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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

9. Lessons from South Africa’s Voluntary Denuclearisation Process and the African Continent’s Position on Nuclear Weapons

verfasst von : Yolandi Meyer

Erschienen in: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume V

Verlag: T.M.C. Asser Press

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Abstract

The African continent is increasingly becoming part of the global debate on denuclearisation. Renewable energy supply in the form of nuclear energy has become a matter of debate on the continent, and new ways of providing electricity is of utmost importance for many Africans. Africa is a continent that is free of nuclear weapons as formally established by the Pelindaba Treaty. South Africa is also the only country in the world to have voluntarily disbanded its nuclear weapons program. The dismantling of the South African nuclear weapons program occurred under very specific circumstances, and the South African experience is not necessarily transferable to other international denuclearisation scenarios. While other countries facing pressure to end their nuclear weapons programs may be confronted with a completely different set of challenges, there are certainly valuable lessons to be learned from the South African experience. The intricate tensions in the Middle East, for example, demonstrate that nuclear armament is usually a symptom of greater political instability and not a cause in itself. There is thus a need for greater focus to be placed on negotiation and diplomacy efforts in order to arrive at the root causes of the imbalances that prompt States to want to establish or expand their nuclear arsenals. However, negotiation and diplomacy efforts should also take into account the differing approaches to the issue of denuclearisation to be able to reconcile such concerns and finally come to a solution which is agreeable to all States.

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Fußnoten
1
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, i.
 
2
Pabian 1995, 1.
 
3
Stumpf 1995/1996, 3; see also ‘Speech by South African President F.W. De Klerk to a Joint Session of Parliament on Accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty’, 24 March 1993, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive at http://​digitalarchive.​wilsoncenter.​org/​document/​116789; De Villiers et al. 1993, 98; see also Pabian 1995, 1; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 259.
 
4
Liberman 2001, 45.
 
5
See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—Status of the Treaty at http://​disarmament.​un.​org/​treaties/​t/​npt.
 
6
Stumpf 1995/1996, 3.
 
7
Stumpf 1995/1996, 3.
 
8
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 234, i.
 
9
Id.
 
10
von Baeckmann et al. 1995, 48.
 
11
De Villiers et al. 1993, 98; see also Stumpf 1995/1996, 3; Liberman 2001, 45, 71; Pabian 1995, 1; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 262.
 
12
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 97.
 
13
Id; see also Fig 2005, 39.
 
14
Id.
 
15
Id, 57–58.
 
16
Id.
 
17
Id, 97.
 
18
Masiza 1993, 35; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 76, 104, 132. Eventually US Congress ended the ‘Atoms for Peace’ program and in 1978 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was enacted in the US which prohibited the transfer of nuclear technology to non-NPT states.
 
19
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 104.
 
20
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 97.
 
21
Stumpf 1995/1996, 3.
 
22
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 105, 110, 130. The US Atomic Energy Act provided for the establishment of a nuclear co-operation agreement which was concluded in 1957 between the US and South Africa and included the provision of the SAFARI I reactor and training of South African nuclear scientists in the US.
 
23
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 106, 107.
 
24
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 132.
 
25
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 106, 107, 123. In the context of arms embargoes against South Africa, however it can also be mentioned in the context of the sanctions in 1975 and the subsequent development of a local nuclear capacity, von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn state: ‘The harsher the criticism they received from the international community the more determined the white government became to stand alone. This again demonstrated that sanctions often have the effect of making a country more self-sufficient.’
 
26
Stumpf 1995/1996, 3; see also De Villiers et al. 1993, 99. In 1970 the Uranium Enrichment Act was promulgated and in the same year the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa (Ucor) was established at Valindaba (Y Plant), next to Pelindaba, and all AEB staff working on enrichment activities were transferred to Ucor, see von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 121, 126. The word Pelindaba consists of two words in the Zulu language meaning ‘discussions’ and ‘finished’ or it can also be translated as ‘we don’t talk about this anymore’ whereas the word Valindaba in Zulu can be translated as ‘we don’t talk about this at all’. See von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 102, 121; see also Wild 2013; see also Magliveras 2019, 193.
 
27
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 106, 107, 128, 134. The Y Plant also produced 3.25% enriched material for the Koeberg reactor.
 
