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Regulatory Scope for GPP

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Green Public Procurement under WTO Law

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 9))

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the legislative framework for GPP in the EU. It analyzes the development of GPP on three levels; firstly on the level of jurisprudence, secondly on the level of legislation and, thirdly, on the policy level. It then highlights the Environmental Integration Principle (EIP) as an important environmental guiding principles for EU states and discusses its legal significance for GPP. The remaining sections of this chapter illustrate the regulation of the public procurement instruments in the EU public procurement directive and demonstrate their effectiveness as a tool for GPP implementation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See for example Semple 2016, 54 or Dragos / Neamtu 2016, 114.

  2. 2.

    COM/2008/400 final, 4.

  3. 3.

    See, ex multis, Semple 2015, 7.01 ff.; Sjåfjell / Wiesbrock, xiii; Schebesta, 316; Nordic Council of ministries, 3 or Miranzo Diaz, 8.

  4. 4.

    Dragos / Neamtu 2014, 310.

  5. 5.

    See for example Semple 2015, 7.11; Arrowsmith / Kunzlik, fn 7; Miranzo Diaz, 12; Schebesta 317. As noted by Bradley, 141, this is symptomatic for the increasingly important role of the CJEU as an arbiter who is obliged to weigh up a variety of concerns that do not necessarily have to be legal in character.

  6. 6.

    Bovis 2016, xiii.

  7. 7.

    Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v State of the Netherlands [Beentjes], ECLI:EU:C:1988:422. In casu, the authority favoured companies that imply long-term unemployed (by means of an award criterion).

  8. 8.

    Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [Concordia Bus], ECLI:EU:C:2002:495.

  9. 9.

    Concordia Bus, Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, ECLI:EU:C:2001:686, paras. 77 and 123.

  10. 10.

    Case C-448/01, EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Republik Österreich [EVN and Wienstrom], ECLI:EU:C:2003:651.

  11. 11.

    Case C-368/10, European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands [Max Havelaar], ECLI:EU:C:2012:284.

  12. 12.

    Case C-262/12, Association Vent De Colère! Fédération nationale and Others v Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable, des Transports et du Logement and Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie [Vent De Colère], ECLI:EU:C:2013:851.

  13. 13.

    COM/1996/583, final, Chapter VI.

  14. 14.

    COM/2001/68, final, 12 and 15.

  15. 15.

    COM/2001/0566 final, passim, Miranzo Diaz, 11.

  16. 16.

    Schebesta, 316.

  17. 17.

    See below, Sect. 8.2.

  18. 18.

    See Article 23 Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 53 Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 48(2)(f) Directive 2004/18/EC.

  19. 19.

    COM/2008/400 final, 4.

  20. 20.

    Kingston 2016, 25.

  21. 21.

    Dragos / Neamtu 2016, 116.

  22. 22.

    COM/2017/572 final, 8.

  23. 23.

    COM/2017/572 final, 8.

  24. 24.

    Sjåfjell / Wiesbrock, 5.

  25. 25.

    Wiesbrock, 112.

  26. 26.

    Sjåfjell / Wiesbrock, 8.

  27. 27.

    Bovis 2016, 18.

  28. 28.

    Wiesbrock, 112.

  29. 29.

    Wiesbrock, 106, with references.

  30. 30.

    These provisions state that the Union “shall aim at” (Articles 8 and 10 TFEU), “shall take into account” (Articles 9 and 12 TFEU) and therefore do not contain an obligation, but rather an encouragement; see also Kingston 2011, 118.

  31. 31.

    Wiesbrock, 106 with reference to Kingston 2011.

  32. 32.

    For a more detailed account see Sjåfjell, passim.

  33. 33.

    Sjåfjell, 55–58.

  34. 34.

    Recital 91 Directive 2014/24/EU states that “Article 11 TFEU requires that environmental protection requirements be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development. This Directive clarifies how the contracting authorities can contribute to the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development, whilst ensuring that they can obtain the best value for money for their contracts.”

  35. 35.

    Concordia Bus, para 57: “In the light of [Article 11 TFEU], which lays down that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of Community policies and activities, it must be concluded that Article 36(1)(a) of Directive 92/50 does not exclude the possibility for the contracting authority of using criteria relating to the preservation of the environment […].”

