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Vickrey allocation rule with income effect

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Abstract

We consider situations in which a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. In this paper, we establish that on domains that include nonquasi-linear preferences—preferences exhibiting income effects—an allocation rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment uniquely exists, which is the Vickrey allocation rule.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka, 567-0047, Japan

    Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa

Authors
  1. Hiroki Saitoh
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  2. Shigehiro Serizawa
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shigehiro Serizawa.

Additional information

This article is dedicated to the memory of the late Jennifer Mao, who motivated Serizawa to analyze the problem addressed in this article. We thank the participants of the Seventh International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare (2004 July) and the Rokko Forum of Kobe University (2005 December) for their useful comments on the earlier versions, and we also thank Professor Masaki Aoyagi, Mitsunobu Miyake, and Shinji Ohseto for their helpful comments. The valuable comments of an anonymous referee are greatly appreciated.

H. Saitoh is a JSPS Research Fellow.

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Saitoh, H., Serizawa, S. Vickrey allocation rule with income effect. Economic Theory 35, 391–401 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0235-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0235-6

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