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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Liberalisation and Competition: Theoretical Backgrounds and Institutional Analysis

verfasst von : Onur Demir

Erschienen in: Liberalisation of Natural Gas Markets

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

This section of the book presents a mixture of theoretical, institutional and empirical consideration of issues regarding natural monopoly, regulation, deregulation and liberalisation in network industries. Natural monopoly theory, public choice theory and economic theory of regulation are specifically focused on since utilities in Turkey, such as the natural gas industry, are mostly state owned and prone to natural monopolies. Since “natural gas market reforms” may be regarded as a form of regulation (or a change in regulation) implemented as a result of a political decision, public choice theory and economic theory of regulation span the spectrum of rational behaviour in energy markets.

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Fußnoten
1
According to Meadway (2013), market failures can occur on either or both sides of the market due to imperfect competition amongst suppliers, badly informed market participants and the unintentional consequences of market operations.
 
2
Pareto efficiency is named after the nineteenth-century economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, who was first to examine the implications of the idea that Pareto improvement exists when there is a way to make some people better off without making anybody else worse off (Varian 1990). The author argues that if an allocation allows for a Pareto improvement, it is called Pareto inefficient.
 
3
According to Bekkering et al. (2015, 349), seasonal swing factor is defined by the maximum hourly gas demand divided by the minimum hourly gas demand in a year.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Liberalisation and Competition: Theoretical Backgrounds and Institutional Analysis
verfasst von
Onur Demir
Copyright-Jahr
2020
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2027-3_2