  36. 36.

    Sjåfjell, 55–58.

  37. 37.

    The requirement for proportionality can be derived from the three duties substantiated by Sjåfjell, 55–58: the first duty is to seek a balance between the various objectives of EU law.

  38. 38.

    Wiesbrock, 130.

  39. 39.

    Wiesbrock, 130; Sjåfjell / Wiesbrock, 11; see in more detail below, Sect. 8.4.

  40. 40.

    Regulation (EC) No 106/2008 on a Community energy-efficiency labelling programme for office equipment, in particular Article 6.

  41. 41.

    Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings requires Member States in Article 9 to ensure that all new public buildings are nearly CO2 neutral.

  42. 42.

    See Directive 2009/33/EC on the promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles. This directive also provides for a common calculation method to measure operational life time costs in Article 6.

  43. 43.

    See also above, Sect. 6.4.

  44. 44.

    Semple 2015, 7.09; Kahlenborn et al., 8.

  45. 45.

    The one exception being the precedence case of Max Havelaar.

  46. 46.

    See above, Sect. 6.4.

  47. 47.

    See above, Sect. 6.4: according to Article X GPA green technical specifications i) cannot amount to unnecessary obstacles to international trade, ii) shall be based on performance and functional requirements as well as on international standards, iii) have to include and consider equivalent offers and cannot be based on trademarks, iv) cannot be drafted with the help of persons with a commercial interests in a manner that would be bad for competition and v) need to be documented and published in a transparent way.

  48. 48.

    See above, Sect. 6.4.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    While EU law typically contains wordings such as “shall afford equal access of economic operators”, the GPA expressly refers to “foreign suppliers, goods or services” (emphasis added).

  51. 51.

    Semple 2015, 4.32.

  52. 52.

    Article X:6 GPA refers to “technical specifications to promote the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment” (emphasis added).

  53. 53.

    Cottier / Oesch, 167.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    See above Sect. 6.4.

  56. 56.

    See also Semple 2015, fn 43.

  57. 57.

    Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reußenköge III GmbH and Land Schleswig-Holstein [Preussen Elektra], ECLI:EU:C:2001:160.

  58. 58.

    Preussen Elektra, para. 73.

  59. 59.

    See above Sect. 6.5.

  60. 60.

    Semple 2015, 440.

  61. 61.

    See for example Recital 91, Recital 97 or Article 67(2) Public Procurement Directive.

  62. 62.

    For the discussion on npr PPM see above, Sects. 6.5 and 8.3.2.

  63. 63.

    Section 6.5.

  64. 64.

    Although the “most economically advantageous tender” was already contained in the 2004 directives, the term in the 2014 directives has a slightly altered meaning and needs to be read in light of new jurisprudence and of its new context, as pointed out in Recital 89 of Directive 2014/24/EU.

  65. 65.

    Semple 2016, 55, fn 12.

  66. 66.

    Wiesbrock 2013, 120.

  67. 67.

    According to Article 67(2) Directive 2014/24/EU “Member States may provide that contracting authorities may not use price only or cost only as the sole award criterion (…)”.

  68. 68.

    So far, the CJEU has confirmed in three cases (Concordia, EVN and Wienstrom as well as Max Havelaar) that environmental (or social) criteria can be decisive to ensure value for money according to the MEAT approach.

  69. 69.

    Sjåfjell / Wiesbrock, 19.

  70. 70.

    Dragos / Neamtu 2016, 116.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    See e.g. Dragos / Neamtu 2016, 117.

  73. 73.

    Dragos / Neamtu 2016, 127 and 132.

  74. 74.

    Concordia Bus, paras. 27 and 44.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., paras. 53 et seqq.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., para. 64.

  77. 77.

    Semple 2015, 4.43.

  78. 78.

    Concordia Bus, para. 59.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., para. 65.

  80. 80.

    EVN and Wienstrom, para. 72.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Semple 2015, 4.43.

  83. 83.

    Beentjes, para. 26.

  84. 84.