28
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 119.
 
29
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 122.
 
30
Stumpf 1995/1996, 4; ‘Why one President gave up his country’s nukes’ The Atlantic (Interview with President FW de Klerk by Uri Friedman, 9 September 2017), https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​09/​north-korea-south-africa/​539265/​. Some authors argue that the nuclear weapons program was initiated as early as 1974 by then President Vorster. See Purkitt and Burgess 2001, 188.
 
31
Stumpf 1995/1996, 4.
 
32
‘Why one President gave up his country’s nukes’ The Atlantic (Interview with President FW de Klerk by Uri Friedman, 9 September 2017), https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​09/​north-korea-south-africa/​539265/​; see also Pabian 1995, 2.
 
33
Stumpf 1995/1996, 5; see also De Villiers et al. 1993, 100; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 135, 172.
 
34
Stumpf 1995/1996, 4; see also De Villiers et al. 1993, 101; ‘Why one President gave up his country’s nukes’ The Atlantic (Interview with President FW de Klerk by Uri Friedman, 9 September 2017), https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​09/​north-korea-south-africa/​539265/​; see also Pabian 1995, 2.
 
35
Stumpf 1995/1996, 4; see also De Villiers et al. 1993, 101; Liberman 2001, 58, 59; see also ‘Speech by South African President F.W. De Klerk to a Joint Session of Parliament on Accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty’ (24 March 1993), History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, http://​digitalarchive.​wilsoncenter.​org/​document/​116789.
 
36
Liberman 2001, 60; see also Pabian 1995, 8 stating that shortly after a 1987 defeat by the SADF, Cuba sent an additional 15,000 troops to Angola. By 1988, the southern border of Angola was manned by 12,000 Cuban units and approximately 200 tanks as well as air defence and surface-to-air missile systems. The SADF, which had a much smaller force on the ground, consequently added units to northern Namibia and activated a 140,000-man reserve force. Shortly thereafter negotiations started on a cease-fire agreement. However, the South African government was still concerned about a possible surprise attack by the remaining Cuban forces on the Namibian border and had to ensure that its nuclear deterrent could be used as a defence mechanism against such a threat. See also George 2004.
 
37
See Purkitt and Burgess 2001, 187. On the laager complex, see W H Vatcher White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism (1965).
 
38
De Villiers et al. 1993, 101; Liberman 2001, 69; Pabian 1995, 5; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 132, 133. South Africa was also expelled from the IAEA General Conference of the IAEA in 1979 and the IAEA demanded that South Africa sign the NPT. This action was probably influenced by the Vela incident earlier that year. The Vela incident was an unidentified double flash of light in the South Atlantic ocean detected by an American satellite, which many believed at the time to be evidence of a nuclear test carried out by South Africa, however it was never proven conclusively. See von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 213.
 
39
Pabian 1995, 7.
 
40
Pabian 1995, 7.
 
41
Pabian 1995, 8.
 
42
Pabian 1995, 7, 8; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 133.
 
43
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 133.
 
44
Stumpf 1995/1996, 4; Liberman 2001, 48, 69; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 132. In 1977, there was significant diplomatic pressure on South Africa by the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from nuclear weapons testing after the discovery of preparations for a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert.
 
45
Liberman 2001, 69.
 
46
Stumpf 1995/1996, 5; see also Liberman 2001, 69; Pabian 1995, 5.
 
47
Liberman 2001, 83.
 
48
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, i.
 
49
Liberman 2001, 50.
 
50
Stumpf 1995/1996, 6; see also De Villiers et al. 1993, 102; ‘Why one President gave up his country’s nukes’ The Atlantic (Interview with President FW de Klerk by Uri Friedman, 9 September 2017), https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​09/​north-korea-south-africa/​539265/​; Pabian 1995, 10; see also von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 211, 281, who state that a Cuban official had told President Botha years later that their fear of South Africa using a nuclear weapon had prevented the Cuban faction from invading South West Africa.
 
51
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 213.
 
52
See von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 213, 230, who describe the period of the early 1990s in South Africa as a ‘period of symbolic gestures’.
 
