Abstract
One of the main issues in the discussion on standard deontic logic (SDL) is the representation of contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations. A well-known example is Forrester’s (1984) paradox of the gentle murderer: it is forbidden to kill, but if one kills, one ought to kill gently.
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Prakken, H., Sergot, M. (1997). Dyadic Deontic Logic and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations. In: Nute, D. (eds) Defeasible Deontic Logic. Synthese Library, vol 263. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8851-5_10
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