We consider a setting in which additional parameters that determine preference characteristics are unknown. The mechanism designer specifies a model for possible type distributions and utility functions. We consider mechanisms that are uniformly …

We investigate a specific type of group manipulation in two-tier elections, which involves pairs of voters agreeing to exchange their votes. Two-tier elections are modeled as a two-stage choice procedure. In the first stage, voters are distributed …

We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect …

We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing common harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact in a public bad setting and must choose ex ante how much to contribute in order to …

An abstract decision problem is an ordered pair where the first component is a nonempty and finite set of alternatives and the second component is an irreflexive relation on that set, called dominance relation. The admissible set of an abstract …

We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters’ preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter’s preference …

Utilitarianism is the most prominent social welfare function in economics. We present three new axiomatic characterizations of utilitarian (that is, additively-separable) social welfare functions in a setting where there is risk over both …

We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences for one good and two identical countries each with one firm initially. Citizens in each country vote either for economic integration (or openness) or for autarky. A decision for …

Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose weaker versions of some of their axioms, and introduce …

We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in $$\mathbb {R}^2$$ R 2 . We show that for the …

The purpose of this note is to provide a topological characterization for the existence of the generalized stable set introduced by Van Deemen (Soc Choice Welf 8:255–260, 1991) as a generalization of the Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.

In this study, we consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. It is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness …

To investigate the effects of private communication on support for prosocial collective choices, we conduct a laboratory experiment in a public goods setting with a majority vote, manipulating whether participants can have private conversations …

A proposed measure of voting power should satisfy two conditions to be plausible: first, it must be conceptually justified, capturing the intuitive meaning of what voting power is; second, it must satisfy reasonable postulates. This paper studies …

The $$\kappa$$ κ -universalization of a symmetric game is the game in which each player considers that any other player chooses with probability $$\kappa$$ κ the same stategy as she. To any normal form game, we associate the symmetric two-stage …

This paper studies single-peaked domains where the designer is uncertain about the underlying alignment according to which the domain is single-peaked. The underlying alignment is common knowledge amongst agents, but preferences are private …

In his book The Community of Advantage, Sugden proposes a form of normative economics that is almost free of the concept of preferences. Specifically, Sugden relies on the idea that everyone can accept the principle that more opportunities is …

Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and …

Our objective is to analyze the relationship between the Shapley value and the core of cooperative games with transferable utility. We first characterize balanced games, i.e., the set of games with a nonempty core, through geometric properties. We …

A permit sharing problem is described by a list of countries, each of which owns a certain amount of emission permits and has a unique technology that requires permits to produce output. We consider the solutions of sharing the optimal global …