53
Stumpf 1995/1996, 6; De Villiers et al. 1993, 103; Pabian 1995, 10.
 
54
According to von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn: ‘President de Klerk also decided not only to set South Africa’s political house in order but also to try to improve its international image. An important step in this direction would be to sign the NPT.’ See von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 213.
 
55
Based on correspondence between Liberman and Stumpf; see Liberman 2001, 74. De Klerk gave instructions to dismantle all existing weapons and existing highly enriched uranium to be handed over to the AEC for safekeeping under certain instructions. See von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 220.
 
56
De Villiers et al. 1993, 102; ‘Why one President gave up his country’s nukes’ The Atlantic (Interview with President FW de Klerk by Uri Friedman, 9 September 2017), https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​09/​north-korea-south-africa/​539265/​.
 
57
De Villiers et al. 1993, 103.
 
58
Purkitt and Burgess 2001, 190; Pabian 1995, 10; Sagan 1996/1997, 71.
 
59
Liberman 2001, 85.
 
60
Purkitt and Burgess criticise Liberman for not including this in his analysis in the article ‘The rise and fall of the South African bomb’. See Purkitt and Burgess 2001, 187.
 
61
De Villiers et al. 1993, 104; the Y Plant was switched off on 1 February 1990. See von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 217.
 
62
De Villiers et al. 1993, 104; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 222.
 
63
Stumpf 1995/1995, 6; Liberman 2001, 74; see also von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 262, who states that the ‘inspections were of a nature that no other country in history has ever before permitted.’
 
64
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 282.
 
65
Id.
 
66
Id.
 
67
‘Opening Remarks by Deputy Minister Luwellyn Landers at the African Regional Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 16 August 2018, Premier Hotel, Pretoria’, 16 August 2018, http://​www.​dirco.​gov.​za/​docs/​speeches/​2018/​land0816.​htm.
 
68
See International campaign to abolish nuclear weapons ‘Signature/ratification status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, http://​www.​icanw.​org/​status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/​; see also eNCA ‘President Zuma signs UN treaty banning nuclear weapons’, 21 September 2017, https://​www.​enca.​com/​south-africa/​sa-signs-deal-to-ban-use-of-nuclear-weapons.
 
69
‘Opening Remarks by Deputy Minister Luwellyn Landers at the African Regional Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 16 August 2018, Premier Hotel, Pretoria’, 16 August 2018, http://​www.​dirco.​gov.​za/​docs/​speeches/​2018/​land0816.​htm.
 
70
‘Opening Remarks by Deputy Minister Luwellyn Landers at the African Regional Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 16 August 2018, Premier Hotel, Pretoria’ 16 August 2018, http://​www.​dirco.​gov.​za/​docs/​speeches/​2018/​land0816.​htm.
 
71
Section 6(1) of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1993; see also Swart 2015, 770. The African Union is also in the process of drafting model legislation on nuclear weapons and specifically ‘legislation that Member States could use as a reference in developing their national legislation on the implementation of resolution 1540…’. See AU Review and Assistance Conference on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) in Africa (6–7 April 2016) para 18.
 
72
Swart 2015, 771.
 
73
Swart 2015, 761; see also Mekonnen 2019, 175.
 
74
Swart 2013, 211.
 
75
See for example the Statement on behalf of the African Group at the general debate of the third preparatory committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the NPT (29 April 2019–10 May 2019) in New York where the African Group stated that the ‘total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be possessed or produced again is the only unqualified assurance against the catastrophic humanitarian consequences arising from the use of such weapons.’ The Group further reiterated the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the role that the IAEA plays in regulating such practices and the ‘importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).’
See also Valero 2018 reaffirming the Movement’s ‘principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which is its highest priority, and remains extremely concerned at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use…’. The members further affirmed their belief that ‘nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and are essential for strengthening international peace and security… non-proliferation policies should not undermine the inalienable rights of States to acquire, have access to, import or export nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.’
 
