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State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse

  • Chapter
Governance and International Legal Theory

Part of the book series: Nova et Vetera Iuris Gentium ((NVIG,volume 23))

Abstract

The post-Cold War era has witnessed renewed debates on the nature, function and meaning of state sovereignty. Phenomena like global capitalism, international governance and the fragmentation of states have given rise to claims that state sovereignty is “in decline”1 or even “diminished”.2 Others have argued that the institutionalization of human rights and humanitarian law should be regarded as a “move along a trajectory to global humanity”3 and as a “globalized discourse”.4 Yet others have questioned the analytical value of the concept of state sovereignty as such: the meaning of “sovereignty” would be so underdetermined that it can be used to justify or criticize almost any action. Globalization, international governance as well as the fragmentation and integration of states thus raise fundamental questions for international legal theory. The state is, after all, still widely regarded as the primary subject of international law, while the institution of state sovereignty is held to be one of the cornerstones of the international legal order. The aim of this chapter is to take up and discuss some of the above-mentioned challenges to the concept of state sovereignty and so to contribute to a better understanding of the meaning and function of state sovereignty in contemporary international law.

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References

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  29. For the latter see especially Kelsen’s moral call to abandon the use of state sovereignty: “Die Souveränitätsvorstellung freilich muß radikal verdrängt werden. Diese Revolutionierung des Kulturbewußtseins tut vor allem not!... Denn die Vostellung von der Souveränität des eigenes Staates it bisher... allem im Wege gestanden was auf... die Weiterentwicklung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft aus ihrem Zustande der Primitivität zu einer civitas maxima... abziet. Als unendliche Aufgabe aber muß solcher Weltstaat als Weltorganization allem politischen Streben gesetzt sein”. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Tübingen, 1920), p. 320.

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  49. An example of this can be found in Berman’s article on self-determination: “Very different conceptions of international society result depending on whether, and to what extent, law or sovereignty is granted ultimate primacy”. N. Berman, “Sovereignty In Abeyance, Self-Determination and International Law”, 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1986, no 1, 390–443.

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  51. In this sense, my argument is related to the tradition of social constructivism in IR-theory. Social constructivism does not take sovereignty as externally given, but rather examines the social practices in which the concept of sovereignty is constructed and reconstructed. For the outlines of the social constructivist argument regarding sovereignty see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, 1992, 391–425; A. Wendt, A Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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  55. “Out of a loose band of irregular entities, it was set to create a horizontal order of independent, sovereign states which most emphatically rejected any superior power...” A. de Zayas, “Westphalia, Peace of 1648”, in Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (1984), p. 537.

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  56. A. Eyffinger, “Europe in Balance: An Appraisal of the Westphalian System”, 45 Netherlands International Law Review, 1998, 178.

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  57. See for this argument also R.H. Jackson (note 40). An example of the Christian, universal language is the Preamble and the first Article of the Treaty of Westphalia of 24 October 1648 between the Emperor and the King of France. The opening words state that the Treaty is concluded “In the name of the most holy and individual trinity”, whereas the first Article declares that “there shall be a Christian and Universal peace...”.

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  62. In the Leviathan, Hobbes introduced the state as an “artificial man” who is distinct from the person of the ruler. See also P. King, The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes (London, Alan and Urwin, London, 1974).

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  64. and J.G. Ruggie, Constructing World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization (London, Routledge, 1998).

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  71. Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United States), Permanent Court of Arbitration (Huber), 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1928), p. 829.

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  72. M. Foweler and J. Bunck, “The Nation Neglected: The Organization of International Life in the Classical State Sovereignty Period”, in R. Beck and T. Ambrosio (eds.), International Law and the Rise of Nations (New York, Chatham House Publishers, 2002), pp. 38–60 at 43.

