5.1 The Interpretation of the FRAND Commitment
Dell, Unocal and Rambus each involved a SSO participant’s failure to disclose patents during the standard setting process. As a result, when the SSO members selected technologies for inclusion into the standard, they lacked knowledge that some technologies may be covered by patents. This knowledge would have shed light on the potential costs involved in incorporating those technologies, as the SSO could have considered the likely royalty that each patent holder may seek on its relevant patents. With knowledge of the patent rights, the SSO could have weighed whether alternative technologies would have presented an overall better value.
N-Data also involved information regarding future royalties associated with a technology under consideration by a SSO. Unlike Dell, Unocal and Rambus, this information did not merely include the fact that N-Data held relevant patents. It also included explicit information regarding the future royalty associated with those patents. In the case of N-Data, it committed to license its patents for $1,000 if they were included in the standard. The SSO could weigh this cost when evaluating the overall value of N-Data’s technology.
Similar to N-Data’s unilateral license offer, many SSOs make use of some form of licensing rule as part of their internal procedures. Licensing rules allow SSO participants to commit to some form of licensing term for patents that may cover technologies incorporated in the standard. Depending on the SSO, they may accompany the disclosure of patents, or be a blanket commitment that covers any patents subsequently found to cover the standard. The licensing rule requires that a commitment be made before the standard is set. That way, the nature of commitment given is known to the SSO as it chooses between technologies for incorporation into the standard. The commitment then governs the licensing that may occur after the standard is set.
Licensing rules can mitigate hold-up of a standard. Because they provide information regarding future royalties at the time that the standard is set; they allow the SSO’s to choose between competing technologies—which may come with differing licensing commitments—at the time when technologies can be chosen without incurring switching costs. This avoids some of the distortive effects that standardization can have on competition between technologies.
The FRAND commitment is a licensing rule.
223 The 2007 Report explained that SSOs may use FRAND licensing commitments to mitigate hold-up.
224 Nevertheless, it noted varying views from commentators regarding whether the FRAND commitment was specific enough to effectively combat hold-up.
225 Some commentary suggested that the FRAND commitment was effective.
226 Others suggested that terms such as “reasonable” and “non-discriminatory” were difficult to define.
227
In addition to licensing rules, a similar method of combatting hold-up by SSO members would be to agree upon royalty rates before the standard was set. If parties were to explicitly disclose the royalties that they would require, similar to N-Data, then this information would unambiguously be available at the time that the standard is being set. In addition to unilaterally announcing royalty rates, patent holders could also engage in ex ante negotiations of royalty rates before the standard was set.
The 2007 Report noted some practical challenges for the use of
ex ante license negotiations. Such negotiations may lead to increased administrative costs and delays and may therefore not be adopted by many SSOs.
228 One reason was that the selection of technologies for inclusion in a standard was often done by participants’ engineers and technical experts whereas license negotiation involved different personnel such as lawyers.
229 For such reasons, one commentator noted that the use of the FRAND commitment functioned by allowing SSO participants to delay licensing negotiation until after the standard is set, while still mitigating hold-up based upon technology selection.
230
1.
FTC Guidance Regarding Licensing Negotiations
The FTC’s 2007 Report provided guidance regarding the use of licensing rules and
ex ante licensing discussions. Absent certain group
ex ante licensing conduct, however, the report did not suggest that SSO’s choice of any particular licensing approach would raise antitrust issues. Nor did it recommend that SSOs adopt any particular approach.
The 2007 Report made clear that the FTC and DOJ did not endorse any particular type of licensing rule. The report explained that there may be a number of business motivations that a SSO would have to consider when selecting a policy that worked for its membership.
231 The 2007 Report explained:
Neither Agency advocates that SSOs adopt any specific disclosure or licensing policy, and the Agencies do not suggest that any specific disclosure or licensing policy is required.
232
The report addressed one type of antitrust concern related to
ex ante licensing: that the collective negotiation of royalty rates prior to the standard being set could sometimes raise concerns under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
233 The 2007 Report addressed two types of concerns. First, discussions between either patent holders or SSO members could constitute a naked restraint of trade that may be
per se illegal.
234 This may include conduct such as using licensing negotiations as a cover for discussing downstream product pricing, or if patent holders would reach naked agreements on the license terms they would offer SSOs.
