1 Introduction

To understand the consequences of intra-European movement for Poland we have to be aware of several political and socio-economic developments, which have shaped its scale and character. The main (geo)political occurrences, the falling apart of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, allowed Poland to transform from a communist to a democratic system. It has changed from a country with strictly controlled outflows to one with borders open to migration. The possibility of free movement for Poles has increased even further with Poland joining the European Union (EU) and the Schengen Area (Anacka and Okólski 2014). As a result, Poles in the EU turned from so-called ‘third-country nationals’, whose movement is controlled, to freely moving EU citizens. The UK, followed by Ireland and Sweden, declared that they would not apply transitional arrangements and provided Poles with full access to their labour markets immediately after Poland’s EU accession in 2004. By 2011 the last EU countries (Germany and Austria) opened up their labour markets to Poles. This means that Poles can work officially in all of the countries in the Schengen Area. According to the European Commission’s terminology they are no longer ‘labour migrants’, but ‘mobile workers’. The absence of these ‘mobile workers’ is for Poland a governance concern. Poland’s Migration Policy,Footnote 1 approved by the Polish government in 2012, is a strategic document that sets out the general direction of activities that aim to ‘minimize negative effects of emigration’ by focusing on systemic solutions, especially concerning assistance to returnees, and monitoring the impact of emigration on Poland (in particular its social consequences) (MI 2012).

The key economic and social developments, which have shaped the character of the intra-European movement of Poles, are a result of Poland’s change from a centralised economy to a capitalist market economy. Since the early 1990s the country has witnessed structural unemployment, growing discrepancies in wages and unstable working conditions. Social aspects, such as a growing number of youth with higher education and more intense participation of women in the labour market (Augustyn 2010) increased the dynamics of labour market changes. Of crucial importance here are the different paste and level of economic development of Poland’s regions, resulting in a growing polarisation – with some regions flourishing, while others being close to economic recession and the rate of unemployment being very diversified across the country (Anacka and Okólski 2014).Footnote 2 Overall, the average monthly salary in Poland is considerably lower than in other EU member states.Footnote 3 The significant differences between wage levels in Poland and other EU member states, combined with access to relatively cheap transport, a better knowledge of English than 20 years ago, and awareness of a large group of Poles ‘out there’ (potentially to fall back in case of need), made moving from a small town in Poland to London more attractive as a destination than moving to Warsaw, Poland’s capital.Footnote 4

Finally, we need to underline that the consequences of intra-European movement are not limited to EU countries. The possibility of intra-European movement for Poles, was accompanied by restrictions for migrants wanting to enter Poland. The liberal approach to foreigners entering Poland since the 1990s has slowly been curtailed with Poland’s process of joining the EU. Visas for third country-nationals, among them Ukrainians, the main migrant group in Poland, were introduced in 2003, just before Poland’s accession to the EU, and a more complex visa system was introduced upon Poland’s joining the Schengen Area in 2007.Footnote 5

The aim of this chapter is to provide, as part of the European research project ‘IMAGINATION’, the perspective of the migrant sending countries on intra-European movement. The chapter characterizes the migration corridors between Poland and urban regions in countries, which are the focus of this book, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden.Footnote 6 It concentrates on the Dutch-Polish corridor for three main reasons. First, the post-2004 movement of Poles was the largest to the Netherlands from the three respective countries. Second, the sending regions represent those with the highest intensity of outflow from Poland and are the places of origin of Poles who engaged in pre- and/or post-2004 movement. Third, it provides important examples of regional and trans-national migration governance. The chapter analyses the implications of intra-European movement of Poles for Poland, and in particular for sending urban regions to the Netherlands. It also reflects upon the link between the EU freedom of movement and the migration of third-country nationals to Poland.

2 “Let’s go West!” CEE Migration Corridors from Poland: Characteristics and Institutional Context

2.1 Scale and Regions of Origin

Poland has had a long history of emigration and a significant track of increased temporary migration after its systemic transition in 1989. However, the post-EU accession brought an increase in scale difficult to ignore. While, according to 2002 census data, 2 percent of Poland’s population were emigrants (786, 000 persons), the 2011 census data shows a 154 percent (sic!) (over 1.2 million) increase (for comparison of pre- and post-enlargement data see Chap. 2). Over 80 percent of these migrants stayed in European Union countries (CSO 2013).Footnote 7 Annual CSO estimates show that the stock of temporary migrants abroad has stabilized at 2 million people (6.6 percent of the total population), which is a significant number of absentees in particular regions. There is little evidence of returns of post-EU accession migrants. The substantial return migration to Poland, which was especially felt during the economic crisis of 2008–09, consisted mainly of migrants who have left Poland before 2004 and who returned to regions “with relatively long traditions of emigration and not necessarily the ones with strong pull factors” (Kaczmarczyk & Lesińska 2012:30).

