Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
Abuse of dominance investigations around the world are often form-based, primarily centred on the pre-requisite of dominance. This may lead to false positives or restrict innovation in today’s dynamic and complex markets. Accordingly, abuse of dominance enforcement requires a shift towards adopting an effects-based approach, weighing pro and anticompetitive effects and considering efficiency justifications. The European Union is increasingly moving in this direction, as is demonstrated by its case law that is analysed in this paper. The paper also explores competition law in India—traditionally a form-based jurisdiction for abuse of dominance investigations—and finds an encouraging trend towards an effects-based approach.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Ahlborn, C., & Evans, D. S. (2009). The microsoft judgment and its implications for competition policy towards dominant firms in Europe. Antitrust Law Journal, 75(3), 887–932.
Albaek, S. (2011). The effects based approach, an overview. In Paper presentenced at St. Martin conference, Brno.
Arezzo, E. (2008). Is there a role for market definition and dominance in an effects-based approach? In M.-O. Mackenrodt, B. Conde Gallego, & S. Enchelmaier (Eds.), Abuse of dominant position: New interpretation, new enforcement mechanisms? (pp. 21–54). Germany: Springer. CrossRef
Behrens, P. (2015). The ordoliberal concept of “abuse” of a dominant position and its impact on Article 102 TFEU. Nihoul/Takahashi, Abuse Regulation in Competition Law. In Proceedings of the 10th ASCOLA Conference Tokyo 2015.
Bhattacharjea, A. (2003). India’s competition policy: An assessment. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(34), 3561–3574.
Bolton, P., Brodley, J. F., & Riordan, M. H. (2000). Predatory pricing: Strategic theory and legal policy. Georgetown Law Review, 88, 2239–2330.
Colomo, P. I. (2016). Beyond the ‘more economics-based approach’: A legal perspective on Article 102 TFEU Case Law. Common Market Law Review 53(3). pp. 709–739. Kluwer Law International.
Competition Act 2002.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 08 of 2014.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 09 of 2013.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 47 and 56 of 2016.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 68 of 2013.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 70 of 2012.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 71 of 2012.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 73 of 2011.
Competition Commission of India Case No. 80 of 2012.
Court of Justice of the European Union. Press Release No. 90/17. Luxembourg, 6 September 2017, Judgment in Case C-413/14 P Intel Corporation Inc. v Commission.
Crane, D., Davis, R., & Friedman, S. Response of members of the Unilateral Conduct Committee of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law. http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/questionnaires/uc%20pp/nga%20crane_davis_friedman%20predatory%20pricing.pd.
DG Competition, European Commission. (2005). DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses.
Edlin, A. S. (2012). Predatory pricing. In E. Elhauge (Ed.), Research handbook on the economics of antitrust law. London: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
European E&M Consultants. Competition competence report. More economics based approach. In Article 102 TEFU: New Test Procedures. https://www.ee-mc.com/publications/ccr/archive.html.
Evans, D. S. (2003). The antitrust economics of multi-sided platform markets. Yale Journal of Regulation, 20(2), Article 4.
Felice, F., & Vatiero, M. (2014). Ordo and European competition law. Research in the history of economic thought and methodology (Vol. 32). Bingley: Emerald Publishing Ltd.
Franczyk, N. J. (2016). Jurisprudence development (abuse of dominance): Issues & implications. In Paper presented at the third international conference on competition regulation & competitiveness.
Frot, E. (2016). Practical approaches in dealing with rebates by dominant suppliers, Effects-based analysis of rebates. Microeconomix.
Gerber, D. J. (1995). Competition law and international trade: The European Union and the neo-liberal factor. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 4(1), 43–44.
Gesmer, L. (1978). Sylvania and vertical restraints on distribution. Boston College Review, 19(4), 751–771.
Gohari, R. S. (2016). Margin squeeze in the telecommunications sector: A more economics-based approach. World Competition: Law and Economics Review, 35(2), 205–232.
Gormsen, L. L. (2013). Exclusionary pricing abuses. Presentation at London.
Gual, J., Hellwig, M., Perrot, A., Polo, M., Rey, P. (coordinator), Schmidt, K., & Stenbacka, R. (2005). Report by the EAGCP. An economic approach to Article 82.
Gurkaynak, G., Inanılır, O., Diniz, S., & Yasar, A. G. (2016). Multisided markets and the challenge of incorporating multisided considerations into competition law analysis. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 5, 1–30.
Gustafsson, D. (2007). Tying under EC competition law. The Tetra Pak II Case.
Hildebrand, D. (2009). The role of economic analysis in the EC competition rules (3rd ed.). Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International.
Jhaku, G., & Malik, P. (2017). Dilemma in antitrust enforcement: How use of economics can guide enforcement rules in multi sided markets. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 5, 260–275. CrossRef
Jones, A., & Townley, C. (2014). Competition law. In C. Barnard & S. Peers (Eds.), European Union law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 11 November 1986. British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission of the European Communities. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A61984CJ0226.
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 17 February 2011. Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62009CJ0052.
