6. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Under EURATOM Law

EURATOM Supply Agency, Annual Report 2014, p. 9.

Ibid, p. 15.

At Cadarache. See Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project, OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 62.

International Atomic Energy Agency, established by Statute of 26.10.1956.

Nuclear Energy Agency, established as European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) by the OEEC Council in December 1957.

Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Articles in this Chapter without a specific reference are those of the EURATOM Treaty. For a consolidated version of the Treaty see OJ C 203, 7.6.2016, p. 1.

See on the relationship between Euratom and EC: Cusack 2003, p. 117. In purely legal terms, however, the relationship is governed by Article 106a(3) EAEC: ‘The provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall not derogate from the provisions of this Treaty.’ Lex specialis derogat legi generali.

The opposition to the Treaty is based on three different motives, all of them based on blatant misunderstandings:

(1) The Treaty is bad because it is ‘nuclear’. The fact that the Treaty seeks to ringfence the dangers of nuclear energy through radiation protection and safeguards is overlooked.

(2) The Treaty is antidemocratic because the European Parliament has no significant role to play. Parliaments, however, are legislative bodies, whereas the Treaty is essentially about performing executive tasks. To the extent that legislation is required, it is to be guided by scientific expert knowledge.

(3) The Treaty is outdated and has become obsolete. Here, no attention is paid to those provisions of the Treaty which allow Euratom law to be adapted by simplified procedures ‘where new circumstances so require’ (see in particular Articles 4(2), 32, 41, 76, 85, 90).

See Grunwald 2014a, p. 21.

In particular Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Paul-Henri Spaak.

Article 1.

Third recital of the preamble.

Article 184.

Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Articles 13 to 19 TEU and Articles 223 to 270, 272 to 274, 277 to 281, 285 to 287 TFEU.

Articles 171 to 182 and Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Articles 310 to 320, 322 to 324 TFEU.

Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 288 TFEU.

Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 19(1) TEU.

Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 16(2) TEU.

Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 17(2) TEU.

See Articles 7 and 31.

Article 106a(1) EAEC in conjunction with Article 17(3) TEU.

Article 7.

Article 24.

Articles 31 and 32.

Articles 47 to 49.

Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 17(1) TEU.

Article 79.

Article 7.

Article 59(b).

Article 83(1).

See e.g. Article 164.

Articles 33 to 38.

Article 53.

Articles 81 and 82.

Article 103.

Article 17(1) TEU.

Articles 83 and 145, Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 260(2) TFEU.

Article 5.

Article 34.

Article 37.

Article 46.

Article 33.

Articles 70 and 71.

Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 292 TFEU.

Article 40.

Article 43.

Article 103.

See Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 288 TFEU.

Articles 29 and 101.

Article 2(h).

Article 102.

See Articles 33, 103, 192 and 193.

See Article 106a(1) EAEC in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU on the preliminary ruling procedure.

See Articles 38, 82 and 106a(1) EAEC in conjunction with Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU.

See Grunwald 2008, p. 1075.

OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1.

See Article 106a(1). See also Grunwald 2015, p. 543.

The Member States‘ discretion is expressly enshrined in Article 194(2) TFEU which recognizes the ‘Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, …’.

See Article 192: ‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.’

Pursuant to Article 4(2) the fields of research are listed in Annex I to the Treaty. That list may be amended by simplified procedure.

See Articles 5 and 6.

See Article 7.

See Article 8.

See Article 10.

Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 1314/2013 of 16 December 2013 on the Research and Training Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community (2014–2018) complementing the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 948.

Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project, OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 62.

See Articles 179 to 190 TFEU.

See Article 4 EAEC and Article 180 TFEU.

See Article 101 EAEC and Article 186 TFEU.

See Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020—the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014–2020), OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 104, which provides for a financial envelope of 77 bn EUR.

Articles 38 to 44 TFEU.

Articles 174 to 178 TFEU.

The Lisbon Treaty has also introduced the concept of a European Research Area in Articles 179(1) and 182 (5) TFEU. See also Grunwald 2011, p. 637–642.

Regulation No 3 implementing Article 24 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, English special edition: Series I Volume 1952–1958, p. 63–70.