According to the 2011 population census, Poles involved in intra-European movement originated mainly from Śląskie, Małopolskie, Dolnośląskie and Podkarpackie region (South-Western and Southern Poland) (see Fig. 10.1). The leading regions for intensity of outflows as compared to the number of inhabitants were Opolskie in Southern, Podlaskie in Eastern and Podkarpackie in South-Eastern Poland (see Fig. 10.1, emigration rate). In terms of pre- and post-enlargement changes we can note that Dolnośląskie region has outnumbered Małopolskie in terms of people leaving. In addition, while for years the Opolskie region was in the lead and it continues to be among significant sending regions, migration from this region decreased (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009).Footnote 8 In light of implications to be discussed, it is important to keep in mind that Opolskie and Podlaskie regions have the lowest number of inhabitants in Poland. Małopolskie and Podkarpackie regions are also no demographic strongholds. Opolskie, Podlaskie and Podkarpackie regions are for the most part economically underdeveloped areas with large agricultural sectors and declining industrial sectors (Kaczmarczyk 2012). Śląskie, Opolskie and Dolnośląskie regions, which are set near Poland’s western border, also represent the ‘traditional’ pattern of Polish migration based on ethnic ties and kinship, primarily to Germany (CSO 2013; Kaczmarczyk 2014). However, the intra-European movement involved also the participation of regions, which before 2004 played a marginal role as regions of migrants origin. It meant that the differences between the intensity of out-migration from particular regions in Poland has decreased (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009, see Fig. 10.1).

Fig. 10.1
figure 1

Emigration from provinces in Poland, 2011

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It is worth noting that Poland is slowly transforming into a net immigration country. From the 1990s to 2005 the registered permanent emigration exceeded immigration, reaching its peak in 2006. Emigration remained high in the subsequent two years due to the already mentioned rapid growth of out-migration connected with EU accession. However, a visible increase in immigration is visible since 2007 and combined with a decrease in emigration, both flows equalised (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2013).

2.2 Intra-European Movement Corridors and Characteristics of Migrants

According to the 2011 population census, the four main EU destination countries for Poles were: the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands.Footnote 9 Table 10.1 shows the dynamics and changing patterns of the movement of Poles. We can trace the significant change occurred with the mass migration to the British Iles. 2007 was the peak year, with 2.3 million persons (6.6 percent of the population) abroad. Much smaller increases than those observed in the early post-accession years were recorded in the years 2011 to 2013. These changes were mostly due to an increase in the number of emigrants to Germany and the United Kingdom.

Table 10.1 Estimates of Polish citizen staying abroad for longer than two months (three months since 2007) (thousands), and percentage changes as compared with previous year, 2002–14 (data for UK, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria)
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From the countries, which are the focus of the book, apart from the already mentioned Netherlands, which is among the main destination countries, in the case of Austria the most significant increase occurs between 2004 and 2007, with a substantial decrease due to the economic crisis in 2008. Fluctuations occur between 2011 and 2012, but the scale of migration in general is not that high. Sweden shows a steady increase, with no decrease due to the economic crisis (for comparison of data for Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden see Chap. 2).

Analysing the estimates of ‘temporary migrants’ from the perspective of the opening of labour markets to Polish nationals, there is a clear impact caused by the lack of transitional arrangements in accessing the labour market by Poles in the case of the UK, Ireland (access in 2004) and the Netherlands (access in 2007) and no visible impact in the case of Sweden (access in 2004) and in the case of Austria (access in 2011) (see also Chap. 2; for an in-depth analysis of the role of transitional arrangements see (Fihel et al. 2015). As Fihel and co-authors write (2015) the primary drivers of migration were labour demand and such factors as migration networks and socio-cultural factors (including language). The impact of transitional arrangements (or their lack), although, as noted above, visible in the case of some countries, was less important. For example, the stable increase of Poles staying temporarily abroad in the Netherlands between 2004 and 2006, as well as the increase in 2007, apart from the impact of transitional arrangements, could be explained as a combination of the characteristics of migration from the Opolskie region (traditional sending region), the structure of the Dutch labour market and the role of recruitment (employment) agencies. The stable increase in the case of Austria between 2004 and 2006 may be due to the existence of migrant networks. Meanwhile, the lack of drastic increase in Sweden may be due to the low demand for foreign workers as a result of ‘social control’ mechanisms (trade unions and employer agreements), where wages are fixed at a high level, which may make employing a foreigner less profitable. Here the employment agencies direct the flows of qualified manpower to specific industries where migrant workers are in demand. In addition, in the case of Sweden and other Scandinavian countries ‘posted worker’ arrangementsFootnote 10 are common. Another barrier to a sudden increase in the case of Sweden are socio-cultural factors, such as language.

As mentioned, the employment (recruitment) agencies play an important role in forming the migration corridor between Poland and some of the EU countries. The fact that they match employer and employee, and prepare prospective employees to take up work abroad is mostly relevant to non-English speaking countries (Napierała & Fiałkowska 2013). For example, agencies from Sweden organise language courses for new employees, often sharing the costs with employers. Research shows that courses were offered in French, German, English, Swedish, Dutch or Norwegian (Napierała & Fiałkowska 2013). Employers anticipate that investments made in future employees will pay off when they start working. It is also an opportunity for workers to improve their skills and employability.