235 Second, SSO members could exercise group buying power when negotiating for licenses to relevant patents.
236
The 2007 Report noted that
ex ante discussion of licensing terms had the potential to be a pro-competitive means of preventing patent hold-up and that such conduct would be evaluated under the rule of reason.
237 When considering such conduct, the report laid out three considerations. First, the report noted that a unilateral disclosure of licensing terms would not constitute a collective act subject to review under Sherman Act Section 1.
238 Second, the report similarly noted that bilateral
ex ante license negotiations were unlikely to require special antitrust scrutiny.
239 Finally, the report noted that joint SSO activities undertaken to mitigate hold-up would likely be evaluated under the rule of reason, although the sham use of licensing negotiations to cover up naked agreements on licensing terms may be accorded
per se treatment.
240
Nevertheless, the 2007 Report expressed that SSOs may choose not to adopt
ex ante licensing practices “for practical reasons, independent of antitrust considerations
241:”
The Agencies do not suggest that SSOs are required to sponsor such discussions during the standard-setting process …. Moreover, it is fully within the legitimate purview of each SSO and its members to conclude that
ex ante licensing discussions are unproductive or too time consuming or costly … The Agencies take no position as to whether SSOs should engage in joint
ex ante discussion of licensing terms ….
242
2.
Policy Research Regarding the FRAND Commitment
While the 2007 Report touched upon the use of FRAND commitments during the standard setting process by SSOs, the 2011 Report shared several observations regarding the impact of FRAND commitments on licensing taking place after standards are set. The 2011 Report observed that parties attempting to determine a FRAND rate would look to the law of patent remedies as a guide.
The 2011 Report recommended that the “reasonable royalty” remedy for patent infringement serve as a guidepost for determining the FRAND rate. A “reasonable royalty” is one measure of damages for patent infringement available to patent holders.
243 One common framework used by courts to compute a reasonable royalty is that of the “hypothetical negotiation.”
244 Under this framework, the reasonable royalty would approximate the royalty that a willing licensor and a willing licensee would have agreed to, assuming that the relevant patents were valid and infringed.
245
The 2011 Report observed that courts considering contract disputes over the determination of a FRAND rate “may look to reasonable royalty damages law for guidance,” noting that “commentators have observed a close relationship between the ‘reasonable’ prong of a RAND commitment and the legal rules for determining reasonable royalty damages.”
246 In addition to serving as a guide for the judicial determination of a FRAND rate, the 2011 Report explained that patent remedies law could influence real-world negotiations for FRAND-licenses:
When a patentee and implementer of standardized technology bargain for a licensing rate, they do so within a framework defined by patent remedies law. That law sets the implementer’s liability if negotiations break down and the parties enter patent litigation, and therefore heavily influences the negotiated amount.
247
5.2 Competition Advocacy Regarding Remedies for Infringement of a FRAND-Encumbered Patent
Patent holders are often entitled to request injunctive relief as a remedy to patent infringement. It is available as a remedy in litigation brought in district court. In addition, one specialized tribunal in the United States, the International Trade Commission (henceforth “ITC”), can issue orders prohibiting the import of patented goods. Both district courts and the ITC apply multi- factor inquiries to determine whether to grant an exclusionary remedy. The FTC’s 2011 Report offered economic considerations for both tribunals to consider when applying these tests. Much of the analysis in the 2011 Report addressed considerations that applied to all patents—both SEPs and others. In addition, the report offered some specific observations regarding SEPs.
The FTC’s 2011 Report discussed how—for all patents including non-SEPs—the grant of injunctive relief influenced the economic incentives provided by the patent system.
248 It observed that innovation is best served “by awarding a permanent injunction in the large majority of cases.”
249 The report discussed three reasons that generally supported granting injunctive relief.
250 First, injunctive relief preserves the exclusivity that provides the foundation of the patent system’s incentives to innovate.
