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Federalism and the growth of government revisited

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Wayne State University, 48202, Detroit, MI

    Philip J. Grossman

  2. Department of Economics, Carleton University, K1S 5B6, Ottawa, Ontario

    Edwin G. West

Authors
  1. Philip J. Grossman
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  2. Edwin G. West
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Additional information

This paper reexamines the issue of decentralization and government growth using Canadian data. In addition, and more importantly, it focuses upon a possibility raised by Brennan and Buchanan but largely ignored in the literature: collusion among governments to circumvent the discipline of competitive federalism. Just as participants in a conventional market will seek to moderate competitive pressures through attempts to establish a cartel, so it is argued, will component governments in a federal constitution collude for the same purpose. Evidence reported indicates a positive correlation between collusion and total Canadian government size as well as the size of each separate level of government.

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Grossman, P.J., West, E.G. Federalism and the growth of government revisited. Public Choice 79, 19–32 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047916

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