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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung des Steuerverhaltens

verfasst von : Stephan Mühlbacher

Erschienen in: Die Psychologie des Steuerzahlens

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Zusammenfassung

In den verschiedenen Theorien zur Erklärung des Verhaltens der Steuerzahler werden sehr unterschiedliche Einflussgrößen der Steuermoral berücksichtigt. Im ökonomischen Modell wird vor allem die Bedeutung einer effizienten Strafverfolgung betont. Moderne Theorien erweitern jedoch den sozialen Kontext der Analyse, differenzieren die verschiedenen Motive der Steuerzahler und beachten neben Kontrollen und Strafen auch eine Reihe weiterer Faktoren. Betrachtet man Steuerhinterziehung als soziales Dilemma, tritt die Rolle der steuerfinanzierten staatlichen Leistungen in den Vordergrund, und es stellt sich die Frage, wie die Zahlungsmoral anderer Steuerzahler erlebt wird. Der Ansatz einer Responsive Regulation rückt hingegen die Qualität der Interaktionen mit den Steuerbehörden und die individuellen Unterschiede zwischen den Einstellungen der Steuerzahler in den Mittelpunkt. Im Slippery Slope Framework werden schließlich die verschiedenen ökonomischen und psychologischen Einflussgrößen der Steuermoral zu zwei Gruppen zusammengefasst: Einerseits können beispielsweise Steuerprüfungen und Strafen die wahrgenommene Macht der Steuerbehörden größer werden lassen, andererseits fördern Gerechtigkeit und positive soziale Normen das Vertrauen in das Steuersystem. Steuerehrlichkeit kann nach dieser Theorie durch Ausübung von Macht erzwungen werden oder als Folge von vertrauensfördernden Maßnahmen freiwillig entstehen.

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Metadaten
Titel
Theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung des Steuerverhaltens
verfasst von
Stephan Mühlbacher
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53846-3_6