | 0.426 |
Moreover,
compared with Hungarian students, Italian students are less likely to be consistent in rejecting liberal democratic values (statistically significant at the 1% level).
8
We also performed the Mann–Whitney U-test to reinforce the robustness of our findings. The result was exactly the same as with ordered logit models, with a small size effect.
9 Based on those results, we can state that regarding the target variables with statistical significance, the Italian and Hungarian groups do not have similar distributions. To observe the directions of the between-group differences, we looked at the mean ranks of the test output. Looking at the target variable of identifying with liberal democratic values, the mean rank of Italian students dominates the Hungarian students’ rankings stochastically, which means that they identified with liberal values more widely than Hungarian students did. For the target variables of openness towards right-wing and left-wing populist values, the mean ranks of Hungarian students is higher, which means that they identified with these values more widely than Italian students did.
10
Based on the estimates, we reject the null hypothesis of the first research question. The Italian and Hungarian students’ attitudes towards liberal democratic values are not identical. Italian students adhered more to liberal democracy, while Hungarians were more open to left-wing and right-wing populism.
According to our results, 14.6% of the Italian students and 11.8% of the Hungarian students chose answers indicating that they considered liberal democratic values to be protected. No students in our sample gave absolutely zero answers corresponding to liberal democratic values. A total of 65.1% of the Italian students and 44.9% of the Hungarian students chose eight or more answers indicating that liberal values are protected values.
11 Those subjects are voters who would never vote for parties that jeopardize liberal democracy. Populist, autocratic parties would not benefit from catering to that segment of the electorate; they would instead identify them as enemies.
Only 2.9% of the Italian students and 5.9% of the Hungarian students gave answers corresponding to liberal democratic values only one or two times. Those individuals would support right-wing or left-wing populist parties and would become the core supporters of a strongman seeking to establish an autocracy.
32% of the Italian students and 49.1% of the Hungarian students chose answers corresponding to liberal democratic values three to seven times. They are voters for whom parties would fight to win over, and they ultimately would decide whether a strongman could stabilize his power or not.
In addition to conducting an analysis based on our questionnaire, which is a snapshot of the current situation, we compared our results with the European Social Survey’s (ESS) dataset to check the dynamics of the change in liberal democratic values. Italy participated in the ESS in 2002, 2004, 2012, 2016 and 2018. The Hungarian dataset was collected during all nine survey rounds between 2002 and 2018. The ESS did not measure all of the values we included in our survey.
12 However, some relevant questions were asked in 2002, 2012 and 2018.
One of them was a statement related to whether “gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish”, with which we can measure civil rights values (minority rights, equal opportunity) (Table
6).
Table 6
Gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish.
Source European Social Survey datasets: ESS1-2002, ed.6.6, ESS6-2012, ed.2.4, ESS9-2018, ed.2.0 (Note: The European Social Survey datasets can be downloaded from:
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)
Hungary | | | | |
| Strongly agree and agree | 48.1 | 46.2 | 34.4 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 22.3 | 25.7 | 28.4 |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 29.6 | 28.1 | 37.2 |
Italy | | | | |
| Strongly agree and agree | 73.5 | 73.3 | 71.4 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 14.4 | 15 | 15.1 |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 12 | 11.6 | 13.5 |
If we look at the differences between the two countries, it can be seen that the gap between Hungary and Italy has widened consistently. The Italian data have been more or less stable; however, the tolerance or acceptance of exclusion has been growing rapidly in Hungary since 2012.
13 The picture seen here corresponds with the results of our survey.
Another statement with which we measured liberal democratic values is related to immigration.
14 Table
7 measures attitudes towards human rights.
Table 7
Attitudes towards immigrants of different races/ethnic groups.
Source: European Social Survey datasets: ESS1-2002, ed.6.6, ESS6-2012, ed.2.4, ESS9-2018, ed.2.0
Hungary | | | | |
| We should allow many or some to come and live here | 13.8 | 25.4 | 15.5 |
| We should allow a few | 63.3 | 46.2 | 41.9 |
| We should allow none | 22.9 | 28.5 | 42.5 |
Italy | | | | |
| We should allow many or some to come and live here | 64.1 | 64.5 | 49.4 |
| We should allow a few | 25.9 | 23 | 34.9 |
| We should allow none | 9.9 | 12.5 | 15.8 |
Table 8
Distribution of Italian and Hungarian students’ answers regarding ten liberal democratic values (in %).