76
Fabricius 2016.
 
77
Id.
 
78
Id.
 
79
This resolution was adopted shortly after resolution 1379 (XIV) (1959) regarding French nuclear testing in the Sahara which might have been one of the reasons for the 1652 resolution. Furthermore, the sixteenth session’s focus on Africa was as a result of an effort to ensure that the continent did not get caught between the West and the Communist bloc during the arms race, see Magliveras 2019, 191. The 1652 Resolution recalled previous resolutions on disarmament including Resolution 1379 (XIV) (1959), Resolution 1378 (XIV) (1959) on general disarmament, Resolution 1576 (XV) (1960) on the prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons, Resolution 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV) (1960) on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear testing and resolution 1629 (XVI) (1961) stating that a general concern for the future of mankind and international law places a responsibility on States regarding actions that may have harmful consequences by increasing ‘radio-active fall-out.’ Other resolutions adopted during the sixteenth session related to nuclear disarmament include: UNGA Resolution 1649 (XVI), Resolution 1653 (XVI), Resolution 1664 (XVI) and Resolution 1665 (XVI); see also Magliveras 2019, 191.
 
80
UN General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI) (1961) Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone.
 
81
Organization of African Unity 1963; see also Magliveras 2019, 190.
 
82
Organization of African Unity 1963.
 
83
Id. See also Magliveras 2019, 191.
 
84
Organization of African Unity 1964; see also Magliveras 2019, 190.
 
85
The Pelindaba Treaty was signed on 11 April 1996 by 47 African States and came into force on 15 July 2009 after the requisite number of ratifications had been acquired. See Magliveras 2019, 194.
 
86
Fabricius 2016.
 
87
Swart 2015, 756; see also Fabricius 2016.
 
88
See World Nuclear Association ‘Uranium in Africa’ (November 2017), http://​www.​world-nuclear.​org/​information-library/​country-profiles/​others/​uranium-in-africa.​aspx; see also Swart 2015, 755, 756.
 
89
Swart 2015, 763.
 
90
UN General Assembly ‘Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction’ Draft Decision A/C.1/73/L.22/Rev.1 (17 October 2018).
 
91
See Joint Declaration 1998 (The “New Agenda” Coalition) (9 June 1998); see also Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa). ‘Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; reiterating the urgency of its implementation’, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.13 (15 March 2018).
 
92
Statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement at the general debate of the third preparatory committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the NPT (29 April 2019), New York.
 
93
Ibid.
 
94
Magliveras 2019, 195. With regard to the peaceful use of nuclear material, see also the Preamble of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996, which promotes ‘regional cooperation for the development and practical application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the interest of sustainable social and economic development of the African continent.’ The Treaty thus reinforces obligations under the NPT, the Bamako Conventions and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
 
95
Article 1(b) of African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996.
 
96
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996.
 
97
Article 8 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996.
 
98
Article 9(c) of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996. Similar to Article III(2) of the NPT.
 
99
See Article 1(b) of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996 and Section XX(2) of the IAEA Statute.
 
100
Articles 10 and 11 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996.
 
101
The African Commission on Nuclear Energy, http://​afcone.​peaceau.​org/​en/​.
 
102
Article 20(1) of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996. Similar to Article X of the NPT; see also Magliveras 2019, 196.
 
103
Protocol I, Article 1 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996. All five States have signed and ratified the Protocol except for the United States of America which has signed but not ratified. See Nuclear Threat Initiative ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) at https://​www.​nti.​org/​learn/​treaties-and-regimes/​african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-anwfz-treaty-pelindaba-treaty/​; see also Magliveras 2019, 195.
 
104
Protocol II, Article 1 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996. All five States have signed and ratified the Protocol except for the United States of America which has signed but not ratified. See Nuclear Threat Initiative ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) at https://​www.​nti.​org/​learn/​treaties-and-regimes/​african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-anwfz-treaty-pelindaba-treaty/​; see also Magliveras 2019, 195.
 
105
Protocol III, Article 1 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1996. France has signed and ratified this Protocol, however Spain has neither signed nor ratified the Protocol. See Nuclear Threat Initiative ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), https://​www.​nti.​org/​learn/​treaties-and-regimes/​african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-anwfz-treaty-pelindaba-treaty/​.
 
106
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 42.
 
107
Liberman 2001, 71; Pabian 1995, 14.
 
108
Sagan 1996/1997, 54.
 
109
Pabian 1995, 14, 15.
 
110
Stumpf 1995/1996, 8. The theory that political isolation could lead to denuclearisation can perhaps also be applied to the North Korean situation as this country has been politically isolated for many years and this could be the reason why it eventually decides to dismantle in order to re-enter the international fold so to speak. See T McNamee ‘Forget the Libya Model. South Africa Shows the Path to Peace with Pyongyang’ (22 May 2018), Foreign Policy, available at https://​foreignpolicy.​com/​2018/​05/​22/​forget-the-libya-model-south-africa-shows-the-path-to-peace-with-pyongyang/​ (accessed 16 August 2018).
 
