6. Islam, Terrorism, and Revolution in Russia

I have offered a detailed treatment of Primakov’s distinction between traditional and extremist Islam, and some of its consequences in the Russian context, in the previous chapters.

Recently, Sagramoso and Yarlykapov (2013) have argued that, in fact, in the North Caucasus the official distinction of traditional Islam has been superseded. In their view, this is proved by moderate Salafi groups, who do not belong to Russia’s traditional Muslim communities, joining Russian official Islamic institutions. It seems to me, rather, that the definition of traditional Islam, which has never been very specific in the first place, has simply been extended to embrace all those forms of Islam that accept the Russian polity and, thus, cease to be a threat.

For a thorough discussion of traditional Islam and of the doctrinal and institutional relations of Muslims in post-Soviet Russia with the ummah, please refer to Chapters 4 and 5 of this book.

Comparisons of present Russian behaviors and strategies with those of the Soviet and, especially, imperial times have been conducted by many authors. For example, Legvold (2007) offers a good selection of some of the most convincing perspectives based on Russian historical patterns or characteristics. Observers increasingly ague that there is a strong continuity with at least a core set of imperial and Soviet themes, such as the search for a great power status, the importance of territorial integrity, and the patronizing of the “near-abroad” (former Soviet republics and neighboring countries).

Indeed, Dostoevsky is considered a key figure to understand the political and human motives of Russian terrorists of the Empire. Both his works and his characters have been read, alternatively, as keen analytical studies or inspirational figures. The literary critic Nora Straus (2006) finds many similarities in the personality traits and mutual social relations of Dostoyevsky’s conspirators from his novel Demons and al-Qaeda male-dominated structure.

It is interesting to note that, while most authors acknowledge the unsurpassed value of the Italian scholar Franco Venturi’s work on Russian populism and terrorism, he himself warns against the diffused tendency to interpret such movements through literature: “There is very little to learn from Dostoevsky for those who want to understand Nechaev” (Venturi 1952, Vol. 1: xiv, translation mine). Serghey Nechaev, a ruthless terrorist, is the symbol of nineteenth-century Russian terrorism and a morbid, almost devilish, figure in Russian imagery.

“The Decembrists (Russian Dekabristy) [were] the Russian revolutionaries who led an unsuccessful uprising on December 14 (December 26, New Style), 1825, and through their martyrdom provided a source of inspiration to succeeding generations of Russian dissidents. The Decembrists were primarily members of the upper classes who had military backgrounds. [T]aking advantage of the brief but confusing interregnum following the death of Tsar Alexander I, they staged an uprising, convincing some of the troops in St. Petersburg to refuse to take a loyalty oath to Nicholas I and to demand instead the accession of his brother Constantine. The rebellion, however, was poorly organized and easily suppressed. […] An extensive investigation in which Nicholas personally participated ensued; it resulted in the trial of 289 Decembrists, the execution of five of them […] the imprisonment of 31, and the banishment of the rest to Siberia” (adapted from Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Decembrist,” accessed August 27, 2014, http://​www.​britannica.​com/​Ebchecked/​topic/​155016/​Decembrist). The case shocked the Russian society– and many foreigners – for the severity of the punishments. Additionally, the executions were conducted in semisecrecy, which contributed to the creation of a “mythical” aura around the event.

See Chapter 5 for a longer discussion on this topic.

Under Putin’s and Medvedev’s presidencies, corruption, and the fight against it, has become a central theme in government discourse concerning all Russia. It is, therefore, a narrative that associates, rather than separates, the North Caucasus to the rest of the country, although here it is considered particularly vicious.

The growth of right-wing extremism has been confirmed by several observers. Allegations of its closeness to institutions such as the Orthodox Church and Putin’s political party have also been suggested. However, the central authorities officially condemn right-wing-inspired violent acts as well (see also Chapter 4).

Generalizations of the enemy into an us-versus-them, simplified categorization are not uncommon in combat operations. For example, in the account of his experience in the Russian special forces in Chechnya, the Ukrainian-Siberian writer (who uses Italian as his literary language) Nicolai Lilin explains that all enemies– independently of their nationality or ethnicity – were called “Arabs” by the Russian soldiers (Lilin 2010).

An ethnic Chechen born in Grozny, Sultygov has been Russian President’s Special Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya from July 2002 to January 2004. Later, he joined Putin’s political party, Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia), were he has held various posts. Today, he is the founder and editor-in-chief of the online newspaper Vestnik rossiiskoi natsii (Messenger of the Russian nation).

Technically, they are incorporated into the Ministry of Interiors of the Russian Federation.

The Basmachi revolution, or Basmachi movement, was a rebellious movement of Muslims in Central Asia against the Russian and, especially, the Soviet regimes, active mainly between 1916 and 1924. Their aims are generally interpreted by the scholarship to be anticolonialist and nationalist, even if the ethnic heterogeneity of the movement made it difficult for its leaders to elaborate a united vision.