Source: Authors’ own compilation
Right to assembly (IT) | 86 | 6 | 3 | 5 |
Right to assembly (HUN) | 73 | 12 | 12 | 2 |
Freedom of speech (IT) | 87 | 6 | 7 | 0 |
Freedom of speech (HUN) | 85 | 9 | 5 | 1 |
Equality of opportunity (IT) | 92 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
Equality of opportunity (HUN) | 83 | 14 | 2 | 1 |
Protection of minority rights (IT) | 87 | 5 | 6 | 2 |
Protection of minority rights (HUN) | 77 | 4 | 17 | 2 |
Human rights (IT) | 81 | 11 | 1 | 8 |
Human rights (HUN) | 53 | 12 | 28 | 8 |
Rule of law (IT) | 54 | 21 | 20 | 4 |
Rule of law (HUN) | 66 | 14 | 18 | 2 |
Freedom of religion (IT) | 96 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
Freedom of religion (HUN) | 83 | 7 | 9 | 1 |
Property rights (IT) | 56 | 26 | 17 | 1 |
Property rights (HUN) | 57 | 29 | 13 | 1 |
Equal voting rights (IT) | 56 | 38 | 3 | 3 |
Equal voting rights (HUN) | 28 | 72 | 0 | 0 |
Separation of power (IT) | 79 | 12 | 9 | 1 |
Separation of power (HUN) | 74 | 13 | 11 | 2 |
Table 9
The ratio of respondents’ choices between liberal democratic values (LD), right-wing populism (RWP), left-wing populism (LWP) and self-interest seeking (SI) in the group of students who selected three to seven statements corresponding to liberal democratic values.
Source: Authors’ own calculation
Freedom of assembly, association and demonstration | 59.0 | 19.3 | 18.1 | 3.6 | 72.7 | 9.1 | 6.1 | 12.1 |
Human rights | 27.7 | 42.2 | 20.5 | 9.6 | 63.6 | 0.0 | 21.2 | 15.2 |
Freedom of religion | 75.9 | 13.3 | 10.8 | 0.0 | 90.9 | 6.1 | 3.0 | 0.0 |
Protection of minority rights | 60.2 | 30.1 | 7,2 | 2.4 | 75.8 | 9.1 | 12.1 | 3.0 |
Equality of opportunity and protection against discrimination | 75.9 | 2.4 | 20.5 | 1.2 | 84.9 | 9.1 | 6.1 | 0.0 |
Universal and equal suffrage in elections | 19.3 | 0.0 | 80.7 | 0.0 | 30.3 | 9.1 | 60.6 | 0.0 |
The table shows that the difference between the numbers of Hungarian and Italian citizens who would accept letting many or some immigrants enter the country has declined, while the difference between Hungarians and Italians who would not let any immigrants enter the country has increased. The difference between the countries is substantial: 2.87 times more Hungarians than Italians would prefer to stop all immigrants from entering their country. Those numbers also are in line with our results and make the latter more robust.
Based on our results, we claim that students from both countries are more likely to support liberal democratic values than to support nationalistic, ethno-cultural populist values or economic populist values, even if the distributions of the two groups differ significantly. However, we cannot say that each of the liberal democratic values had the same support in both countries. That is our second research question.
3.2 Second research question: do Hungarian and Italian students differ in terms of which liberal democratic values they consider to be protected?
Pearson’s chi-squared test helps to answer that question. That test asks whether a statistically significant difference exists between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies in one or more categories of a contingency table. To determine the size of the effect of the chi-square independence test, we adopted Cramér’s V.
15We find a statistically significant difference between Italian and Hungarian students:-
At a significance level of 1% for the right to assemble and associate, human rights, universal and equal voting rights;
-
at a significance level of 5% for equality of opportunity and protection against discrimination, freedom of religion; and
-
at a significance level of 10% for the protection of minority rights.
No statistically significant differences are found regarding freedom of speech and opinion, property rights, rule of law, or separation of power.
16
When we looked at the strength of the association of values and citizenship, we found strong associations (Cramér’s V ≥ 0.15) for all values of liberal democracy, which were statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. Nevertheless, we found very strong associations for human rights (Cramér’s V was 0.354) and for universal and equal voting rights (Cramér’s V was 0.364). The results for universal and equal voting rights are particularly interesting because they are not only one of the core elements of liberal democracy but also essential for procedural democracy.
A smaller proportion of the Hungarian respondents than Italian respondents considered liberal democratic values to be protected. The Hungarians were proportionally more open to both left-wing and right-wing populism regarding all the values except for the protection of property rights and the rule of law. The differences are largest for the value of human rights, for which 27.81% of the Hungarian respondents gave a right-wing populist answer and only 0.97% of the Italian respondents did so, and for universal and equal voting rights, for which 72.19% of the Hungarian students chose a left-wing populist answer and only 37.86% of the Italian students did so. It is worth noting that the majority of the Hungarian students also identified with liberal democratic values except in relation to universal and equal voting rights (Table
8).
17
Pearson's chi-squared test and our descriptive statistical analyses
18 allow us to conclude that Italian students are more likely to consider the following values to be protected: the right to assemble and associate, equality of opportunity and protection against discrimination, human rights, the protection of minority rights, freedom of religion, and universal and equal voting rights. We found no significant differences between the Italian and Hungarian respondents regarding the values of freedom of speech and opinion, the rule of law, the separation of power, and property rights.
19
We therefore reject the null hypothesis of the second research question: a significant difference between Hungarian and Italian students exists with respect to the liberal democratic values they consider to be protected. We found that Italian students are more consistent in considering liberal democratic values to be protected values, while Hungarian students are more consistent in rejecting such values. One of the reasons for that difference could be that Italian students are more conscious of protecting those values than Hungarians are, while Hungarian students are more conscious of rejecting liberal democratic values.
3.3 Third research question: in which country would it be easier to establish a sustainable autocracy, Hungary or Italy?
To answer our third research question, we checked whether the demand from Hungarian and Italian students is sufficient to construct a stable autocracy in Hungary or Italy.
20 The members of society who are fully committed to liberal democratic values are not the focus of a strongman, since they would never vote for him. The group of voters who fully reject liberal democracy likewise does not attract too much attention, since they would never turn to parties that advocate liberal democracy. The autocrat therefore needs to focus on voters whose preferences for liberal democratic values are unstable. If that uncommitted group of voters comprises a large fraction of the electorate, then the autocrat has a good chance of obtaining power and holding onto it.
Examining our survey results, we can conclude that in both countries, a demand for an autocratic, populist strongman is evident. However, in Italy, the number of likely autocrat supporters plus those who have unstable value systems regarding liberal democracy make up a rather small portion of the students surveyed, while in Hungary, the same group represents a majority or at least a significant proportion of the students surveyed.
21 It also is clear from the results of the survey that the Hungarian students would not support a dictatorship in Hungary, since most of them at least partially adhere to liberal democratic values. The system primarily is internally constrained; external constraints are collateral (Bozóki and Hegedűs
2018).
The literature also suggests that right-wing populism is more fertile ground than left-wing populism for autocratic regimes (Halmai
2019).
22 As indicated, to answer our research question, we looked in depth at the composition of the group of students from our sample who did not indicate a clear preference for liberal democratic values.
23 We found that a larger proportion of Hungarian students systematically chose right-wing populist statements than did their Italian counterparts (Table
9).
The most striking difference is the case of the value attached to human rights; 42.2% of the Hungarians agreed with the right-wing populist statement, whereas none of the Italians did so. Similarly, regarding the protection of minority rights, 30.1% of the Hungarian respondents selected the right-wing populist statement, while only 9.1% of the Italian students marked the same. It also is noteworthy that in both countries, strong reservations about giving voting rights to undereducated people are observed.
Based on our analyses, we argue that the value systems that people hold in Hungary create conditions that are conducive to establishing a sustainable autocracy, given that (1) a large proportion of the Hungarian respondents did not consider liberal democratic values to be protected and (2) a considerable proportion of the Hungarian respondents who did not demonstrate a stable preference for liberal democratic values also demonstrated a tendency towards right-wing populism, especially regarding human rights and the protection of minority rights. We likewise can assert that the value systems held by Italian people do not create conditions conducive to establishing a sustainable autocracy.
Therefore, based on our survey, we reject the third research question’s null hypothesis and state that it would be easier to establish a sustainable autocracy in Hungary than in Italy.