111
Pabian mentions countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Libya and Iran as examples of states where such measures have been successful and one could also add additional countries to that list such as North Korea. See Pabian 1995, 15.
 
112
Stumpf 1995/1996, 8; Pabian 1995, 14; Sagan 1996/1997, 54.
 
113
See ‘Why one President gave up his country’s nukes’, The Atlantic (Interview with President FW de Klerk by Uri Friedman, 9 September 2017), available at https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​09/​north-korea-south-africa/​539265/​ (accessed 8 August 2018), where President de Klerk states: ‘…the lessons we’ve learned in South Africa, in a wider context apart from nuclear weapons, is that only through negotiation, only if enemies or opponents talk to each other, can peace be achieved, can a new dispensation be agreed upon. If you don’t talk, you get thrown deeper and deeper into more conflict.’
 
114
Liberman 2001, 72.
 
115
Id.
 
116
Id, 75.
 
117
Pabian 1995, 15.
 
118
Stumpf 1995/1996, 8.
 
119
Purkitt and Burgess 2001, 189.
 
120
On 2 February 1989 Botha resigned as National Party (NP) leader after a stroke but stayed on as President with de Klerk replacing him as leader of the NP. There was great conflict between the two leaders during this time and in August of that year Botha resigned as President of the country and de Klerk was sworn in as Acting President. On 20 September 1989, de Klerk was confirmed as President after general elections took place earlier in September of that year. See von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 212, 213.
 
121
See Liberman 2001, 64, who obtained this quote from a reliable source quoted by M Hibbs ‘South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent’ (1993) Nuclear Fuel p. 5; Sagan 1996/1997, 70. See also von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 263 who describe Botha as a ‘militarist in every fibre of his being.’
 
122
Purkitt and Burgess 2001, 189.
 
123
‘Why one President gave up his country’s nukes’ The Atlantic (Interview with President FW de Klerk by Uri Friedman, 9 September 2017) available at https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​09/​north-korea-south-africa/​539265/​ (accessed 8 August 2018). President de Klerk further described the use of nuclear weapons as ‘morally indefensible.’
 
124
Liberman 2001, 48. Liberman explains, according to Solingen’s theory, the difference between liberalizers and nationalist-statist governments as follows: ‘Liberalizers…see nuclear restraint as a means to international approval, aid and trade. In contrast, nationalist-statist governments more readily flout international norms and risk sanctions because they care less about international finance and trade, because they gain domestic political support from state enterprises, and because they see symbolic political benefits in defying foreign demands.’ See E Solingen ‘The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint’ (1994), 19(2) International Security, 139–142.
 
125
Sagan 1996/1997, 56.
 
126
For example, once the US demonstrated its nuclear capabilities during World War II, the Soviets considered it to be imperative that they develop their own nuclear weapons, after the Soviets acquired nuclear capabilities the UK and France followed suit to guard against the Soviet threat; see Sagan 1996/1997, 57, 58.
 
127
Strydom 2017, para 56.
 
128
Albright and Stricker 2016, 297.
 
129
Swart 2015, 766; von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, 222. See also Albright and Stricker 2016, 276–277, who state that with regard to dismantlement, a nuclear weapon should be seen as consisting of a nuclear device as well as a delivery system. Therefore the focus should not just be on regulating the dismantlement of the device but also the production and development of a delivery system. South Africa, for example, dismantled both its nuclear devices and its delivery system by ending its space launch program.
 
130
De Villiers et al. 1993, 109.
 
131
See M Daou, ‘Iran and Israel: A history of the world’s best enmity’, France 24 (11 May 2018), https://​www.​france24.​com/​en/​20180511-iran-israel-history-enmity-nuclear-hostility.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Lessons from South Africa’s Voluntary Denuclearisation Process and the African Continent’s Position on Nuclear Weapons
verfasst von
Yolandi Meyer
Copyright-Jahr
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-347-4_9