Such as polygamy and Islamic education in schools. Silant’ev’s article seems to depict mostly the early years of post-Soviet Russia, when the institutional control of Moscow and Islamic organizations over the Muslim communities was much weaker than today.

See Chapters 2 and 3.

A good place to start for a review of the arguments in favor and against the idea of a post-Soviet Russian Empire is Trenin 2001.

Dugin is an influential philosopher and thinker – in his own words, “the discoverer of Geopolitics [as a doctrine] under Soviet Communist Russia” (Dugin 2013). Starting from the study of Mackinder’s theory of heartland, Dugin, by his own admission, elaborated its implications for the Soviet Union, and later for Russia. According to this theory, by its nature Russia was the “pivot” of the world order (Dugin 2013, 2007, 1997). As a result, Dugin conceptualized the Neo-Eurasianist intellectual and political movement, especially active on the Russian scene of the 1990s (see also Chapter 2 and related bibliography). Later, Dugin became an unofficial advisor to Vladimir Putin, and now he is a popular professor of geopolitics at Moscow State University.

Dzhemal’ (whose father is Azeri), by his own admission, visits Iran regularly and is familiar with the political situation there, and so his loyalty to Russia is denounced as at least ambiguous by his political opponents (NTV 2013; Solov’ev 2011).

In the course of 2014, the availability of Poistine.ru has changed from time to time. At the time of last check, on June 6, 2016, the website had been shut. Most probably, it is due to the opening of the new website, Kontrudar, although the reasons for the move of location are not known to me.

An American political scientist, Francis Fukuyama argued that the dialectical struggle between liberalism and communism was definitively resolved with the failure of the latter, which would mark the triumph of liberalism and democracy as sole models of government. He made his argument first in the essay “The End of History?”, and then in the book The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama 1989 and 1992, respectively), both extremely popular and influential. Dzhemal’ is by far not the only critic of Fukuyama’s theory, which was contested both outside of and within the liberal camp.

Qur’anic term for Judaism and Christianity, whose text of reference is the Bible (“the Book”).

A Jew from an intellectual family, Vladimir Solov’ev is an equally popular, strong public figure. He authoritatively moderates several programs on major TV channels, in which he tackles the most pressing domestic and foreign issues.

It is noteworthy that one of the fundamental accusations against Ali Shar’iati was to be a “Marxist”.

In 2013, Umland was not sure about the state of activity of the Florian Geyer. In the summer of 2014, its website was active and new videos of Dzhemal’s lectures under the organization’s flag were uploaded. In November 2014, the website homepage announced its closure due to unpaid hosting rights to the internet provider. Later, however, the website was restored and it is now (April 2017) up and running.

Dzhemal’s article contested the affirmation of Valerii Zor’kin, Head of the Russian Constitutional Court, who had praised the practice of slavery as having been beneficial for Russia’s development in history (Zor’kin 2014). In particular, it would have provided security to the imperial subjects (including the slaves). Dzhemal’ (Islamnews 2014) quotes a “booklet” by Limonov in which he describes the miserable conditions of aluminum workers in the “oligarch-capitalist epoch”.

Today, Eduard Limonov is still a public figure, although his direct ascendance is on a very small audience. Nevertheless, throughout his life and political path, he has come into contact with much of the ultra-nationalist guard – with mutual influence and, at times, contrasts. His biography by Emmanuel Carrère (2012), although not always reliable on single events, provides a good introduction to the Russian nationalist scene, and shows the network of relations among many of its exponents, from Dugin, to Dzhemal’, to Prokhanov, to the writer and journalist (also for Anna Politkovskaya’s Novaya Gazeta) journalist Zakhar Prilepin. Prilepin is a member of Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party and an admirer of Prokhanov as a writer. He has published a collection of essays by various Russian intellectuals, including Prokhanov, about their idea of Russian “nation” (Prilepin 2009).

In a brief section of a broader essay, Evgueni Moroz (2005: 128–134) has also clearly exposed Dzhemal’’s proximity to fascist thought and to Russian ultra-nationalism. Moroz insightfully suggests that Dzhemal’s project is to unify “all possible enemies of Western democracies”, including fascists, communists, Orthodox nationalists, and “new pagans”. Moroz also acknowledges Dzhemal’s admiration for Khomeini. However, Moroz attributes it merely to Dzhemal’s participation to the Khartoum Conference and his support of militant Islam and Islamic terrorists, and not to a particular ideological or even strategic affinity with Iran. Moroz’s short account also lacks any reference, in Dzhemal’s thought, to the preservation of Russia’s greatness and to Russian messianism. Dzhemal’ is essentially presented as an associate of enemies of the state (Chechen terrorists, Muslim extremists) that attack the Russian regime from outside, and not so much as an ideolog who intends to change it from within (albeit through radical measures).