Second-order direct democracy in Switzerland: How sub-national experiences differ from national ballots

Abstract

Direct democracy can be understood as an effective complement to representative institutions, adding the electorate as an additional veto player to policy-making processes (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008; Hug & Tsebelis 2002). Direct democratic institutions change the game of political decision-making, since all players' agreements are necessary for a change in the political status quo. The introduction of referendums and initiatives results thus, on the one hand, in a higher number of veto players, making changes to the status quo more difficult. But on the other hand, political outcomes tend to better approximate the preferences of the median voter if the possibility of a ballot vote exists. While quite a lot of attention has been paid to the design and us of these institutions at the national State level, less is known about them at subnational levels of government.