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  73. The crucial role of effective control does not mean, of course, that sovereignty and effective control can be regarded as synonyms. Effective control is an important factor that has to be taken into account in determining the coming into existence of a state. There are, however, many examples of states where the government has lost effective control and who yet remain members of the community of sovereign states (e.g. Lebanon in the 1980s or some African states in the 1990s). These examples indicate that, although effective control is the normal context in which the concept of state sovereignty is applied, sovereignty is a scheme of interpretation which can also be used in exceptional situations like civil war, foreign occupation and collapse of central authority. In these situations, the concept of state sovereignty is used to uphold the status quo and to prevent the termination of one of the members of the society of sovereign states. See for this argument also Werner & de Wilde (note 16), 283–313.

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  74. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–1949, p. 948.

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  75. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports (1970), p. 3, at paras. 33, 35. See also the recognition respect for self-determination as an erga omnes obligation in East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports (1995) p. 90.

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  76. Barcelona Traction (note 60), p. 91.

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  77. See Malanczuk (note 21), p. 59. For a more detailed analysis of obligations erga omnes see C. Annacker, Die Durchsetzung von erga omnes Verpflichtungen vor dem Internationalen Gerichtshof (Hamburg, Kova, 1994).

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  78. A.J. de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996)

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  79. W. Czaplinski, “Concepts of jus cogens and Obligations erga omnes in International Law in the Light of Recent Developments”, Polish Yearbook of International Law, 1997/1998, 87

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  80. O. Pegna, “Counterclaims and Obligations Erga Omnes before the International Court of Justice”, 9 European Journal of International Law 1998, 724; M. Byers, “Conceptualizing the Relationship between Jus Cogens’ and ‘Erga Omnes’ Rules”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 1997, 211.

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  81. Resolution 3061 (XXVIII), 2 November 1973, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, 143–147. See also M.N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 144, 145. Note, however, that the requirement of effectiveness has also been applied less strictly outside colonial contexts. An example is the acceptance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state although even President Izetbegovic admitted that Bosnia-Herzegovina “could not protect its independence without foreign military aid”.

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  91. M. Koskenniemi (note 23), pp. 206–261. See also the examples given by D. Kennedy, “Theses about International Law Discourse”, German Yearbook of International Law, 1980, 353–391. See also D. Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987). Some of the other examples mentioned by Koskenniemi are: the Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria case (1931), the Asylum case (1950) the Nuclear Tests case (1974) as well as the problem of trans-border pollution, where one state’s the sovereign right to use one natural resources is countered by another state’s sovereign right to decide what takes place on its territory.

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  93. Ibid.

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  95. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports (2002), p. 3.

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  96. Ibid., Application, pp. 7, 9.

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  97. Ibid., Counter Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, 28 September 2001, para. 3.3.29. See also the oral pleadings on Thursday 23 November 2000 CR 2000/35, para. 3.

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  99. Article 2(7) reads as follows: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VIL” The domestic jurisdiction clause was also included in the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 15(8).

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  100. See Schrijver (note 26), 75.

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  102. G. Schwarzenberger, E. Brown, Manual of International Law (London, Stevens, 1976), p. 52.

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  103. See for this argument H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Tübingen, Mohr, 1920)

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  104. and H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed. (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).

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  105. A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law, General Part (London, Longman, 1947), p. 13.

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  106. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Wien, Deuticke, 1960), especially Chapter 1.

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  107. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 2 (translation of the Allgemeine Theorie der Normen by Michael Hartney).

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  108. For such an analysis of legal institutions see A. Ross, “Tû-tû”, 70 Harvard Law Review, 1957, 812–825.

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  109. Koskenniemi (note 23), p. 218. Koskenniemi here sketches the consequences of the “legal” or reductionistic approach towards sovereignty.

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  110. Hart (note 82), p. 38.

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  111. For legal positivism see D.N. MacCormick, O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1986)

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  112. D.W.P. Ruiter, Institutional Legal Facts, Legal Powers and Their Effects (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1993)

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  113. and D.W. P. Ruiter, Legal Institutions (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2002).

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  114. See for legal semiotics B. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Merseyside, Deborah Charles Publications, 1988).

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  115. For the interpretive school see R. Dworkin (note 38). For an example of the use of a broader conception of the legal order in international law see Jose Alvarez, “Judging the Security Council”, 90 American Journal of International Law, 1996, 31 (on the expressive function of the International Court of Justice).