Who were those Poles who engaged in mobility after 2004? According to the CMR/BAEL database from 2004–2006 almost two-thirds of post-accession migrants are men. Four regions, among them Opolskie and Śląskie, are an exception to this masculinisation of migration. Meanwhile, 2011 Census data shows already a 54% share of women among all emigrants (CSO 2013). Migrants involved in intra-European movement are also younger (on average below 30 years old) when compared to pre-2004 migrants. Here again four regions, among them Opolskie, are exceptions, with the migrants being older (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). The 2011 Census data shows that women migrate at a younger age then men. However, an important share constitute also women over 60 years old (possibly elderly-care workers or grandmothers proving care for their grandchildren) (Ślusarczyk & Slany 2016). Post-accession migrants are also relatively well educated, with the share of those with higher education having increased and those with primary education – decreased. According to the 2011 Census data women engaged in the post-2004 movement were better educated than men, with also a smaller share of women then men with primary vocational education. The share of migrants originating from towns with over 100 thousand inhabitants has increased. However, still the majority of migrants originated from villages (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). Unfortunately the available data tells us little about the socio-economic status of these migrants. From regional studies we know that many of those young migrants were graduates with no labour market experience. They were also rather childless. However, the proportion of accompanying dependents (under 14) has been growing over the past few years, which may be a sign of temporary migration changing into more long-term or even settlement migration (Kaczmarczyk 2013; CSO 2013). No mass migration of highly qualified labour was noted at that time, although in some professions, such as anaesthetists, the outflow was significant (Wiśniewski & Duszczyk 2007) (for information on types of Central and Eastern European migrants see Chap. 3). However, the socio-demographic diversity of this group points to high selectivity and suggests heterogeneity in terms of socio-economic status of Poles engaged in intra-European movement (see Chap. 1 in this volume).

As the CMR/BAEL data-base from 2004–2006 shows, the United Kingdom and Ireland are the main recipients of a large share of the young (not exceeding 28 years), relatively well educated post-accession migrants, who originate often from urban areas and frequently from regions which previously were not sending migrants abroad. 26 percent in Ireland and 22.5 percent in the UK of Poles had tertiary education. Meanwhile, intra-European movement from Poland to Germany and the Netherlands is characterised by the participation of a different type of migrant: over 40 years old, with vocational education and originating from rural areas (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009, Kaczmarczyk 2010). Among migrants to the Netherlands only 4 percent had tertiary education. The two types of migrants in EU destination countries were present before 2004, however accession to the EU has changed the proportion of these in favour of younger, better educated, male migrants.

It is worth shortly outlining the particularities of the migration corridors, which are the focus of this book, these are: Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands (see also Chap. 2). The main regions of origin of Poles migrating to Austria are Małopolskie, Dolnośląskie and Podkarpackie, closely followed by the Śląskie and Mazowieckie regions. The first four regions of migrant origin are geographically concentrated, all located in the south, spatially the closest for travel to Austria. In Małopolskie, in the case of migrants going to Austria urban areas dominated as places of migrant origin (Bieńkowska et al. 2010b). The average length of stay abroad of Dolnośląskie region inhabitants was two years. 57 percent of migrants from Małopolskie region stayed 25 months or longer in Austria. However, the Małopolskie region study shows also that over 28 percent of those who stayed in Austria were short-term migrants (between 3 and 12 months) (Bieńkowska et al. 2009, 2010b). Thus, the general trend is rather long-term migration, although the scale of short-term migrants should not be ignored.

In the case of Sweden, the majority of Poles originated from the Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie and Mazowieckie regions (see Fig. 10.1). The first two regions are located in the north, neighbouring with Sweden across the Baltic Sea. When looking at the share of migrants to Sweden as compared to the total number of migrants from the region, Zachodniopomorskie, Mazowieckie and Dolnośląskie have the most (CSO 2013). As in the case of Austria, Poland’s EU accession has not significantly impacted migration from Poland to Sweden. Migrant networks play a role, with Sweden having already had a large Polish diaspora before 2004 (Gerdes & Wadensjö 2013). The role of recruitment agencies is also significant, as is the demand for highly skilled migrants originating mainly from urban regions. The recruitment agencies are to a large extent responsible also for the selectivity of migration, with a predominance of young women in post-accession migration to Sweden.

As we will later on focus also on the regional implications of the Poland-Netherlands corridor, the description of this corridor is more detailed. In case of the Netherlands, Poles have migrated there long before Poland’s accession to the European Union. The autochthon population (having German roots) from the Opolskie region has a long history of labour migration primarily based on dual Polish-German citizenship (Walaszek 2007, Jończy 2014, CSO 2013, Kaczmarczyk 2013, Chap 2). The 2002 population census showed 10,000 Poles staying temporarily in the Netherlands. The scale of post-2004 migration from Poland has completely taken by surprise Netherland’s policy-makers, who were expecting approximately 20,000 persons arriving. The 2011 census shows a ten-fold increase to the data from 2002, with over 105, 000 Poles staying there temporarily.

The migrants to the Netherlands originate mainly from Southwestern Poland (see Fig. 10.1). The Opolskie region borders with the Czech Republic. It is known both for its history of emigration and the intensity of outflows. According to Jończy (2014) approximately 9 thousand persons are permanently absent for already several years from the Opolskie region, which he coins as a new type of post-accession “suspended migration” (the total estimate for the region of those suspended migrants – i.e. those who have emigrated, but did not deregister - is 100,000). Estimates of unregistered emigration (permanent and labour) in the population of Opolskie region (total of 1013 thousand) were equal to 200 thousand persons by the end of 2011 (Jończy 2014). The informal channel of recruitment that developed in the past between Opolskie and the Netherlands was cemented and further developed by recruitment agencies in the 1990s, providing access to the non-autochthon population of the region, which dominated post-accession migration.Footnote 11

Apart from the already mentioned Opolskie, also Śląskie and Dolnośląskie dominate as sending regions (see Fig. 10.1). The Śląskie region borders with the Czech Republic and Slovakia and is a traditional emigration region like Opolskie. This spatial closeness and existence of migrant networks are important explanations for the reasons for migration from this area, as in terms of economic indicators the region is doing well.Footnote 12 At least one member of over 7 percent (120,931) of households went abroad for over three months between 2004 and 2011. From these, approximately 10 percent (12093) chose the Netherlands as their destination (Bieńkowska et al. 2011).

The Dolnośląskie region is placed at the border with Germany and the Czech Republic. In Dolnośląskie there is a great internal discrepancy in regard to unemployment rates with the highest rate equal to 25.9 percent (wałbrzyski poviat) and the lowest to 4.2 percent (wrocławski poviat).Footnote 13 These differences meant that the region was at the bottom end among regions in Poland in regard to the stability of the functioning of the labour market. However, thanks to the EU accession it became one of the fastest developing regions. Still the systemic transformations were so dramatic that the level of employment has not reached yet the levels from 1999.Footnote 14 Between 2004 and 2007, 6 percent (12012) of all 182,000 migrants from the Dolnośląskie region headed for the Netherlands (Bieńkowska et al. 2009).

Almost 90 percent of Poles staying in the Netherlands fall into the category of labour migrant and a significant share constitute short-term migrants (3–12 months) (CSO 2013). The 2011 population census data also shows that short-term migration (3–12 months) is certainly more significant in the case of the Netherlands, than it is for Sweden or Austria. This is linked to both the larger scale and the more seasonal character of labour migration to this country. Migration to the Netherlands was feminized until Poland’s EU accession and the post-accession migration brought an increase of male migrants (Kaczmarczyk et al. 2012).

3 Implications of Post-2004 Migration for Poland

Post-enlargement migration from Poland is characterised by a greater variety of forms then post 1989 migration, including the tendency to stay longer and even settle abroad (see also Chap. 2). The population outflow due to intra-European movement has already had enormous consequences for the intensification of depopulationFootnote 15 at regional and local level, especially for cities (Zborowski et al. 2012; Spórna et al. 2016). This is due to the fact that particular regions in Poland are clearly ‘migrant-sending regions’ and due to the selectivity of migration, with particular groups more inclined to migrate. As a result of migration population, ageing intensifies. The young age of migrants has caused the birth rate to fall in Poland by approximately 10 percent (Fihel & Solga 2014). This, together with the number of children born abroad, influences the changing population structure of Poland as a whole and of particular regions. Assuming no return of post-accession migration, the birth rate will fall by another 10 percent and by 2035 the population structure will be a challenge to the labour market with a decrease in those of working age (KBM PAN 2014).

Focusing on the migrant sending regions to the Netherlands, Śląskie and Opolskie (traditional emigration regions) have to cope with consequences of depopulation (accompanied by low birth rates and an ageing population) (KBM PAN 2014; for information on consequences for receiving regions see Chap. 3). A number of towns in these regions can be classified as “shrinking cities”, among them in the Katowice conurbation (total of 33 cities) in Śląskie and small urban centres in Opolskie (Zborowski et al. 2012; Spórna et al. 2016). The most difficult situation is in the Opolskie region. As was already mentioned, according to estimates approximately one-third of the regions’ population have left the region over the past 35 years (Jończy 2014). The rate of emigration for this region is 10 times higher than the average rate for Poland, and the region’s birth rate is the lowest in the country. Depopulation has had a negative impact on development in over 70 percent of the Opolskie region’s counties. This is primarily due to the migration of young and entrepreneurial inhabitants. One in every five people aged 20–30 has left the region (Jończy 2014; Solga 2013). Jończy (2014) writes that emigration abroad is accompanied by the internal exodus of young people to large urban centres, especially to the city of Wrocław, both to study and to find work. As a result of all of these factors population ageing in this region is especially acute, with the regional government having established a special demographic area.Footnote 16

The depopulation of the region, particularly visible in rural areas and in smaller cities, is accompanied by the reduction of infrastructure. Schools, kindergartens, and nurseries are being closed down, the number of local associations, sports clubs and voluntary fire brigades decreases, bus and train connections cease to exist (Jończy 2014, Solga 2013). This is not only the result of emigration, but it also becomes its additional cause, decreasing the region’s attractiveness as a place to live and thus making it even more prone to depopulation and emigration (Jończy 2014).

