Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating houses to agents when monetary compensations are not allowed. We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Balinski M, Sönmez T (1999) A tale of two mechanisms: student placement. J. Econ. Theory 84: 73–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehlers L, Klaus B (2004) Resource monotonicity for house allocation problems. Int. J. Game Theory 32: 545–560

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehlers L, Klaus B, Pápai S (2002) Strategy-proofness and population monotonicity for house allocation problems. J. Math. Econ. 38: 329–339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ergin H (2002) Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities. Econometrica 70: 2489–2497

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am. Math. Monthly 69: 9–15

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kesten O (2006) On Two Competing Mechanisms for Priority Based Allocation Problems. J. Econ. Theory 127: 155–171

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pápai S (2000) Strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange. Econometrica 68: 1403–1433

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomson W (2008) The theory of fair allocation. Princeton University Press, Princeton (forthcoming)

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213, USA

    Onur Kesten

Authors
  1. Onur Kesten
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Onur Kesten.

Additional information

I am very much indebted to William Thomson for his invaluable suggestions.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kesten, O. Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems. Int J Game Theory 38, 17–21 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation