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Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

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Summary.

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1.  Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496, USA (e-mail: rdeb@mail.smu.edu), , , , , , US

    Rajat Deb

  2.  Department of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, Kusatsu, Shiga 525-8577, JAPAN (e-mail: ohseto@ec.ritsumei.ac.jp), , , , , , XX

    Shinji Ohseto

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  1. Rajat Deb
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  2. Shinji Ohseto
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Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998

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Deb, R., Ohseto, S. Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note. Economic Theory 14, 685–689 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050348

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