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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Regional Integration and Secession with Rent-Seeking

verfasst von : Moriki Hosoe

Erschienen in: Regional Economic Analysis of Power, Elections, and Secession

Verlag: Springer Japan

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Abstract

These days, we have experienced many cases of the nationwide integration and separation, for example, from bloody conflicts of Balkan countries, to the collapse of Soviet Union, to the enlargement of the European Union. Though there are several nations with long-time political stability in history, considerably many countries periodically encounter some serious separation problem among ethnic or religious regions. This is not only a nationwide problem but also a regional problem. Especially the conflicts among several regions have broken up constantly. Multiracial nations are said to be destined to face the regional conflicts at any time.

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Metadaten
Titel
Regional Integration and Secession with Rent-Seeking
verfasst von
Moriki Hosoe
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Verlag
Springer Japan
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2_3