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Social Choice and Welfare OnlineFirst articles

27.01.2023 | Original Paper

Mechanism design with model specification

We consider a setting in which additional parameters that determine preference characteristics are unknown. The mechanism designer specifies a model for possible type distributions and utility functions. We consider mechanisms that are uniformly …

verfasst von:
Pathikrit Basu

25.01.2023 | Original Paper

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures

We investigate a specific type of group manipulation in two-tier elections, which involves pairs of voters agreeing to exchange their votes. Two-tier elections are modeled as a two-stage choice procedure. In the first stage, voters are distributed …

verfasst von:
Hayrullah Dindar, Jean Lainé

Open Access 30.12.2022 | Original Paper

Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members

We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect …

verfasst von:
Daniel Cardona, Jenny De Freitas, Antoni Rubí-Barceló

27.12.2022 | Original Paper

Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads

We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing common harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact in a public bad setting and must choose ex ante how much to contribute in order to …

verfasst von:
Julien Jacob, Eve-Angéline Lambert, Mathieu Lefebvre, Sarah Van Driessche

26.12.2022 | Original Paper

Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton

An abstract decision problem is an ordered pair where the first component is a nonempty and finite set of alternatives and the second component is an irreflexive relation on that set, called dominance relation. The admissible set of an abstract …

verfasst von:
Michele Gori

10.12.2022 | Original Paper

Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters’ preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter’s preference …

verfasst von:
Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Lang, Ali I. Ozkes, Stéphane Airiau

07.12.2022 | Original Paper

Foundations of utilitarianism under risk and variable population

Utilitarianism is the most prominent social welfare function in economics. We present three new axiomatic characterizations of utilitarian (that is, additively-separable) social welfare functions in a setting where there is risk over both …

verfasst von:
Dean Spears, Stéphane Zuber

30.11.2022 | Original Paper

On the political economy of economic integration

We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences for one good and two identical countries each with one firm initially. Citizens in each country vote either for economic integration (or openness) or for autarky. A decision for …

verfasst von:
Rabah Amir, Hend Ghazzai, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

28.11.2022 | Original Paper

Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river

Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose weaker versions of some of their axioms, and introduce …

verfasst von:
Wenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu, René van den Brink

25.10.2022 | Original Paper

Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions

We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in $$\mathbb {R}^2$$ R 2 . We show that for the …

verfasst von:
Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers

Open Access 17.10.2022 | Original Paper

A topological characterization of generalized stable sets

The purpose of this note is to provide a topological characterization for the existence of the generalized stable set introduced by Van Deemen (Soc Choice Welf 8:255–260, 1991) as a generalization of the Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.

verfasst von:
Athanasios Andrikopoulos

11.10.2022 | Original Paper

Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

In this study, we consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. It is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness …

verfasst von:
Fumiya Inoue, Hirofumi Yamamura

04.10.2022 | Original Paper

Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?

To investigate the effects of private communication on support for prosocial collective choices, we conduct a laboratory experiment in a public goods setting with a majority vote, manipulating whether participants can have private conversations …

verfasst von:
Kira Pronin, Jonathan Woon

30.09.2022 | Original Paper

The blocker postulates for measures of voting power

A proposed measure of voting power should satisfy two conditions to be plausible: first, it must be conceptually justified, capturing the intuitive meaning of what voting power is; second, it must satisfy reasonable postulates. This paper studies …

verfasst von:
Arash Abizadeh, Adrian Vetta

21.09.2022 | Original Paper

Universalization and altruism

The $$\kappa$$ κ -universalization of a symmetric game is the game in which each player considers that any other player chooses with probability $$\kappa$$ κ the same stategy as she. To any normal form game, we associate the symmetric two-stage …

verfasst von:
Jean-François Laslier

Open Access 15.09.2022 | Original Paper

Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty

This paper studies single-peaked domains where the designer is uncertain about the underlying alignment according to which the domain is single-peaked. The underlying alignment is common knowledge amongst agents, but preferences are private …

verfasst von:
Aroon Narayanan

12.09.2022 | Original Paper

On Sugden’s normative economics and the comparison of non-nested opportunity sets

In his book The Community of Advantage, Sugden proposes a form of normative economics that is almost free of the concept of preferences. Specifically, Sugden relies on the idea that everyone can accept the principle that more opportunities is …

verfasst von:
Bertrand Crettez

Open Access 10.09.2022 | Original Paper

Implementation in strong core by codes of rights

Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and …

verfasst von:
Michele Lombardi, Foivos Savva, Nikolas Zivanas

10.09.2022 | Original Paper

Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Our objective is to analyze the relationship between the Shapley value and the core of cooperative games with transferable utility. We first characterize balanced games, i.e., the set of games with a nonempty core, through geometric properties. We …

verfasst von:
Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada

06.09.2022 | Original Paper

The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem

A permit sharing problem is described by a list of countries, each of which owns a certain amount of emission permits and has a unique technology that requires permits to produce output. We consider the solutions of sharing the optimal global …

verfasst von:
Sang-Chul Suh, Yuntong Wang