Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
SLX-Digitalkonferenz: Zukunftswerkstatt 2024

Mehr Umsatz mit Top-Kontakten

Am 7. Mai erfahren Sie, wie Vertriebsteams Leadgenerierung, Leadnurturing und Leadstrategien effizient steuern können.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Constitutional Political Economy
Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 1/2008

01.03.2008 | Original article

The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics: implications for understanding the third sector

verfasst von: Vladislav Valentinov

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 1/2008

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the exchange paradigm of constitutional economics from the perspective of the theory of the division of labor. According to this theory, human wants can be satisfied by two basic mechanisms—exchange and self-sufficiency. The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics emphasizes the former mechanism while neglecting the latter. Building on major economic theories of the third sector, it is argued that the latter mechanism is more helpful than the former in explaining the existence of third sector organizations. The paper concludes by discussing implications of this argument for the further development of constitutional economics.
Vorheriger Artikel Discussion, construction and evolution: Mill, Buchanan and Hayek on the constitutional order
Nächster Artikel America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Literatur
Becker, G., & Murphy, K. (1992). The division of labor, coordination costs, and knowledge. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 1137–1160.CrossRef
Ben-Ner, A., & Gui, B. (2003). The theory of nonprofit organizations revisited. In H. Anheier, & A. Ben-Ner (Eds.) The study of the nonprofit enterprise (pp. 3–26). New York: Kluwer/Plenum.
Ben-Ner, A. (1986). Nonprofit organizations: Why do they exist in market economies? In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.) The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and policy (pp. 94–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buchanan, J. (1964). What should economists do? Southern Economic Journal, 30, 213–222.CrossRef
Buchanan, J. (1999 (1984)) Rights, efficiency, and exchange: The irrelevance of transaction cost. In J. Buchanan (Ed.) The collected works of James Buchanan. The logical foundations of constitutional liberty (volume 1) (pp. 260–277). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J. (1999 (1990)) The domain of constitutional economics. In J. Buchanan (Ed.) The collected works of James Buchanan. The logical foundations of constitutional liberty (volume 1) (pp. 377–395). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J. (2001a (1982)) The domain of subjective economics. Between predictive science and moral philosophy. In J. Buchanan (Ed.) The collected works of James Buchanan. Moral science and moral order (volume 17) (pp. 24–39). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J. (2001b (1993)) Property as a guarantor of liberty. In J. Buchanan (Ed.) The collected works of James Buchanan. Federalism, liberty, and the law (volume 18) (pp. 216–259). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J. (2000). The reason of rules: Constitutional political economy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Demsetz, H. (1997). The economics of the business firm: Seven critical commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grimalda, G., & Sacconi, L. (2005). The constitution of the not-for-profit organisation: Reciprocal conformity to morality Constitutional Political Economy, 16, 249–276.CrossRef
Hansmann, H. (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise. Yale Law Journal, 89, 835–901.CrossRef
Hansmann, H. (1987). Economic theories of nonprofit organization. In W. Powell (Ed.) The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 27–42). New Haven et al.: Yale University Press.
James, E. (1983). How nonprofits grow: A model. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2, 350–66.CrossRef
James, E. (1987). The nonprofit sector in comparative perspective. In W. Powell (Ed.) The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 397–415). New Haven et al.: Yale University Press.
James, E., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (1986). The nonprofit enterprise in market economies. Chur: Harwood.
Krashinsky, M. (1986). Transaction costs and a theory of the nonprofit organization. In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.) The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and policy (pp. 114–132). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mises, L. (1996). Human action. San Francisco: Fox and Wilkes.
Ortmann, A. & Schlesinger, M. (1997) Trust, repute, and the role of nonprofit enterprise. Voluntas, 8(2), 97–119.CrossRef
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996). Altruism, nonprofits, and economic theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 701–728.
Salamon, L. & Anheier, H. (1992) In search of the nonprofit sector. Voluntas, 3, 125–151.CrossRef
Smith, A. (1981). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations 1. Liberty Fund: Indianapolis.
Vanberg, V. (1994). Rules and choice in economics. London et al.: Routledge.
Weisbrod, B. (1988). The nonprofit economy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Yang, X., & Borland, J. (1991). A microeconomic mechanism for economic growth. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 460–482.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics: implications for understanding the third sector
verfasst von
Vladislav Valentinov
Publikationsdatum
01.03.2008
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 1/2008
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-007-9028-y

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 1/2008

Constitutional Political Economy 1/2008 Zur Ausgabe

Original Article

America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective

Original Article

Taxonomy: racism versus fiscal conservatism in voting on segregationist provisions in Alabama’s constitution

Original Article

Discussion, construction and evolution: Mill, Buchanan and Hayek on the constitutional order

Editorial

Editorial Announcement