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Unilateralism and Power of Revision

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Economic Sanctions under International Law

Abstract

International relations are based on finding common ground among the diverse interests of States while respecting the unique interests of each State with regard to its sovereignty. Although a reliable set of rules and policies for international cooperation is in the common interest of all States, achieving this is often complicated by the unilateral policies and decisions of State actors. The availability of exception clauses in international agreements and, in particular, the manner in which some States take recourse to those exception clauses questions the reliability and confidence in the current international legal system. Moreover, the lack of effective judicial review of the unilateral actions taken under such clauses leaves open the possibility for more unilateralism in international law. A consideration of relevant case law dealing with the invocation of exceptions reveals a possible strategy for strengthening judicial review to prevent unjustified unilateral actions by States.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of any organizations or person. This chapter is an extract from some of the author’s research.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g., Crossley 2008, pp. 9, 15, 22.

  2. 2.

    See e.g., Perrons 2004, pp. 8−15.

  3. 3.

    See e.g., Chayes and Chayes 1995.

  4. 4.

    See e.g., Sassen 1996, pp. 21−26 and 90−95.

  5. 5.

    Maduro 2002, p. 49; see also Global Policy Forum, Globalization of Law, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/law/index.htm (accessed 23 July 2014).

  6. 6.

    See Vandevelde 1998, pp. 506−510, 522−525. See e.g., Hamner 2002, p. 385.

  7. 7.

    See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, About UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (accessed 23 July 2014).

  8. 8.

    See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, about UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/about−unidroit/overview (accessed 23 July 2014).

  9. 9.

    See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, about UNCITRAL, Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (accessed 23 July 2014).

  10. 10.

    See Sassen 2002, pp. 189−196.

  11. 11.

    See e.g., Martinez and Magdalena 1996, pp. 64−65.

  12. 12.

    See e.g., Tsai 2000, pp. 1317–1318, 1329.

  13. 13.

    Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Individual Opinion by Judge Alvarez, 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43.

  14. 14.

    Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, The Economist, 16 September 1999.

  15. 15.

    See e.g., Narine 2007, p. 216.

  16. 16.

    See Berman 2002, p. 311.

  17. 17.

    See e.g., Johnson and Post 1996, pp. 1367−1368; see also Post 1996, pp. 155, 165−71.

  18. 18.

    See e.g., GATT, 1947, Articles XX−XXI, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; ICCPR, Article 19(3), 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 53, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Geneva Convention IV).

  19. 19.

    See e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 221(a), 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.

  20. 20.

    For more details see Shany 2005, pp. 907 et seq.

  21. 21.

    See e.g., Reichard 2006, p. 115.

  22. 22.

    NAFTA, 17 December 1992, 23 I.L.M. 289, 605.

  23. 23.

    ECT, 17 December 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.

  24. 24.

    GATT 1947, Article XXI(b), 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.

  25. 25.

    See e.g., Rona 2002, pp. 207–216.

  26. 26.

    See e.g., Shany 2005, pp. 909−910, 934; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245.

  27. 27.

    See e.g., Carozza 2003, pp. 57−58.

  28. 28.

    See e.g., Buzan 2008, p. 25.

  29. 29.

    See e.g., Idem, pp. 25 et seq.

  30. 30.

    See e.g., Romm 1993, pp. 1−8.

  31. 31.

    See Ronli 2003; see also Burke−White 2004, pp. 278−280; Price 2003.

  32. 32.

    GATT 1947, Article XXIII, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.

  33. 33.

    See Alford 2011, pp. 702−703; see also Shany 2005. Article XXI allows Members to define their “essential security interests.”.

  34. 34.

    See Shapiro 1997, pp. 106−107; Lindsay 2003, p. 1297.

  35. 35.

    22 U.S.C. § 6021−6091.

  36. 36.

    See Alexander 1997, pp. 559, 579−581; see also Lindsay 2003, pp. 1302−1306.