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 15 March 2007, British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities. Case C-95/04 P. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62004CJ0095.
Judgment of the Court of 13 February 1979 - Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities - Dominant position - Case 85/76. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?isOldUri=true&uri=CELEX:61976CJ0085.
Katsoulacos, Y. (2016). Judicial review, economic evidence and the choice of legal standards by utility maximizing competition authorities.
Këllezi, P. (2009). Rhetoric or reform: Does the law of tying and bundling reflect the economic theory? In A. Ezrachi (Ed.), Article 82 EC: reflections on its recent evolution (pp. 147–168). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Malik, P. (2016). Competition law in India: Perspectives. Vikalpa, The Journal for Decision Makers, 41(2), 168–193. CrossRef
Mandorf, M., & Sahl, J. (2013). The role of the ‘equally efficient competitor’ in the assessment of abuse of dominance. Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics.
Marty, F. (2015). Towards an economics of convention-based approach of the European competition policy. Historical Social Research, 40(1), 94–111.
Neven, D., & Mano, M. (2006). Further steps towards an effects-based approach. Presented at Economic Developments in European Competition Policy, CRA Conference, Brussels.
OECD. (2005). Policy roundtables, competition on merits. https://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/35911017.pdf.
OECD. (2006). Policy brief. What is competition on the merits? http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/37082099.pdf.
OECD. (2009). Policy roundtables. Two-sided markets. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf.
Osterud, E. (2010). Identifying exclusionary abuses by dominant undertakings under EU competition law. The Spectrum of Tests. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International.
Oxera. (2015). The post Danmark II judgment: Effects analysis in abuse of dominance cases. Oxera. Retrieved from http://www.oxera.com/Latest-Thinking/Agenda/2015/The-Post-Danmark-II-judgment-effects-analysis-in-a.aspx.
Papandropoulos, P. (2007). How should price discrimination be dealt with by competition authorities? Droit & Économie Concurrences N, 3, 34–38.
Patil, S., Chatterjee, P., Gautam, S., Ananth, M. S., Jha, A., Reis, S., et al. (2013). Competition law in India. Jurisprudential trends and the way forward. Bangalore: Nishith Desai Associates.
Pera, A. (2008). Changing Views of competition, economic analysis and EC antitrust law. In Paper originally prepared for the 2008 Macerata Lecture on European Economic Policies at the University of Macerata, Italy.
Perrot, A. (2005). Towards an effects based approach to price discrimination. In The Pros and Cons of Price Discrimination, Swedish Competition Authority.
Petit, N. (2009). From formalism to effects? The Commission’s communication on enforcement priorities in applying article 82 EC, World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol 32, 485–504. Kluwer Law International.
Pollina, B. (2014). False negatives under a discount attribution test for bundled discounts. CommLaw Conspectus, 22, 74–107.
Reckon (2007). British Airways v. Commission  EUECJ C-95/04. Retrieved from http://www.reckon.co.uk/item/a9cb4c25.
Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy & Law, SVS Raghavan Committee (2000).
Rokita, K. (2015). Abuse of dominance by granting rebates in EU competition law. In Ascola Tokyo conference 2015.
Rosenblatt, H., Armengod, H., & Scordamaglia-Tousis, A. (2013). Latham & Watkins. Post Danmark: Predatory pricing in the European Union. The European Antitrust Review.
Sandicchi, G. B. (2005). American and European perspectives on monopolization and abuse of dominant position: A comparative law and economics analysis of single firm conduct. http://people.stern.nyu.edu/lwhite/al&e.spring2005/TermPapers/sandicchi.pdf.
Sidak, J. G., & Willig, R. D. (2016). Two-sided market definition and competitive effects for credit cards after United States v. American Express. The Criterion Journal on Innovation, 1, 1301–1311.
Skadden. (2010). Margin squeeze in regulated markets. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Deutsche Telekom AG vs. Commission. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates.
The Unilateral Conduct Working Group. (2010). Report on the analysis of refusal to deal with a rival under unilateral conduct laws. In Paper presented at the 9th annual conference of the international competition network (ICN), Istanbul, Turkey.
Verizon Communications Inc. V. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (02-682) 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 305 F.3d 89, reversed and remanded. Cornell University Law School. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-682.ZO.html.
Walckiers, A. (2012). An economic approach to exclusionary rebates? In Paper presented at the St. Martin conference, Brno.
Weyl, E. G. (2010). A price theory of multi-sided platforms. American Economic Review, 100(4), 1642–1672. CrossRef
Wheeler, L. (2017). Supreme Court agrees to hear American Express case. The Hill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/355721-supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-american-express-case.
Zenger, H., & Walker, M. (2012). Theories of harm in European competition law: A progress report. In J. Bourgeois & D. Waelbroeck (Eds.), Ten years of effects-based approach in EU competition law (pp. 185–209). Brussels: Bruylant.
- Legal Treatment of Abuse of Dominance in Indian Competition Law: Adopting an Effects-Based Approach
Nisha Kaur Uberoi
- Springer US
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta