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A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems

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Spanish Economic Review

Abstract

We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IDEGA & Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15782, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

    Ignacio García-Jurado

  2. Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15782, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

    Julio González-Díaz

  3. University of Alicante & Ivie, Alicante, Spain

    Antonio Villar

Authors
  1. Ignacio García-Jurado
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  2. Julio González-Díaz
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  3. Antonio Villar
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Correspondence to Julio González-Díaz.

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García-Jurado, I., González-Díaz, J. & Villar, A. A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems. SpanEconRev 8, 189–197 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-006-9005-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-006-9005-z

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