251 Second, the credible threat of an injunction provides a significant deterrent to infringement.
252 Third, a predictable injunction threat will encourage private ordering and licensing by the parties.
253
The 2011 Report also discussed the ability of an injunction to cause patent hold-up
254:
The threat of an injunction will lead the manufacturer to pay royalties up to its switching costs, which may be higher than the cost at the time of product design. Commentators explain that the threat of hold-up gives patent holders excessive bargaining power in component-based industries that allows the “patent owner to capture value that has nothing to do with its invention, merely because the infringer cannot separate the infringing component from the non-infringing ones” after it has sunk costs into the design and marketing of a product. The implementers of the patented technology do not receive the price benefits that competition among technologies can provide…
255
The 2011 Report did note that some commentators were critical of allowing concerns about hold- up inform the injunction analysis. The report noted that such critics argued that decreasing the likelihood of an injunction would lead implementers to choose infringement over licensing.
256 Some commenters also argued that it would result in lower royalties that provide insufficient incentives for inventors to invests in optimal levels of research and development.
257
The 2011 Report expressed that the proper balance between intellectual property and competition policy could be met by balancing the reasons militating for and against the grant of an injunction.
258 The report explained that “although the potential costs from hold-up should be considered, not all hold-up warrants denial of an injunction.”
259
2.
Advocacy Regarding Injunctive Relief in the District Courts
(a)
The 2011 Report on the Evolving IP Marketplace
The 2011 Report discussed how economic considerations should factor into the analysis that courts perform to determine when to grant an injunction. The patent statute provides that courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity … on terms as the court deems reasonable.”
260 The Supreme Court’s 2006
eBay v. MercExchange decision reaffirmed that the traditional four-factor test for equitable relief applied.
261 The test requires that a party seeking an injunction demonstrate:
1.
that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
2.
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
3.
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
4.
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
262
The 2011 Report offered economic considerations regarding the application of these factors. Regarding the fourth factor, “that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction,” the report recommended that, “when warranted by the facts,” courts should consider the public’s interest in avoiding patent hold-up, “which can increase costs and deter innovation.”
263 The report noted that the patent system would nevertheless, “very often award injunctions to patentees,” outside of exceptional circumstances.
264 The report cautioned against expanding the public interest analysis “to include the benefit of lower prices.”
265 The report explained:
Beyond the circumstances of hold-up that can raise prices by distorting competition with unpatented technology … the public’s interest in lower-priced goods generally should not influence the injunction analysis. In enacting the Patent Act, Congress made the judgment that an exclusive right, through its ability to allow patentees to charge higher prices, encourages innovation to the public benefit. Courts should not second-guess that judgment as a general matter.
266
The 2011 Report also addressed the application of the
eBay analysis to SEPs. It noted that “hold- up in the standard setting context can be particularly acute,” because lock-in due to standardization can make an entire industry susceptible to hold-up.
267 The report recommended that courts “give careful consideration” to each
eBay factor when considering an injunction prohibiting use of patented technology incorporated into an industry standard.
268 It also explained that the presence of a FRAND commitment would be relevant to the injunction analysis.
269
The FTC submitted a brief as
amicus curiae before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Apple v. Motorola. The case was an appeal from a decision dismissing a patent infringement lawsuit in the Western District of Wisconsin following summary judgment.
270 The FTC’s brief addressed the district court’s application of the
eBay analysis to determine whether it would issue a permanent injunction on one of Motorola’s patents, which Motorola had declared essential to ETSI for the UMTS standard used in some 3G cellular telephones.
271
The
amicus brief explained concerns regarding hold-up:
High switching costs combined with the threat of an injunction could allow the patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms despite its RAND commitment because implementers are locked into practicing the standard. The resulting imbalance between the value of the patented technology and the rewards to the patentee may be especially acute where the injunction is based on a patent covering a minor component of a complex multicomponent product, as is often the case with standard-essential patents in information technology industries.
The brief explained that hold-up could allow a patent holder to negotiate royalties beyond the “competitive value” of the technology:
Under these circumstances, the threat of an injunction may allow the holder of a RAND-encumbered SEP to realize royalty rates that reflect the investments firms make to implement the standard, rather than the competitive value of the patented technology, which could raise prices to consumers while undermining the standard- setting process.
272
The brief described how the FRAND commitment could mitigate the risk of hold-up and the impact of the threat of an injunction:
RAND commitments mitigate the risk of patent hold-up, and encourage investment in the standard. After a RAND commitment is made, the patentee and the implementer will typically negotiate a royalty or, in the event they are unable to agree, may seek a judicial determination of a reasonable rate. However, a royalty negotiation that occurs under the threat of an injunction may be heavily weighted in favor of the patentee in a way that is in tension with the RAND commitment.