Since 1990s, the process of depopulation affected all cities of the Śląsk region. In the years 1990–2013, the Katowice conurbation depopulation process concerned 32 out of 37 municipalities, characterised by urban shrinkage of some cities, with a large number of young people under 35 migrating to other cities and abroad. For example, the city of Bytom has lost practically all of its economic base - it has currently only one coal mine operating (out of 6 mines in the 1980s) and companies related to the fuel and clothing industries have been closed or moved to other cities. Approximately 8 percent of flats are uninhabited (Spórna et al. 2016).

Researchers analysing the impact of the post-accession migration on families in the Opolskie region, using a normative and blaming phraseology, claim that non-autochthon (Silesian) population is less masculinised and thus causes more often what has been called ‘full euro-orphanage’ (both parents working abroad and children remaining in Poland) (Jończy 2014).Footnote 17 Authorities point out the substantial financial strain caused by the combination of migrant workers paying taxes abroad and not contributing to the local budget, while at the same time expecting local institutions to educate their children and to care for their elderly parents. As Solga notes (2013) after 2004 there has been a clear increase in expenditure on elderly care for migrant families in 39 percent of the counties in the Opolskie region. The counties have to cover the full costs of home-based care or social assistance provided to elderly members of migrant families, as it is often difficult to find evidence of the real income of those working abroad (Solga 2013).

Depopulation is linked also to lack of labour force at the regional labour markets. 25 percent of the gminas (administrative communities) in Opolskie experience a deficit of labour supply due to the migration of specialists and qualified workers (Solga 2013). The potential impact of post-2004 returnees on the regional labour markets is not yet known, as was noted earlier it seems that those who have returned are pre- enlargement migrants. However, the post-2004 migrants may not fill the gaps. As was stated before post-accession migrants to the Netherlands are predominantly temporary labour migrants, who are rather older and with vocational education. Thus, these are not the type of returnees that local and regional authorities wish for (Solga 2013). Also among the returnees to Śląskie region in the period 2004–2011, the majority did not have a proof for the new qualifications and skills they gained abroad (Bieńkowska et al. 2011). As a result the unemployment rate can actually rise.

When it comes to the macro-economic implications, the post-2004 migration resulted in a decrease in the unemployment rate in Poland to below 10 per cent in 2007 and a general improvement in economic indexes. However, these can be attributed also to other factors such as a better economic climate or wider structural changes. Has migration had a positive impact on the level of unemployment in the regional labour markets as claimed in the “crowding-out” hypothesis (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009)? The hypothesis states that the people from peripheral regions with low financial capital an oversupply of labour move. In Opolskie the decrease of the unemployment rate in the years 2004–2008 is clearly visible. The Western part of the region was much more affected by a decrease of unemployment due to migration, as it was until the enlargement characterised by 2–3 times higher rates of unemployment then in the rest of the region (Jończy 2014). Similarly, migration abroad played one of the key roles as drivers of unemployment decrease in cities in the Katowice conurbation (Śląsk province) (Spórna et al. 2016). However, since 2008 the impact has declined, with a number of migrants deciding to settle abroad and the purchasing power and the possibility for investments (due to the strengthening of the Polish currency) of the returnees having declined. A number of autochthons decided to return, which on the one hand resulted in partial economic revival, while on the other hand (combined with the macro-economic crisis) meant an increase in unemployment rates.

Also what should be noted from macro-economic implications is that for the past 20 years remittances have played a growing role in the Polish economy, increasing from 0.5 to 1.5 per cent of GDP in the years 1995–2011, with a peak of 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2006–07. Remittances have contributed to the growth of real disposable income and to an increase in household consumption contributing a further 0.1 percentage points to GDP from 4.3 to 4.4 per cent (Barbone et al. 2012). As Luca Barbone and other authors write: ‘The value and share of remittances in GDP increased considerably after Poland joined the EU and most European labour markets opened their doors to Poles. Remittances were also larger than EU transfers until 2008.’ Remittances have an enormous effect on macroeconomic aggregates (consumption and income). At the level of household budgets, Barbone and other authors (2012) showed that: 1) remittances are sent to a relatively small number of households in Poland (2.5 percent in 2008) and represent a sizeable portion of their incomes; and 2) recipients of remittances are mainly from small towns and rural areas rather than large cities.

Focusing on the Poland-Netherlands corridor remittances in the Opolskie region were appraised at PLN 6 billion in 2010 (approx. € 1,5 billion). This huge sum accounted for half of the Opolskie inhabitants’ annual disposable income and as a result has led the rankings of disposable income among all the regions in Poland (Jończy 2014). Data on other regions show that approximately one fourth of migrants has sent remittances in a regular fashion. According to data from a study (2004–2011) carried out among returnees in Śląsk, 27 percent of returnees have sent regular remittances while abroad (the majority a monthly amount between PLN 1000 and PLN 2500, approx. €250–625). 19 percent sent remittances occasionally. What is also of great importance is that among households receiving remittances, they were the main source of income for 41 percent and in addition an important source of income for 32 percent (Bieńkowska et al. 2011). In general remittances were spent on consumption, renovations and buying property (evidence among others from Śląskie and Opolskie region) (Bieńkowska et al. 2011; Solga 2013).