  37. 37.

    Request for Consultations by the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1 (13 May 1996). See Alexander 1997, pp. 579−582.

  38. 38.

    Alexander 1997, pp. 579−582; see also Lindsay 2003, p. 1306.

  39. 39.

    The Panel’s authority lapsed on 22 April 1998, pursuant to Article 12.12 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See World Trade Organization, Trade Topics, Dispute Settlement, The Disputes, DS38: United States—The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds38_e.htm (accessed 17 August 2014); WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Article 12.12, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see also European Commission, Trade, Market Access Database, Trade Barriers, Helms−Burton Act, http://madb.europa.eu/madb/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=960295&version=2 (accessed 17 August 2014).

  40. 40.

    See e.g., Bradley 2013, p. 280.

  41. 41.

    See, e.g., Shany 2005.

  42. 42.

    See Idem, pp. 935−936.

  43. 43.

    LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466.

  44. 44.

    Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12.

  45. 45.

    Iran v. United States, Award No. 382−B1(IV)−FT , 19 Iran−U.S. C.T.R 273 (1988).

  46. 46.

    See Shany 2005, p. 935.

  47. 47.

    LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513−514.

  48. 48.

    Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 60.

  49. 49.

    Idem, p. 62.

  50. 50.

    Iran v. United States, Award No. 382−B1(IV)−FT , 19 Iran−U.S. C.T.R 273 (1988).

  51. 51.

    19 Iran−U.S. C.T.R 273, paras 15, 17.

  52. 52.

    Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration between Iran and the United States), 19 January 1981, available at http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/1−General%20Declaration%E2%80%8E.pdf (accessed 23 July 2014).

  53. 53.

    19 Iran−U.S. C.T.R 273, paras 17−18.

  54. 54.

    Idem, para 20.

  55. 55.

    Idem, para 21.

  56. 56.

    Idem, paras 21−57.

  57. 57.

    Idem, para 46.

  58. 58.

    Idem, para 49.

  59. 59.

    Idem, para 60.

  60. 60.

    Idem, para 60.

  61. 61.

    Idem, para 62.

  62. 62.

    See Klug 2003, pp. 125−133.

  63. 63.

    Shany 2005, p. 910ff; Klug 2003, pp. 125−133.

  64. 64.

    See Gabčikovo−Nagymaros Project (Hungary v.Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40.

  65. 65.

    Shany 2005 pp.931−935.

  66. 66.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment. 1986 I.C.J. 14.

  67. 67.

    Idem, 14, 116.

  68. 68.

    Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161.

  69. 69.

    Idem, 161, 196.

  70. 70.

    Idem.

  71. 71.

    Idem.

  72. 72.

    For more details see, e.g., Yourow 1996; Shany 2005.

  73. 73.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31−33, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332.

  74. 74.

    See WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Article 3.2, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see also Articles 3.8, 3.9.

  75. 75.

    Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, p. 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996).

  76. 76.

    See Rufus and Wilson 2005, pp. 161−164.

  77. 77.

    See WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Article 11, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.

  78. 78.

    See e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R (8 October 2001); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R,WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998).

  79. 79.

    Appellate Body Report, European Communities—EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, p. 42, WT/DS26/AB/R (16 January 1998).

  80. 80.

    Idem p. 44.

  81. 81.

    See Perez 1997, pp. 408−410; see also Akande and Williams 2003, p. 96. See e.g., Cameron and Gray 2001, p. 248.

  82. 82.

    Schloemann and Ohlhoff 1999, pp. 424, 431.

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  1. Hague Center for Law and Arbitration, Postbus 53291, 2505AG, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Ali Z. Marossi

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    Ali Z. Marossi

  2. The Hague, The Netherlands

    Marisa R. Bassett

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Marossi, A.Z. (2015). Unilateralism and Power of Revision. In: Marossi, A., Bassett, M. (eds) Economic Sanctions under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-051-0_9

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