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  116. For the notion of institutions and institutional facts see J.R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 175–198 (reprint from the 1969 edition). For an application of this notion to legal theory see especially Ruiter 1993 and 2002 (note 90).

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  117. Dworkin (note 38), pp. 90–96.

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  118. R. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 22. Note, however, that Grotius did not have a separate concept of intervention, apart from a concept of war. For a general discussion of the evolution of the term “intervention” see P. Winfield, “The History of Intervention in International Law”, British Yearbook of International Law, 1922–1923, 130–149.

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  119. See also Ann Van Wijnen Thomas, AJ. Thomas, Non-intervention, The Law and Its Import in the Americas (Dallas, Southern Methodist University Press, 1956)

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  120. A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? A reappraisal of the limits of legal imagination in international affairs (Manchester, 1986).

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  121. E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), translation in The Classics of International Law, (Washington D.C., Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916), Book II, Chapter IV, para. 54.

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  122. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports (1986), p. 14.

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  123. Winfield (note 93), 130.

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  124. Partly, this form of intervention overlaps with the term “dictatorial intervention”: intervention which involves the threat or use of force “in case the dictates of the intervening power are disregarded”. T.J. Lawrence, Principles of International Law (London, MacMillan, 1913), p. 124.

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  125. See for an analysis of the doctrines in the 18th and 19th century especially: I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991), pp. 14–51.

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  126. See also P. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force (Amsterdam, Spinhuis, 1993).

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  127. G.F. von Martens, The Law of Nations: Being the Science of National Law, Covenants, Power &c, Founded upon the Treaties and Customs of Modern Nations in Europe (London, Cobbett, 1829), Book III, Chapter II, section 1.

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  128. Ibid., Book VI, Chapter VIII, section 1.

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  129. Ibid., Book III, Chapter II, section 1.

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  130. See Brownlie (note 98), pp. 14–51.

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  131. For an analysis of the transformation war after 1900 see K.J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1996).

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  132. For an analysis see Brownlie (note 98); H. McCoubrey, N.D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1992).

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  133. The prohibition on the use of force was laid down in Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact which condemned recourse to war and renounced it as an instrument of national policy (United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 46, Part 2, p. 2343). The prohibition could also be derived from the practice of states as Brownlie (note 98, p. 108) concludes: “If the legal materials and especially the diplomatic correspondence of the years between 1928 and 1939 are examined, it becomes clear that nearly every government in existence had at some time estopped itself from denying the illegality of resort to force except in self-defence”.

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  134. Article 2(4) UN Charter determines that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Among the several UN Resolutions dealing with the threat or use of force the following are especially worth mentioning: Declaration on Principles of International Law, GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/5217 (1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Resolution 2131 (XX), 21 December 1965; Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 1974. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice recognized the prohibition on the use of force as a norm of international customary law and concluded moreover that GA Resolutions 2625 (XXV) and 3314 (XXIX) reflect valid customary international law. See Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports (1986), paras. 187 to 201.

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  135. This formulation of a jus cogens norm is derived from Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (International legal Materials, 8, 1969, p. 679. For a discussion of the jus coges status of the prohibition of the threat or use of force see A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990).

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  136. See supra note 105.

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  137. Van Creveld (note 1).

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  138. See for a discussion of this point e.g. Scholte (note 10).

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  139. In this context, the much debated report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty is worth mentioning. The Report was titled “The Responsibility to Protect” and emphasized that sovereignty implies responsibility and that the primary responsibility for the protection of human rights lies with the state itself.

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  140. In this context Schrijver (note 26), 96, has referred to the 1997 World Bank World Development Report (Washington, 1997) which explicitly recognizes the central role of the state in social and economic development.

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  141. Sean Murphy, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments”, 48 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1999, 545

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  143. A. Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, a legal reappraisal (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).

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  1. Faculty of Law, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

    Wouter G. Werner (Senior lecturer in international law)

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Ige F. Dekker Wouter G. Werner

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Werner, W.G. (2004). State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse. In: Dekker, I.F., Werner, W.G. (eds) Governance and International Legal Theory. Nova et Vetera Iuris Gentium, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6192-5_5

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