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Erschienen in: Review of Accounting Studies 2/2011

01.06.2011

Legal systems and auditor independence

verfasst von: Hung-Chao Yu

Erschienen in: Review of Accounting Studies | Ausgabe 2/2011

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Abstract

This paper examines whether an appropriate legal system, which is a combination of a legal regime and a damage apportionment rule, effectively enhances auditor independence. Economic and psychological hypotheses derived from a one-period game model in which the auditor may commit either a technical audit failure (resulting from the auditor’s inability to detect true output given a lack of audit effort) or an independence audit failure (resulting from the auditor’s intentional misreporting on false output) are tested. Three major findings are documented. First, auditor independence affects firm investment, which in turn affects audit effort. Under this strategic dependence, no single legal system can provoke audit effort, improve auditor independence, and encourage firm investment simultaneously. To enhance auditor independence and motivate investment, a legal system consisting of both a strict regime and a proportionate rule is preferred. Second, the strict regime induces more auditor independence than the negligence regime, while the proportionate rule induces higher audit effort than the joint-and-several rule. Finally, auditors’ moral reasoning and penalty for misreporting are both positively associated with their independence. In addition, the effect of moral reasoning on auditor independence diminishes as the level of penalty increases. These two results hold only when the legal systems that auditors face are considered.

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Fußnoten
1
In real audit failure cases, the issue of whether technical and independence audit failures are mutually independent is unclear; therefore, I do not consider this issue explicitly. This study takes as given that both types of audit failure are independent.
 
2
In the model, providing a bonus to the auditor is not a strategic decision for the manager. Rather, the manager will always offer the bonus for a favorable report in the case of a low output. Also, asking for a bonus is not a strategic decision for the auditor. The auditor only strategically decides whether he wants to accept the bonus and misreport. This assumption rules out the possibility that the auditor extorts the manager for a high audit report when the output is high as well as low (Kofman and Lawarrée 1993).
 
3
The auditor’s two effort levels are assumed to exceed the minimum acceptable auditing standards, ruling out the possibility that choosing a low effort level may lead to gross negligence or even constructive fraud.
 
4
The auditor’s technical and misreporting penalties are assumed to be independent of the manager’s investment. This assumption rules out the possibility that a damage measure that depends on the investment level may induce suboptimal auditor effort and investment. See Schwartz (1997) and King and Schwartz (1999, 2000) for investigations of this issue.
 
5
Because the auditor does not know what investment the manager will choose and the possible output at the beginning of the game, the auditor’s ex ante expectation of committing either type of audit failure (or committing no audit failure) is uncertain. Therefore, when I use backward induction to solve the game, the auditor’s ex ante best strategy is to choose a high effort to minimize the possibility of committing a technical audit failure, even though his equilibrium strategy is to always report favorably regardless of the audit evidence he obtains. Thus equilibria (#A) and (#C) are sustained.
 
6
In practice, an independence audit failure generally constitutes a fraud and when the auditor commits fraud he should be strictly liable regardless of the effort level he chooses. Therefore, the NE regime seems not applicable to the independence audit failure. This concern can be addressed by two explanations. First, the auditor’s misreporting may not be discovered until the economy worsens and investment failures occur (Business Week 2002). The key point is that fraud resulting from an independence audit failure does not automatically trigger an auditor’s legal liability. An independence audit failure usually becomes public either through whistle-blowing or by a client’s announcement of a restatement or bankruptcy. Second, in real litigation against the auditors, an independence audit failure is relatively more difficult to identify and determine than a technical audit failure given the unavailability of and difficulty in gathering convincing evidence that can prove the auditor’s violation of independence (Spellmire et al. 1993). Therefore, an auditor who misreports has the chance to escape litigation under the NE regime.
 
7
Bloomfield (1997) defines “strategic dependence” as the interaction in which an auditor who assesses high fraud risk would be less willing to accept clients’ account balances, which in turn reduces the managers’ fraud.
 