See Grunwald 1988, pp. 33–48.

See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities, COM(2012) 571 final, 4.12.2012.

See in particular Council Directive 2014/87/EURATOM of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, OJ L 219, 25.7.2014, p. 42.

See:

See Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council (1991) ECR I-4561, para 14: ‘The indications are … that the purpose of the articles … is to ensure the consistent and effective protection of the health of the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations, whatever their source and whatever the categories of persons exposed to such radiations.’ Unfortunately the Court did not care to mention this important passage when it ruled later on in Case C-61/03 Commission v United Kingdom (2005) ECR I-2511 with regard to radiation protection that ‘activities falling within the military sphere are outside the scope of (the) Treaty’ (para 36), thus leaving the general public and workers unprotected against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation having their source in the ‘military sphere’ (see also point 6.4.2 below).

‘The expression “basic standards” means:

(a) maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety;

(b) maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination;

(c) the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers.’

See Article 106a EAEC in conjunction with Article 258 TFEU.

See Article 194 TFEU. See also the recent document: ‘Energy Union Package’, Communication from the Commission: A Framework Strategy for a Resiliant Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015) 80 final, 25.2.2015, with further references.

COM(2008) 738/3 of 11.11.2008. See also Grunwald 2010, p. 425–427.

The industrial activities referred to in Article 41 are listed in Annex II to the Treaty. See also Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 2587/1999 of 2 December 1999 defining the investment projects to be communicated to the Commission in accordance with Article 41 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ L 315, 9.12.1999, p. 1. As regards the general reporting obligation applicable to the energy sector see Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 617/2010 of 24 June 2010 concerning the notification to the Commission of investment projects in energy infrastructure within the European Union and repealing Regulation (EC) No 736/96, OJ L 180, 15.7.2010, p. 7.

This discussion should in particular relate to the objectives of Chapters 3 and 7 of the Treaty and should cover all nuclear safety and security aspects of the investment project.

See Council Decision 77/270/EURATOM of 29 March 1977 empowering the Commission to issue Euratom loans for the purpose of contributing to the financing of nuclear power stations, OJ L 88, 6.4.1977, p. 9. See also Grunwald 2003, p. 231 et seq.

See Council Decision 90/212/EURATOM of 23 April 1990, OJ L 112, 3.5.1990, p. 26.

The model of Joint Undertakings was copied by Article 187 TFEU.

These advantages are listed in Annex III to the Treaty (“Advantages which may be conferred on Joint Undertakings under Article 48 of this Treaty”).

Council Decision 2007/198/EURATOM of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it, OJ L 90, 30.3.2007, p. 58.

See Weilemann 1983; Allen 1983, Chapter VI, p. 473.

See Articles 52(2)(b) and 54. See also Council Decision 2008/114/EC (sic!), EURATOM of 12 February 2008 establishing Statutes for the EURATOM Supply Agency, OJ L 41, 15.2.2008, p. 15. The Agency has its offices in Luxembourg.

This policy is qualified by Article 52(1) as a ‘common supply policy’. As a common policy it is equivalent to policies for which the Union has an ‘exclusive competence’ under Article 3 TFEU.

See Case C-161/97 P Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems v Commission (1999) ECR I-2116 and Joined Cases T-149/94 and T-181/94 Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems v Commission (1997) ECR II-161.

Rules of the Supply Agency of the European Atomic Energy Community determining the manner in which demand is to be balanced against the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials of 5 May 1960, as amended by Regulation of the Supply Agency of 15 July 1975, OJ L 193, 25.7.1975, p. 37.

Proposal for a Council Regulation adopting criteria for the granting of Commission authorization for exports of nuclear materials outside the Community, OJ C 29, 31.1.1985, p. 10.

See Commission Regulation (EURATOM) No 66/2006 of 16 January 2006 exempting the transfer of small quantities of ores, source materials and special fissile materials from the rules of the chapter on supplies, OJ L 11, 17.1.2006, p. 6.

No amendment has ever been adopted. The last three proposals submitted by the Commission based on Article 76 are the following:

For a detailed account see Kilb 2015, p. 151.