It is difficult to find support in data on social remittances, which actually are a more long-term effect of migration. This difficulty stems partly from the newness of post-accession migration. According to research results from Dolnośląskie and Śląskie, return migrants were more open, tolerant and self-assured than before migration (Bieńkowska et al. 2010a, 2011). The studies mainly referred to cultural capital in the form of learned language and work experience that was regarded as valuable (i.e. helped them to find work back in Poland.) Kaczmarczyk (2012:11), who analyses Social Diagnosis data, writes that: ‘persons with migration experiences assess their chances on the Polish labour market in a more positive way than non-migrants, are more self-confident, open-minded and ready to accept different lifestyles, while at the same time are relatively critical of religious or political authorities’. However, he also points to the fact that overall the return migrants do share roughly the same characteristics as non-migrants. However, Gawlewicz (2015a), who studied how migrants and non-migrants influence each other’s ideas regarding sameness and difference in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion and sexuality, shows that although there is a multi-sidedness to the circulation of ideas, migrants as ‘experts in migration’ are more often seen by non-migrants as ‘being correct’. This circulation of ideas is not determined by the migrants’, but occurs also during migration, due to regular contact via Internet and phone. Among the social transfers is also a particular language of difference, either that of respect (inclusive or ‘politically correct’) or of stigma (essentialist and orientalist understanding of difference), with the latter being more often transferred than the former (Gawlewicz 2015b). The sending regions with a large share of seasonal migrants and temporary workers are characterised by a particular migration culture, affecting the rhythm of life of local inhabitants. Yet another important aspect is the transformation of attitudes toward ‘traditional’ gender and family roles of post-EU enlargement migrants with a belief that more balance in household responsibility is needed. At the same time there is resistance towards these changes, with the public discourse on emigration characterised by a normative and blaming phraseologyFootnote 18 (Grabowska & Engbersen 2016).

Summarising, financial remittances have a powerful impact on the overall poverty rate and result in a slight decrease in income disparities (Barbone et al. 2012). For example, studies from the Opolskie region shows that the opportunity to work abroad has improved standards of living (better housing, providing education for children) in social groups which before migration were socio-economically marginalised (Jończy 2014). Although, the opportunity to earn well relatively quickly allowed numerous families to escape social marginalisation, regional authorities in general see rather the negative consequences of migration predominating. For regional authorities trans-European movement translates into demographic change and challenges related to regional development. Even within those regional authorities that, due to long emigration experience, seem to be better prepared for dealing with the challenges and facilitating migrants’ return, new counties start to send migrants, and demand a response to the consequences from the local authorities. Some representatives of the authorities claim the migration of those who belong to a labour oversupply (young graduates) and the return of migrants with new skills and capital as positive implications. Even the positive aspect of remittances with increased consumption and overall improvement of living standards of migrant families has another side results in polarised development of regions. The outflow of the most entrepreneurial and relatively well educated has demographic, social and economic consequences and intensifies this polarisation. Apart from the Opolskie region, hardly any of the regional development strategies respond to international migration issues.

4 EU Mobility and Third-Country Nationals Migration as two Sides of the Coin: Poland’s Governance Responses

In general, contemporary migration, meaning actually intra-European movement, was not until recently among the Polish state’s priorities. The authorities saw their obligations as being primarily towards Polonia – to those who had long been settled abroad, but especially to Polish ethnic minorities in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The Poles abroad who are of greatest interest to representatives of the state are those who can ‘stand for Poland’: those working in international organisations, Polonia leaders, etc. The more challenging migrants – those who are exploited, are victims of trafficking or have failed to integrate abroad – were for a long time seen as having to bear the burdens of their own migration decisions. However, the scale of post-accession migration, its consequences for particular regions in Poland in terms of labour shortages and a change in institutional competenciesFootnote 19 resulted in the inclusion of post-accession migrants as one of the groups addressed by the diaspora policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which has taken over responsibilities for Poles abroad, provides funds to civil society in Poland and abroad, supporting both Polonia and contemporary migrants with top-down activities (administrative determinants of governance). This funding programme also forces the professionalisation of Polonia organisations and a change from state-centric to civil society-centric in terms of implementation of activities (although financed from the national budget).

In regard to the protection of Poles rights abroad, there is a scarcity of bilateral and transnational forms of governance. The migration corridor between Poland and the Netherlands is a rare case that provides some examples. The transnational co-operation takes place at different levels. When it comes to the country level, such institutions as the Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) and the National Labour Inspectorate (PIP) send their representatives abroad to organise meetings with Polish migrants and opening liaison offices abroad. In addition, in November 2006 the Polish National Labour Inspectorate (PIP) and its Dutch counterpart (Arbeidsinspectie) signed an agreement on co-operation and data exchange that covers existing legal regulations, placed workers and workers’ complaints. It is clear that those migrants using intermediary agencies get most of their information from these agencies, and if inaccurate, or deliberately false, information is provided to the potential migrant, they are at increased risk of becoming victims of human trafficking. In 2014 the Netherlands’ Embassy in Poland began to develop a regional network on labour migration, funded by various authorities in the Netherlands. Its principal mission is to engage with local networks, experts and civil society in Poland, and to provide pre-departure information for potential migrants. Regarding multi-level governance, many bottom-up activities are funded or co-funded nationally. There are examples of projects carried out between Polish and Dutch regulatory bodies, civil society, local, regional and national authorities aimed at preventing exploitation of Polish migrant workers.Footnote 20 Among the organisations involved in such projects are La Strada Poland, the NGO FairWork,Footnote 21 the Association of Polish Women in the NetherlandsFootnote 22 and the Foundation Barka NL.Footnote 23