273
The legal argument in the brief focused on how the presence of a FRAND commitment would affect the injunction analysis under the eBay standard. The amicus brief discussed the application of each eBay factor to the situation of a FRAND-encumbered SEP.
The brief discussed the application of the first two
eBay factors: that the patent holder be irreparably harmed and that monetary relief would be inadequate.
274 Citing the decision below, the brief argued that “a RAND commitment means that the patentee ‘implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that patent.”
275 The brief also cited to decisions holding “that a practice of widespread licensing, including offers to license to the defendant, strongly militates against a finding of irreparable harm.”
276 In sum, the brief concluded:
A fortiori, a commitment to offer a license to
all comers on FRAND terms should be sufficient to establish that a reasonable royalty is adequate to compensate the patentee for infringement by any particular implementer willing and able to abide by those terms.
277
Addressing the other factors, the brief argued that the public interest would also support denial of an injunction:
The public interest in promoting innovation and protecting consumers also weighs heavily against an injunction here. To be sure, consumers would be harmed by the immediate impact of being deprived of a popular product. But consumers would also suffer in the longer run because an injunction would reduce the returns to innovation by Apple and other patent holders who have patents that are essential to the same standard or otherwise read on Apple’s excluded products, who may face lower royalties….
278
In addition to this argument, Commissioner Rosch expressed a separate view in the FTC’s
amicus brief, concurring yet separately arguing that issuing injunctive relief is “inappropriate where the patent holder had made a FRAND commitment.”
279 He argued that, “even if the patentee contends that it has met its FRAND obligation,” the FRAND commitment is a commitment to license that is inconsistent with seeking injunctive relief.
280 He argued that “the only exception to this is when the licensee refuses to comply with the decision of a federal court or some other neutral arbitrator defining the FRAND terms.”
281
The Federal Circuit issued a decision finding that Motorola was not entitled to an injunction on its SEP.
282 The court declined to adopt a
per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs. Rather, it held that courts should apply the
eBay analysis, taking the FRAND commitment into account.
283 Performing the analysis, the court reasoned that “a patentee subject to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm.”
284
In so doing, the decision recognized that there may be situations where an injunction would still be warranted, notwithstanding the presence of a FRAND commitment:
[A]n injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect… To be clear, this does not mean that an alleged infringer’s refusal to accept any license offer necessarily justifies issuing an injunction. For example, the license offered may not be on FRAND terms. In addition, the public has an interest in encouraging participation in standard-setting organizations but also in ensuring that SEPs are not overvalued.
285
Several justices expressed differing views on the circumstances where it would be appropriate to grant an injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent. Judge Rader dissented from the Federal Circuit’s opinion, noting that the determination of whether a licensee was willing required “requires intense economic analysis of complex facts” and is “not likely to be susceptible to summary adjudication.”
286 Judge Prost, on the other hand, concurred, yet “disagree[d] that an alleged infringer’s refusal to enter into a licensing agreement justifies entering an injunction against its conduct.…” He expressed that an injunction would be appropriate only in limited situations, such as when an infringer were judgement-proof or refused to pay a court-ordered damages award after being found to infringe a valid patent.
287
3.
Advocacy Regarding Exclusion Orders at the International Trade Commission
(a)
The 2011 Report on the Evolving IP Marketplace
The FTC has also engaged in competition advocacy before the ITC. The ITC provides a specialized tribunal for patent holders to block the importation of goods that infringe their patents.
288 Remedies in the ITC are generally limited to an exclusion order that directs U.S. Customs to bar articles from entry into the United States.
289
The ITC’s grant of an exclusion order is not governed by the
eBay standard.
290 Rather, it is governed by a public interest inquiry, provided in Section 337, which has four prongs:
1.
the public health and welfare;
2.
competitive conditions in the United States economy;
3.
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States; and
The ITC considers these factors when issuing an exclusion order, but it “has rarely used the provision to deny an order.”
291 In addition, should the ITC grant an exclusion order, Section 337 provides that the President has the ability to review to order to ensure that its grant is consistent with the public interest.
The 2011 Report recommended that the ITC take hold-up concerns into account when applying the public interest factors, arguing that the analysis “should allow consideration of how an exclusion order can cause hold-up, raise prices and decrease innovation.”
