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Über dieses Buch

Just the Facts Ma'am is the only book written from an economics perspective that addresses one of the most remarkable cases of the reversal of corruption in the history of the United States - a case of corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

1. Introduction

Abstract
Chapter 1 presents a brief introduction to the purpose of the monograph and lays out the road-map for the rest of the book. The theme so developed is the following: development economics research on corruption has surged in recent years, in part because there is a growing consensus that the efficacy of foreign aid hinges on the honest management of funds. The overall theme of the literature has been to demonstrate the corrosive effect corruption has on enterprise and the political process. We present here a case study of successful institutional change in the 1950s Los Angeles Police Department in which Police Chief William H. Parker produced a record of effective reforms. Finally, we introduce that we intend to apply this history to modern day development economics.
R. Mark Isaac, Douglas A. Norton

2. A Brief History of Los Angeles: Conditions for Institutional Change

Abstract
In order to understand what William Parker accomplished and how he did it, it is necessary to lay some historical groundwork about the history of the settlement of Los Angeles, the parallel history of its neighbor to the South (San Diego), and, of course, a detailed discussion of the pattern of corruption in Los Angeles in general and in the Los Angeles Police Department in particular. This is the task of Chapter 2. In the first section, we look at the historical rivalries between Los Angeles and San Diego. As later developments made Los Angeles the more economically dominant of the two cities, it is important to recognize that, early on, San Diego was perceived to be the city best situated for growth in Southern California. In the second section, we look more closely at the growth of Los Angeles as a deliberately designed process of self-selection, appealing to Midwestern immigrants with a strong religious and ethical orientation. Finally, in the third section, we detail the specifics of Los Angeles police corruption during the 1920–1950 period, with particular emphasis on the years 1938–1949.
R. Mark Isaac, Douglas A. Norton

3. Corruption Reform, Equilibrium Selection, and the Institutional Entrepreneur

Abstract
This work is intended to be what has been called an “analytical narrative;” that is, it is a presentation of a specific, naturally occurring circumstance but with the analysis examined through the lens of a strategic economic model. The core of our model, corruption reform modeled as an equilibrium selection problem, is presented in the first two sections. We then describe in greater detail many of the policies William Parker implemented in his reform drive in the Los Angeles Police Department. We close the chapter by relating his policies back to our model.
R. Mark Isaac, Douglas A. Norton

4. Essential Components of the Success of Parker’s Reforms

Abstract
Because our core model is one of corruption reform as an equilibrium selection problem, it is important to analyze in detail the conditions that we believe helped William Parker, acting as what we call an “institutional entrepreneur,” to move from a high-corruption to a low-corruption equilibrium. In this chapter, we identify, and then explore in detail, four such conditions: internal contestability, external contestability, values, and media. These conditions are not discussed in abstract terms. Instead, for example, with regards to the first condition, we examine in detail the particulars of governance in California in the 1930s,’ 40s, and’ 50s that promoted internal governmental contestability. We attempt to provide the same level of specificity with regards to all of our four conditions.
R. Mark Isaac, Douglas A. Norton

5. Application to Economic Development

Abstract
In Chapter 5, we return to the important motivation for the entire monograph. Much of the debate over corruption reform in developing countries has been about failure stories. Our analytical narrative focuses instead upon an enormous success in corruption reform, and lessons to be drawn from it. But this example occurred years ago and far away, in both distance and potentially in economic and cultural conditions, from contemporary developing economies. We do not intend to suggest that Parker’s specific reforms as such should be the guide for current corruption reform efforts. Parker’s specific policies were applicable to and successful for Los Angeles in the 1950s. What we do believe is that the conditions that we identified in Chapter 4 that supported Parker’s efforts can be generalized across time and circumstances. Thus, we examine the importance of political contestability, a free media, and a focal system of values in the context of the current debate over corruption reform in developing countries. We close with an application to the novel “Charter Cities” movement.
R. Mark Isaac, Douglas A. Norton

Appendix

Abstract
In this Appendix we will add detail on the idea we introduced in the main body of this volume, namely, modeling corruption as a coordination game with two equilibria: corruption and honesty. We present a highly simplified example of a single stage game with two players: a citizen and a policeman. First, some notation:
R. Mark Isaac, Douglas A. Norton

Backmatter

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