See Commission Regulation (EURATOM) No 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of EURATOM safeguards, OJ L 54, 28.2.2005, p. 1. The Regulation is complemented by two Recommendations of 15 December 2005 (OJ L 28, 1.2.2006, p. 1) and 11 February 2009 (OJ L 41, 12.2.2009, p. 17).

Article 81. For the continuous inspection of the reprocessing plants at La Hague (France) and Sellafield (UK) the Commission is operating on-site laboratories.

Article 82 first and second paragraphs.

Article 83(2) and (4).

Article 82 third and fourth paragraphs.

See the definition in Article 197.

Pursuant to Article 72 first paragraph the Agency may build up commercial stocks. On the conditions laid down in Article 80 special fissile materials may ‘be deposited with the Agency or in other stores which are or can be supervised by the Commission’.

By virtue of Article 72 second paragraph the Commission may build up emergency stocks.

The Community’s non-contractual liability is governed by Article 188 s paragraph.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union several attempts were made by criminal dealers to sell diverted nuclear material of Soviet origin in European countries.

In its Ruling 1/78 (1978) ECR 2127 the Court of Justice held (para 15): ‘Like the EEC Treaty the EAEC Treaty seeks to set up, with regard to matters covered by it, a homogeneous economic area; it is within this area from which barriers have been removed that the Commission and the Supply Agency are called upon to exercise their exclusive rights in the name of the Community.’

Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1.

For recent reflections on nuclear liability and insurance see the contributions in Raetzke 2014, pp. 279–355.

See Agreements on Fusion Research with the United States of America (OJ L 148, 1.6.2001, p. 80), Canada (OJ L 346, 22.12.1998, p. 65), Switzerland (OJ L 242, 4.9.1978, p. 2; OJ L 116, 30.4.1982, p. 21 and OJ L 20, 24.1.2008, p. 11), Japan (OJ L 57, 28.2.1989, p. 63 and OJ L 246, 21.9.2007, p. 32), Russia (OJ L 287, 31.10.2001, p. 30), Ukraine (OJ L 322, 27.11.2002, p. 40), India (OJ L 242, 15.9.2010, p. 26), Brazil (OJ L 242, 15.9.2010, p. 34) and Kazakhstan (OJ L 143, 7.6.2005, p. 28). See also Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), OJ L 161, 24.6.2009, p. 14.

Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project, OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 62.

Commission Decision 2005/844/EURATOM of 25 November 2005 concerning the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), OJ L 314, 30.11.2005, p. 21; Commission Decision 2005/845/EURATOM of 25 November 2005 concerning the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, OJ L 314, 30.11.2005, p. 27.

See Nuclear Safety Convention (1994), OJ L 318, 11.12.1999, p. 21.

See EURATOM Supply Agency, Annual Report 2014, p. 27 et seq.: Origins of uranium delivered to EU utilities, 2014 (in tonnes and % share), Purchases of natural uranium by EU utilities by origin, 2006–14 (tU).

Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, OJ L 51, 22.2.1978, p. 1, and Additional Protocol of 22 September 1998 (1999/188/EURATOM), OJ L 67, 13.3.1999, p. 1. Agreement of 6 September 1976 between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA INFCIRC/263, October 1978; Accord conclu le 27 juillet 1978 entre la France, la Communauté européenne de l‘Énergie Atomique et l‘Agence Internationale de l‘Énergie Atomique relatif à l‘application de garanties en France, AIEA, INFCIRC/290, Décembre 1981.

Commission Decision 2008/99/EC (sic!), EURATOM of 19 December 2007 concerning the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, OJ L 34, 8.2.2008, p. 3.

Agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were concluded with the United States of America (OJ L 120, 20.5.1996, p. 1), Uzbekistan (OJ L 269, 21.10.2003, p. 8), Ukraine (OJ L 261, 22.9.2006, p. 26), Japan (OJ L 32, 6.2.2007, p. 64), Kazakhstan (OJ L 10, 15.1.2009, p.16), Australia (OJ L 29, 1.2.2012, p. 4), South Africa (OJ L 204, 31.7.2013, p. 3), Canada (SEC(2011) 969 final, 26.7.2011).