    Concordia Bus, para. 66.

  85. 85.

    EU Buying Green Handbook, 64 and 65.

  86. 86.

    Semple 2015, 5.19.

  87. 87.

    See above, Sect. 8.4.2.1.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., 5.21.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    For a description of eco-labels, see above, Sect. 6.4.4; within the context of energy labels see Weber 2018, passim.

  92. 92.

    Corvaglia 2016, 607; Schebesta, 326; Weber 2018, 247 et seqq.

  93. 93.

    Schebesta, 326.

  94. 94.

    “They [contracting authorities] can use, but are not obliged to use appropriate specifications that are defined in ecolabels” (Preamble of Directive 2004/18/EC Recital 91).

  95. 95.

    For a detailed analysis of the Max Havelaar ruling see Steiner 2012, passim.

  96. 96.

    The EKO label certifies products with at least 95% organic agricultural ingredients and Max Havelaar is a label that relates to fair trade, i.e. social standards like payment of minimum wages for workers, see Max Havelaar paras. 34 et seqq.

  97. 97.

    Max Havelaar, para. 67.

  98. 98.

    Ibid.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., paras. 69 and 70.

  100. 100.

    Caranta 2016, 102. Furthermore, the author points to the exceptions in the field of energy-efficiency, where labelling requirements may be mandatory, see Caranta 2016, 103.

  101. 101.

    This is a repetition of the requirement already incorporated in the respective provisions on technical specifications (Article 42), award criteria (Article 67) and contract performance conditions (Article 70).

  102. 102.

    Concordia Bus, para. 66, see also Sect. 8.4 on award criteria.

  103. 103.

    See above, Sect. 8.4.

  104. 104.

    Miranzo Diaz, 15.

  105. 105.

    See also above, Sects. 3.6 and 6.6.

  106. 106.

    The 2014 reform softens the so far strict separation between supplier related criteria and contract related criteria: While, in general, exclusion or selection criteria are meant to concern a tenderer’s overall capability, award criteria should concern the contract only. However, Article 67(2)(b) Directive 2014/24/EU now states that qualification and experience of staff can also be considered within the framework of award criteria, of course only on a weighted preference basis.

  107. 107.

    See above Sect. 6.6: Article VIII(1) GPA states as follows: “A procuring entity shall limit any conditions for participation to those that are essential to ensure that a supplier has the legal and financial capacities and the commercial and technical abilities to undertake the relevant procurement.”

  108. 108.

    Mandatory ground of exclusion means that the contracting authorities of the respective EU Member States have to exclude a tenderer, when these reasons are given. The mandatory character of these exclusion grounds is indicated by the wording “shall” and by the wording “the obligation to exclude an economic operated shall also apply” in the last sentence of Article 57(1) Directive 2014/24/EU.

  109. 109.

    The pertinent international environmental agreements are listed in Annex X Directive 2014/24/EU.

  110. 110.

    Semple 2015, 4.11.

  111. 111.

    Sections 8.3.1 and 8.4.2.1.

  112. 112.

    Wiesbrock, 132.

  113. 113.

    The EU Commission calls public procurement “a strategic instrument in each Member State’s economic policy toolbox”, see COM/2017/572 final, 2.

  114. 114.

    Semple 2016, 54.

  115. 115.

    According to the EU Commission 55% of procurement procedures are still based on the lowest price, see COM/2017/572 final, 5.

  116. 116.

    The GPA does not regulated (npr) PPM within the context of award/evaluation criteria, see above, Sects. 6.4 and 6.5.

  117. 117.

    See above, Sect. 6.4.4.

  118. 118.

    See above, Sect. 2.2.

  119. 119.

    See above, Sect. 6.4.1.2.

  120. 120.

    Sjåfjell / Wiesbrock, 239.

  121. 121.

    See webpage of the Italian ministry of environment (ministerio dell’ambiente), available at: http://www.minambiente.it/pagina/gpp-acquisti-verdi.

  122. 122.

    GPA/W/341, 5.

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    Rika Koch

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Koch, R. (2020). Regulatory Scope for GPP. In: Green Public Procurement under WTO Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48214-5_8

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