The 1991 Child Support Act

This chapter provides the intellectual basis and methodological approach for the study. It argues that the ‘stages heuristic’ has not outlived its usefulness in policy analysis, but rather remains a valuable framework to utilise when undertaking research into the policy-making process. It stresses that the purpose of this study is to undertake both an ‘analysis of policy’, and ‘analysis for policy’, this being the view that the field of policy analysis should use its knowledge of policies, and policy-making process, to improve the policy-making process and/or policies.

This chapter sets the scene for a deeper understanding of the context in which the 1991 Child Support Act was formulated, and how the ‘problem’ was constructed. It provides an historical and contextual background, looking at the trends relating to lone-parent families in Britain. This chapter demonstrates that the period preceding the creation of the 1991 Child Support Act was one of considerable change, not only in terms of the changing landscape of lone parents, but also a change through the introduction of New Right ideas within the Government and the popular press.

This chapter focuses on the problem definition stage. It demonstrates that the developments highlighted in Chapter 2 fed into how the ‘problem’ was defined, how the policy was represented, and subsequently, how policy-makers utilised ‘problem representation’ as a power resource to pave the path for successful passage of the policy. In the case of 1991 Child Support Act, there were considerable links between how the problem was defined and the policy’s subsequent failure. This chapter argues that there were numerous actors in the policy-making process, each viewing the policy through a different frame, and thus attaching different definitions of what the problem was that the policy sought to rectify. The chapter highlights that there was an unclear definition of the ‘problem’, which led to ambiguous and incompatible aims and objectives being contained within the Bill. The chapter argues that it is important to view ‘problem representation’ as being different to ‘problem definition’, and indeed how ‘problem representation’ is a tactic used to mask true motives and objectives. The chapter ends by arguing that Thatcher and the Treasury deployed this strategic use of ‘problem representation’ to frame the debate in terms of parental responsibility to children and an attempt to remedy a failing system. It demonstrates that Thatcher and the Treasury hid their definition of the problem under the problem identified by Newton and Mackay, using language and imagery to begin setting the agenda to not only garner popular support, but also limit any potential opposition. It stresses that even before the formal policy-making process had begun, the roots of policy failure had started to spring.

This chapter begins the examination of the formation of the 1991 Child Support Act. It assesses the role of policy transfer in both the creation and failure of the Act. The chapter argues that in the case of the 1991 Child Support Act it was not exclusively a case of policy transfer from one country to another, rather what took place was ‘incoherent dual policy transfer’. An inconsistent mix of the DSS’s attempt to introduce an appropriate, complete, and informed policy transfer from Australia, and Thatcher and the Treasury’s determination to introduce what was inappropriate, incomplete, and uninformed policy transfer from America. The chapter argues that there was no condensing process, whereby a strategic plan was devised to integrate elements of both policies; instead, both groups of actors fed directly into the new policy. It ends by suggesting that Thatcher and the Treasury allowed the DSS to undertake policy transfer from Australia, only to undermine it by injecting parts of their policy, as the policy presented by the DSS seemed more likely to win support. It suggests that Thatcher and the Treasury allowed ‘incoherent dual policy’ transfer to occur, using it as a convert, strategic tool to embed their desired attempt at policy within that of the DSS and LCOs’, just as they did with their definition of the problem.

This chapter focuses on the role of power within of the core executive and its impact on the formation of the 1991 Child Support Act. It stresses that in the drafting of the 1991 Child Support Bill there were two strands of thought and that these conflicting perspectives reflected the objectives pursued by different Government Departments and Ministers. It assesses the imbalance of power, looking at how divergent agendas gained position within the single policy. It evaluates the power resources (that of direct, indirect, and misdirected power) that Thatcher and the Treasury utilised to successfully push through their Treasury-driven agenda. The chapter also discusses the power relations and ‘battles’ that occurred within the core executive, showing why Newton introduced a policy despite not entirely agreeing with the details. This chapter states that while the policy proposal of Newton and Lord Mackay was maintained, the detail inside the Bill was controversial, ill-judged, and contradictory to the original aims, due to the involvement of Thatcher and the Treasury. The chapter ends by advancing upon Kingdon’s idea of ‘policy windows’ (1984), demonstrating that Thatcher and the Treasury were aware that their approach would be unlikely to obtain support and lead to the desired policy change, and so they concealed their ‘problem stream’ and ‘policy stream’ within that of Newton and Mackays’.

This chapter examins the legislative process, assessing it as the significant contributing factor in policy failure. It argues that the consultation process was merely a ‘rubber-stamping’ exercise and that the Parliamentary scrutiny process was both undermined and inadequate. The chapter argues that the plethora of administrative and implementation problems that the CSA faced could all be accredited to the policy itself. The chapter’s assessment of the consultation process demonstrates that several pressure groups highlighted the problems which the CSA would face, but these concerns were received with disdain by policy-makers. It then moves to examine the House of Lords stage, highlighting that they too raised a number of concerns over the detail of the Bill. The chapter also discusses the role of the House of Commons, arguing that it proved to be an ineffective source of checks-and-balance, ultimately allowing a flawed policy to pass through its chamber. The problems experienced by the 1991 Child Support Act were identified at consultation, during the House of Lords stage and, in large part, at the House of Commons; the problems were foreseeable and foreseen, but ignored. The chapter also assesses the role of the Opposition, stating that the scrutiny they performed was motivated by ‘blame avoidance’, therefore limited, ineffective, and inadvertently undermining and devaluing the process of Parliamentary scrutiny. It demonstrates that the failings of the Parliamentary scrutiny process allowed a ‘bad Bill’ to become a ‘bad Act’, paving the path to policy failure.

This chapter argues that the problems experienced during implementation and operation are in large part due to failings in legislature, discussing the role of ‘next-steps’ agencies, and how they moved the lines of accountability. It argues that the use of ‘next-steps’ agencies distorted our understanding and appreciation of the failure that took place when the Child Support Agency was in operation. The chapter then provides the conceptual background to this study’s approach to implementation and its relationship to policy formation and policy failure. The chapter is brief, this is because it argues that what have typically been argued to be implementation concerns, such as those raised within the idea of ‘perfect implementation’, should be seen as stemming from problems at other stages in the policy process. The chapter argues that instead of using the idea of ‘perfect implementation’, the criteria of ‘perfect legislation’ should be pursued.

This chapter focuses on the operation and apparent failings of the 1991 Child Support Act and evaluated the root of these failings. This chapter links back to the work done in previous chapters, reiterating how policy failure was foreseeable and foreseen, but ultimately avoidable. It discusses in turn what led to the creation of a flawed policy, and also what allowed it to pass through Parliament with ease. The chapter argues that formation of legislation is the bottleneck of policy success or failure. The chapter ends by establishing the criteria of ‘perfect legislation’, arguing that these are an appropriate framework to guide policy-makers, policy analysts, and academics through the complexities of policy-making, and avoid policy failure.

This book was designed to fulfil two main functions; firstly it was to tell the untold story of the 1991 Child Support Act from inception to operation as a whole. Highlighting how at each stage in the policy-making process issues emerged that ultimately lead to the creation of an unworkable policy and a failing agency.