Article 37 reads as follows: ‘Each Member State shall provide the Commission with such general data relating to any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form as will make it possible to determine whether the implementation of such plan is liable to result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil and airspace of another Member State. The Commission shall deliver its opinion within six months, after consulting the group of experts referred to in Article 31.’

Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed (2005) ECR I-2481.

See Errera et al. 1958, pp. 118–119, on Article 52 in fine according to which the Agency may not discriminate between users on the grounds of the use which they intend to make of the supplies requested: ‘Cette interdiction de discrimination en ce qui concerne l‘emploi porte aussi sur l‘approvisionnement des programmes civils et militaires. En effet, le droit d‘option et le droit exclusif de conclure les contrats de fournitures assurent à l‘Agence un monopole … en matière d‘approvisionnement ; toute discrimination au détriment des programmes militaires reviendrait donc à les condamner indirectement, ce qui n‘entre en aucun cas dans la compétence d‘Euratom.’—See also Neri and Sperl 1962, p. 170, quoting from the relevant document of the French Conseil de la République, discussing Article 52: ‘… le Traité ne comporte aucune interdiction de principe de l‘utilisation à des fins militaires, des matières fissiles spéciales mises à la disposition d‘un Etat membre de la Communauté et ceci résulte en particulier des Articles 52 et 87 et indirectement de l‘article 84.’—Likewise Neri, Sperl 1962, p. 200, quoting from the relevant parliamentary document of the French Assemblée Nationale, discussing Article 62: ‘Cette disposition s‘applique aussi bien à des matières fissiles qui seraient produites par exemple par les piles de production en vue d‘approvisionner telle ou telle centrale d‘E.D.F. qu‘à une production réalisée pour les besoins de la défense nationale. Ainsi, le Traité assure que nous pourrons … conserver … pour nos besoins de défense nationale, le plutonium que nous produirons ou la plus grande partie de celui-ci. … De ce fait nous restons libres pour tout programme militaire, tout en ayant la certitude indispensable pour les approvisionnements …’—See Gaudet 1958, p. 54, on intended uses: ‘Cette formule implique la liberté de choix de la destination, qu‘aucune autre disposition du Traité ne limite par ailleurs. Il s‘agit donc d‘un controle de conformité. Les usages militaires en particulier ne sont pas interdits par le Traité d‘Euratom.’—See Weilemann 1983, p. 177: ‘Nachdem Frankreich sich die Option militärischer Nutzung prinzipiell offengehalten hatte, gelang es der französischen Delegation, die Vertragsbestimmungen so zu gestalten, daß ein militärisches Nuklearprogramm ungehindert durchgeführt werden konnte… Nachdem … in Paris grünes Licht für die französische Nuklearrüstung gegeben worden war, forderten seine Unterhändler … , dass unter Durchbrechung des Prinzips des gleichen Zugangs, Frankreich der Bedarf an Kernbrennstoffen für seine laufenden Programme während einer Übergangszeit garantiert werde. Diesem Wunsch wurde in dem späteren Artikel 223 entsprochen …’.

See Pirotte et al. 1988, pp. 88 et seq.: „La remise en cause des dispositions supranationales“, „La mise en sommeil du chapitre VI“ and „Le consensus pour un fonctionnement minimaliste de l‘Agence“.

As regards Chapter 2, the Court fails to see that the security provisions laid down in Articles 24 to 27 seek to afford the same protection of defence interests as Article 296(1) EC Treaty (now Article 346 (1) TFEU). As regards Chapter 3, the Court fails to see that Article 37 is not addressed to the ‘military sphere’ but to the Member State in its capacity as guarantor having ‘to ensure compliance with the basic standards which have been established’ (Article 33). Under Article 37 the Member State has to ensure that radioactive emissions originating on its territory do not adversely affect the ‘general public’ (Article 30) of another Member State by contaminating its water, soil or airspace. All that is required by Article 37 is that the Member State satisfies the Commission that such contamination will not happen. To this end an emission plan has to be provided which the Member State is free to formulate without disclosing any commercial or military secrets upstream. Another ill-considered consequence of the Court’s judgment is that it also excludes the ‘protection of the health of workers’ (Article 30) in the defence industry and the military sector, including military hospitals, from the scope of Chapter 3, a consequence that cannot be remedied by the Court’s reliance on EU environmental law (see para 44 quoted above). A lot more could be said about this misguided judgment, but in the present context these few remarks must suffice. See also Grunwald 2010, p. 423 et seq.