8
The details of the formal model (including the game tree, proofs, and parameters) are available upon request.
 
9
The neo-Kohlbergian theory regards moral judgment as a rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning, thus reflecting an individual’s propensity to process moral dilemmas in a unique manner. Rest et al. (1999) proposes three moral schemas that view morality in different ways. In the Personal Interest schema, an individual’s moral reasoning is guided by doing whatever is influentially beneficial to him. Therefore, the Personal Interest schema encourages cooperation with family and close friends only. In the Maintaining Norms Schema, individuals are aware of the importance of “society” resulting from institutions, role-systems, and established practices. Individuals begin to consider the long-term cooperation with distant third parties, recognize the advantages of role systems and established practices, and perceive a need for generally-accepted norms and conventions to govern the society. In the Postconventional Schema, individuals’ behavior can depart from moral criteria if such departure can be justified on procedural or substantive moral grounds. In addition, duties and rights arise from the moral purpose behind the moral criteria rather than from the moral criteria themselves. While individuals follow moral criteria uniformly, they can also scrutinize the moral criteria for fairness. See Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) and Schatzberg et al. (2005) for detailed discussions of the neo-Kohlbergian framework and its applications in auditing.
 
10
Economic experiments are usually run in a series of periods in which each subject engages repeatedly in the same experimental task. This repetition, which allows subjects’ learning, serves as a technique for enhancing external validity because subjects’ behavior at the end of the repetitions is more representative of their behavior in real economic settings than their behavior at the beginning (Loewenstein 1999).
 
11
In accordance with the induced value theory (Smith 1976) and to minimize any role-playing effects, I use “Player A” and “Player M” to denote the auditor and the manager, respectively. In addition, the auditor’s report is labeled by “verification report.” Finally, the technical and independence audit failures are denoted as “verification failure” and “issue a High report when signal is Low”, respectively. The experimental instructions and materials are available from the author upon request.
 
12
Because most managers choose a high investment and most auditors choose a low effort level during the last twenty and ten periods, the number of periods in which investment output is low and in which the auditor obtains correct audit evidence is zero for many auditors across three penalty levels. Thus the calculations of auditors’ misreporting frequencies become infeasible. Given this reason, I do not report these frequencies and their corresponding t tests in Panel B of Table 3 for the last twenty and ten periods. For completeness and comparison purposes, however, I draw the bars in Panel C of Figure 2 for the last twenty and ten periods (across three penalty levels under two damage rules), assuming auditors’ misreporting frequencies approach zero.
 
13
The DIT presents the subjects with three or six hypothetical stories, each dealing with a different ethical dilemma. Subjects are asked to rate the relative moral importance of twelve items on a 5-point scale, and rank the four most important items for resolving each dilemma. For the four most important items chosen by each subject, a DIT P score is calculated by adding the points allocated to the Post-conventional items for all dilemmas, and then by converting a subject’s total points to a percentage. Since the P score represents the proportion of Post-conventional reasoning used to rationalize the dilemmas, subjects with higher P scores tend to rely more on Post-conventional moral reasoning than subjects with lower P scores. To avoid subjects’ dispersal due to overly long experimental sessions, I adopt the three-story (that is, Heinz, Prisoners, and Newspaper) DIT instrument in my experiment.
 
14
The bootstrap-estimated parameters are computed from resampling the original data. To test the significance of the variables of interest, confidence limits are calculated using the bias-corrected and accelerated method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). Confidence limits are given six significance level values: 0.5%, 2.5%, 5%, 95%, 97.5%, and 99.5%. Confidence intervals can then be created using pairs of these limits (for example, 2.5 and 97.5% confidence limits form a 95% confidence interval). To achieve acceptable accuracy, all parameters are estimated with 40,000 replications.
 
15
Unreported bootstrapping results show that, if REGIME and RULE and their related interaction terms are removed from model (1), the bootstrap-estimated coefficients \( \hat{b}_{4} \) = −0.1707 and \( \hat{b}_{5} \) = −0.2524 are not significant at all conventional significance levels.
 
16
Unreported results show that, if the legal variables and their interaction terms are dropped from model (2), the bootstrap-estimated coefficients \( \hat{b}_{1} \) are not significant at all conventional significance levels.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Legal systems and auditor independence
verfasst von
Hung-Chao Yu
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2011
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Review of Accounting Studies / Ausgabe 2/2011
Print ISSN: 1380-6653
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7136
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-011-9141-z

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