Returning to the country-level of governance, in 2008 an Interdepartmental Working Group on Return Migration was appointed which developed a programme that assumed the government should not try to influence individual migrants’ decisions to return, but rather should provide migrants with necessary information enabling them to make an informed decision (Duszczyk et al. 2009). The programme was quite ambitious and consisted of several packages. The main flagship however was the information portal POWROTY (returns) launched in 2009. The most systematic examples from the local (urban) level of governance are regional policy solutions concerned with the outcomes of migration in the Opolskie province. In 2007 the local authority launched the ‘Opolskie – I’m staying here’ project to promote employment and professional development within the region and thus decrease the number of migrants. The programme is also aimed at potential students and migrant returnees. Regional office representatives took part in employment fairs in numerous European countries to promote returning to the Opolskie region among Polish migrants. Information meetings about unemployment benefit and business start-up funds were held in countries where Poles were working and planning to return. The ‘Opolskie – I’m going to live here’ programme, in place since 2009, aims to ameliorate the effects of migration from the region and the resulting depopulation, and to encourage people from other regions by promoting sales of land. The demographic impact of migration is regarded as the most significant obstacle to the regional development strategy for the years 2012–20.Footnote 24

However, the absence of a significant number of Poles, combined with a very low fertility rate and accelerated ageing of the population (CSO 2013, European Migration Network and European Policy Committee, 2011), meant that the share of economically active population decreased and the share of economically passive population of Poland increased. Counting on returnees did not seem to be sufficient. In 2006 the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy stated that labour shortages were becoming a serious issue and the government needs to elaborate a ‘method of ensuring a decent amount of highly qualified workers to address the current state of affairs within the Polish and the international labour market” (Sejm RP 2006 cited in Duszczyk et al. 2010: 69). As a result of these declarations Poland introduced already in 2006 a simplified employment scheme for short-term workers from countries of the Eastern Partnership, including Ukraine. This scheme allowed citizens’ of Poland’s neighbouring countries to take up employment in agriculture and horticulture without a work permit for a period of three months within six months. It enabled farmers to employ foreign workers already in the harvest period of 2006. This regulation was further liberalised in 2009, with today citizens of five countries allowed to work for up to six months within a twelve month period without a work permit. Although the declarations concerned highly qualified workers, this ordinance attracted mainly low skilled workers. Over 1.3 million (96 per cent of all declarations) employer’s declarations was issued to Ukrainian nationals in 2016,, while in the first half of 2017 there were 947,917declarations registered to Ukrainian nationals showing the significant demand for foreign workforce.Footnote 25 Since 2009 employers, who have employed a foreigner who entered on the basis of the mentioned declaration and work for at least 3 months, can apply for a work permit without the labour market test.Footnote 26 From 2012 to 2014 the regional (voivodship) administrative offices issued 12,984 work permits without the labour market test. This constituted 11.14 per cent of all work permits issued in that period. Further liberalisation of access to Poland’s labour market is visible in changes in the procedure for granting work permits to foreigners, which was time-consuming and expensive for employers until 2007. The legal changes starting in 2007 regarding the labour market and promotion of employment simplified the process and speeded it up, as well as considerably reducing the fees paid by employers when applying for a work permit or for an extension of a work permit.

The character of immigration is “island-like” – concerning only certain regions in Poland (mainly well prospering and eastern border regions), while in others migrants are practically nonexistent. Ukrainian migrants are mainly concentrated in large towns and urban centres, with a clear predominance of the Mazowieckie region, with the capital, Warsaw (Fihel 2006; Górny and Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2014). The Mazowieckie region has the lowest unemployment rate and the highest number of those economically active in Poland. The Ukrainian labour migrants, similarly to Poles migrating abroad, are on average relatively young (below 40 years old). The majority of Ukrainians are relatively well educated, with the greater part having at least secondary vocational education (Kaczmarczyk 2015), however the agreement on mutual recognition of education (2005) is not de facto applicable, as a lion’s share end up in low-skilled or unskilled jobs.

Important to mention is the presence of a segmented labour market, with Poles being less and less willing to work in the secondary sector of the labour market for a low remuneration. This makes the Ukrainian migrants a complementary labour force, with most migrants engaged in seasonal work in agriculture, but also in construction and domestic work, including elderly and child-care. The implications of the presence of Ukrainian labour force is especially important for those regions where labour market sectors, such as agriculture (for the Mazowieckie, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie and Małopolskie regions), play a dominant role. The presence of Ukrainian women in the domestic works sector translates also in the possibility for Polish women to enter the labour market, and fill-out an important institutional care-gap. However, at the same time a petrification of domestic work as ‘women’s work’ occurs, with Polish men not engaged (Kindler et al. 2016). Ukrainian migrants are also visible in education – as either foreign language teachers working in provincial schools or as teachers of Russian or Ukrainian language in private language schools. In the former case they have a very positive impact on the respective town, where it is usually difficult to find Polish teachers for the position (Bieniecki & Pawlak 2008).