A full account of the political erosion of Treaty obligations is given by Pirotte et al. 1988, Trente Ans d‘Expérience Euratom.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 729, Nr. 10485, 1970, p. 169.

Article IX(1) NPT.

Article 106a(1) EAEC in conjunction with Article 49 TEU (‘Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union …’).

For the present territorial application of the Treaty see Article 198.

It has been suggested that European cultural identity rests on three pillars: Jewish-Christian Religion, Greek Philosophy and Roman Law.

See Grunwald 2015, p. 553.

CERN in Geneva was established in 1953, the IAEA in 1956, and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) within the OEEC/OECD in 1957.

OJ L 329, 23.12.1975, p. 28.

High Level Liaison Committee and Low Level Liaison Committee.

Agreement 78/164/Euratom between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republik of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Community in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, OJ L 51, 22.2.1978, p. 1.

Agreement of 6 September 1976 between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA INFCIRC/263, October 1978; Accord conclu le 27 juillet 1978 entre la France, la Communauté européenne de l‘Énergie Atomique et l‘Agence Internationale de l‘Énergie Atomique relatif à l‘application de garanties en France, AIEA, INFCIRC/290, Décembre 1981.

See Additional Protocol of 22 September 1998 supplementing Agreement 78/164/Euratom (1999/188/Euratom), OJ L 67, 13.3.1999, p. 1. The Additional Protocols supplementing the Voluntary Offer Agreements with the United Kingdom and France were not published in the OJ.

See Commission Document SEC(2008) 1888 of 13.5.2008.

See also Commission Decision 2010/398/Euratom of 15 July 2010 on the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning EURDEP (EUropean Radiological Data Exchange Platform), OJ L 182, 16.7.2010, p. 15.

See e.g. Commission Decision of 5.9.2013 on the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding for a partnership between the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safety cooperation, C(2013) 5641 final of 5.9.2013.

See Articles 23 to 46 TEU.

See e.g. Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP of 21 October 2013 on the Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security and verification in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, OJ L 281, 23.10.2013, p. 6.

OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34. See also the detailed six-monthly progress reports on the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. ex.: OJ C 41, 5.2.2015, p. 1.

See in particular Articles 4 and 5.

COM(2009) 143 final of 26.3.2009.

COM (2014) 247 final of 5.5.2014 (CBRN-E: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear-Explosives).

OJ L 71, 12.3.2014, p. 3.

For a full account see Grunwald 2014a, p. 21 et seq.

Such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. See on nuclear phase-out the contributions to the fourth working session in Raetzke 2014, pp. 357–387.

Such as Poland. See on nuclear new build the contributions to the second working session in Raetzke 2014, pp. 119–277.

Pursuant to Article 216, the “Commission proposals on the way in which the institution of university status referred to in Article 9 is to function shall be submitted to the Council within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty”.

In 2009 the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), established under Article 106a(1) EAEC in conjunction with Articles 301 to 304 TFEU, expressed the following concerns (OJ C 306, 16.12.2009, p. 56):

“The EESC is particularly interested in the question of building, maintaining and developing skills in the Member States, particularly those which have little or no experience with nuclear energy. These Member States must address this question without delay, in particular by developing the necessary training opportunities. In addition, the EESC suggests that consideration be given to European certification of competence in the field of nuclear power, and that training relates to the technical management as well as to the health aspects of nuclear accidents.”

The general ‘Requirements for Radiation Protection Education and Provision of Information’ are set out in Articles 14 to 18 and 59 of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom, OJ L 13, 17.1.2014, p. 1.