292 The report also raised concerns regarding standard essential patents, recommending that “the ITC incorporate concerns about patent hold-up, especially of standards, into the decision of whether to grant an exclusion order in accordance with the public interest.”
293 Nevertheless, the report also explained that “the instances in which the ITC would deny an exclusion order based on these considerations would be rare.”
294 The report also explained that such a denial would leave the patent holder without an infringement remedy in the ITC because that agency lacks the power to award monetary damages. In conclusion, the report explained that “potential solutions deserve further study.”
295
(b)
Public Interest Statements
The FTC submitted statements on the public interest in two ITC investigations, 337-TA- 745 and 337-TA-752.
296 The investigations involved complaints by Motorola against Apple and Microsoft. The FTC’s comments raised the concern that “patentee can make a RAND commitment as part of the standard setting process, and then seek an exclusion order for infringement of the RAND-encumbered SEP as a way of securing royalties that may be inconsistent with that RAND commitment.”
297 Each comment observed that “high switching costs combined with the threat of an exclusion order could allow a patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms despite its RAND commitment,” and that these concerns “may be especially acute where the exclusion order is based on a patent covering a small component of a complex multicomponent product.”
298
The FTC provided several suggestions to the ITC to mitigate the risk of hold-up. First, it suggested that the ITC consider the risk of hold-up in its public interest analysis.
299 Alternatively, it suggested that the ITC craft its exclusion order remedy to provide time for parties to mediate for an ongoing royalty prior to the exclusion of its products.
300 Nevertheless, the FTC’s comments acknowledged that there would be circumstances when the public interest would support the grant of an exclusion order, such as when “the holder of the RAND-encumbered SEP has made a reasonable royalty offer.”
301
Following the FTC’s comments, other federal agencies also addressed the grant of ITC exclusion orders in cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs. The Department of Justice and the Patent and Trademark Office issued a joint Policy Statement raising concerns regarding the potential for hold-up from the grant of exclusion orders.
302 The Statement noted that “[i]n some circumstances, the remedy of an injunction or exclusion order may be inconsistent with the public interest,” particularly “where an exclusion order based on a F/RAND-encumbered patent appears to be incompatible with the terms of a patent holder’s existing F/RAND licensing commitment to an SDO.”
303 Nevertheless, the Statement also indicated:
An exclusion order may still be an appropriate remedy in some circumstances, such as where the putative licensee is unable or refuses to take a F/RAND license and is acting outside the scope of the patent holder’s commitment to license on F/RAND terms.… An exclusion order also could be appropriate if a putative licensee is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court that could award damages. This list is not an exhaustive one.
304
In 2014, the Executive Office of the President took these considerations into account when conducting its review of an exclusion order granted in 337-TA-794, a complaint by Samsung against Apple.
305 Relying upon the analysis laid out in the Policy Statement, the office found the grant of the exclusion order was inconsistent with the public interest and instructed the ITC to consider the possibility of patent hold-up when conducting its public interest analyses in the future:
[I]n any future cases involving SEPs that are subject to voluntary FRAND commitments, the Commission should be certain to (1) to examine thoroughly and carefully on its own initiative the public interest issues presented both at the outset of its proceeding and when determining whether a particular remedy is in the public interest and (2) seek proactively to have the parties develop a comprehensive factual record related to these … including information on the standards-essential nature of the patent at issue if contested by the patent holder and the presence or absence of patent hold-up or reverse hold-up. In addition, the Commission should make explicit findings on these issues to the maximum extent possible.
306
In June 2015, the ITC issued a request for written submissions with respect to its review of a decision in 337-TA-613, which found infringement of a FRAND-encumbered SEP.
307 The request solicited responses on a number of questions regarding how the public interest analysis should be implemented to account for the FRAND commitment. Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioners Ohlhausen and Wright offered differing suggestions. Chairwoman Ramirez suggested that “the SEP holder should have the burden of establishing that the putative licensee is unwilling or unable to take a license on FRAND terms.”
308 In contrast, Commissioners Ohlhausen and Wright argued “[t]he ITC should not begin its analysis by initially imposing upon the SEP holder the burden of proving that the accused infringer is unwilling or unable to take a license on FRAND terms.”
309