As some scholars claim budget losses occur due to the unofficial character of work (no taxes) and little spending by Ukrainian migrants in Poland (mainly spending in Ukraine) (Brunarska et al. 2012). However, these budget losses are disputable. As a recent study considering different scenarios of the fiscal impact of Ukrainian migration shows there might not be any, rather the opposite. As Kaczmarczyk writes (2015:28), “Ukrainian immigrants not only do make a positive contribution to the Polish public finances but it is higher than in case of the native-born”. As the author explains this is a result of the particular forms of labour market incorporation, rather than a function of the socio-demographic characteristics of Ukrainians migrants. However, at the same time, a complete legalisation of migrants from Ukraine in Poland is expected to translate into a significant increase of the tax base and extension of the revenue side (Kaczmarczyk 2015). The Polish migration policy points among the future needs and recommendations of further action to provide novel legal channels for managing labour migration, thus reducing the scope for irregular migration and to create a welcoming environment for the settlement of migrants who are perceived to improve significantly the competitiveness of the Polish economy. Still, the Polish authorities show no political will to adopt a migrant integration policy, with a strategic document prepared by a few dedicated administrative officials and experts waiting “in the drawer”. In general, having a large group of irregular migrants may mean a marginalised and exploited group that the state will have at some point to take responsibility for.

5 Conclusions

During the communist era emigration from Poland was closely controlled by the state, restricted and politicized, which is reflected in the great value placed by Poles on freedom of movement within the EU. This freedom as such is an important factor in triggering migration from Poland.

The character of pre- accession migration and intra-European movement did not change substantially in the case of Poles. What has changed significantly is the scale of temporary labour migration – with a significant increase in the stock of migrants in the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands and gradual but highly selective increase (with young women dominating) of the migrant stock in the case of Sweden. What is also important, there are signs of temporary migration changing into more long-term or even settlement migration. It seems that transitional arrangements as to the opening of labour markets were not of key importance, and social factors, such as existing networks and recruitment agencies, as well as cultural factors, such as language, did play important roles in the formation of the migration corridors from Poland.

As at length presented in this chapter, the implications for Poland’s main sending regions, range from outright negative such as depopulation, in some cases characterised by the shrinkage of cities, decrease of labour force and increase in intra-regional inequalities, to a few positive (among others improved the lot of individual families). When it comes to governance responses to those implications we can point at the country-level to three main changes in state policies (1) the redefinition of policy towards the diaspora by identifying the post-accession migrants as one of the addressees, as well as providing support for organisations representing Polonia and Poles abroad, (2) liberalisation of access to the labour market for third-country nationals, (3) activities facilitating return (both at state and at regional level). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) governance towards Poles abroad is clearly ‘in the making’. They are attempting to harmonise the very different interests of the diverse Polish community abroad. We need to note the changes that occurred after the 2015 elections, with the party Law and Justice in power. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs has already announced that the Polish Senate will again receive the competencies for the Polish diaspora and the emphasis will be yet again on “Polonia in the East”. At the local (urban) governance level, bottom-up activities are much more ad hoc, but also seem to be more responsive to the specific needs of migrants and overall migration implications. However, examples of a systemic form of migration governance can be found in the case of Opolskie province.

Poland is - similarly to the Czech Republic (see Chap. 6) and to Turkey (see Chap. 8) – a special case in the ‘IMAGINATION’ research analysis. It is both a sending and a receiving country. Poland’s responses towards the entry and work of Ukrainian migrants provide evidence how the consequences of free movement are not limited to EU territory. Intra-European mobility and migration of third country nationals, while treated often as two separate phenomena by policy-makers, are two sides of the same coin. For Poland this means a double governance challenge. Apart from informing its citizens abroad on the possibilities of return to Poland, they responded to the labour demand created partly by Poles leaving by simplifying the access to the labour market by Ukrainians. The question remains whether the facilitated access to labour markets for Ukrainians really was an answer to the consequences of Poles leaving. Probably to a small extent. It rather was an answer to the changes within Polish society and labour market, making the complementarity (in the terms of competence) of Ukrainian labour force debatable. Ukrainians take over those jobs that Poles are able to do (in terms of competence), but are not willing to do due to unfavourable working conditions. Whether these who have previously worked in jobs currently occupied by Ukrainians is not clear. Looking at the regions from which Poles have emigrated and which experience depopulation do not have, most, apart from Opolskie region, a policy actively attracting immigrants (both internal and external) to settle. Thus, regional governments do not as of yet use the emigration-immigration nexus for their benefit. Time will tell whether the governance of third-country nationals will contribute to solving the challenges related to consequences of intra-European mobility in Poland.