See Article 106a(1) EAEC in conjunction with Article 292 TFEU.

See Grunwald 1988, p. 33. See also Grunwald 2003, p. 288 et seq.

Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 3954/87 of 22 December 1987 laying down maximum permitted levels of contamination of foodstuffs and of feedingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency, OJ L 371, 30.12.1987, p. 11; Council Decision of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency (87/600/EURATOM), OJ L 371, 30.12.1987, p. 76.

In particular financial assistance under the PHARE and TACIS programmes. See for further references Grunwald 2003, p. 289 et seq.

See Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, OJ L 81, 22.3.2007, p. 1, and Commission Decision 2007/530/EURATOM of 17 July 2007 on establishing the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management, OJ L 195, 27.7.2007, p. 44. See also Communication from the Commission “Nuclear Safety in the European Union”, COM(2002) 605 final, 6.11.2002.

See Agreement in the form of letters exchanged between the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Switzerland concerning the inclusion of the latter in the Ecurie arrangements (European Community urgent radiological information exchange), OJ C 335, 13.12.1995, p. 4.

See Nuclear Safety Convention (1994), OJ L 318, 11.12.1999, p. 21; Commission Decision 2005/844/EURATOM of 25 November 2005 concerning the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), OJ L 314, 30.11.2005, p. 21; Commission Decision 2005/845/EURATOM of 25 November 2005 concerning the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, OJ L 314, 30.11.2005, p. 27.

The measures taken under EURATOM radiation protection law and in the field of external relations were complemented under EEC/EC/EU civil protection law (see Article 196 TFEU). The current civil protection programme (2014–2020) is set out in Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924. Pursuant to its Article 1(2) that mechanism also applies to radiological disasters (see also recital 28).

See Commission Decision 1999/819/EURATOM of 16 November 1999 concerning the accession to the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), OJ L 318, 11.12.1999, p. 20.

See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments (“stress tests”) of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities, COM(2012) 571 final, 4.10.2012.

See Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 109. For the period 2014 to 2020 an amount of EUR 225 million is earmarked to ‘finance measures to support the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries…’.

OJ L 172, 2.7.2009, p. 18, as amended by Council Directive 2014/87/EURATOM of 8 July 2014, OJ L 219, 25.7.2014, p. 42.

IAEA Safety Fundamentals: Fundamental safety principles, IAEA Safety Standard Series No SF-1 (2006).

Article 2(b) requires the Community to ‘establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public …’.

In its interim-report on the stress tests after the Fukushima accident the Commission stated in November 2011, that ‘at present, there are no common safety standards or criteria for nuclear power plants in the EU’ (COM(2011) 784 final, 24.11.2011, p. 9). The European Economic and Social Committee, on its part, found in October 2012 that ‘there is no common approach to nuclear safety regulation among the Member States “and recommended that the Nuclear Safety Directive” harmonise these aspects’ (OJ C 44, 15.2.2013, p. 140).

Fourth recital of the Treaty’s preamble.

Such right of access is already foreseen in Articles 35 and 81 which could serve as a model.

Commission Decision 2008/99/EC (sic!), EURATOM of 19 December 2007 concerning the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, OJ L 34, 8.2.2008, p. 3.

Ruling 1/78 (1978) ECR 2154 para 21.

Fourth recital of the Treaty’s preamble. This recital is also the starting point of the Court’s reasoning in para 21 of its Ruling quoted above.

Article 79 seems to focus only on traditional safeguards measures. The ‘catch all’ or ‘implied’ powers foreseen in Article 203 can only apply when there is no other empowering provision. In this case, however, a legal basis exists in Chapter 3 of the Treaty.

In this context it is to be noted that Article 32 serves the same purpose in Chapter 3 as the simplified amendment procedures set out in Articles 4(2), 41, 76, 85 and 90 do in Chapters 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8 respectively. See for a detailed reasoning on this point Grunwald 2014, p. 25 et seq.

In German it is the same term ‘Sicherheit’ that applies to both concepts.

See at the international level: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management of 5 September 1997, OJ C 51, 26.2.2002, p. E/261.

OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 48.