Regular ArticleConsistent Bayesian Aggregation
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Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
2022, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :This raised a question: does Harsanyi's result remains valid when the individuals and the planner are Savage-style subjective expected utility maximizers, perhaps with different beliefs? In an influential paper, Mongin (1995) answered this question in the negative: in the Savage framework, the planner can satisfy the ex ante Pareto axiom if and only if all agents have the same beliefs. Since such homogeneity of beliefs is empirically implausible and perhaps even normatively undesirable, Mongin interpreted this result as an impossibility theorem.
Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives
2022, Journal of Economic TheoryBelief-averaging and relative utilitarianism
2021, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :They show that no social choice function satisfies the following properties: acts in the choice set are expected utility-maximizing for a belief and utility function of society, this belief (utility function) of society depends only on the agents' beliefs (utility functions), Pareto-dominated acts are never chosen, and no agent can dictate the belief. Much of the literature on single-profile results is inspired by Mongin (1995) and Gilboa et al. (2004) and focuses on the Pareto condition. Recall that Mongin proved that the Pareto condition can hold only if all agents have the same belief.
A welfare criterion with endogenous welfare weights for belief disagreement models
2021, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationSmooth aggregation of Bayesian experts
2021, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :To preserve Theorem 1, one would have to directly make an assumption analogous to (3). Gajdos et al. (2008) obtain a negative aggregation result that generalizes Mongin (1995). They consider a planner and agents whose preferences belong to a large class that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty.
A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk
2022, Economics and Philosophy