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Industrial Ownership and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China

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Abstract

This study explores the differences in pollution control performance of industries with different types of ownership – State owned (SOE), collectively or community owned (COE), and privately owned (POE). A theoretic analysis is conducted and followed by an empirical assessment with Chinese data. The empirical results show that the COEs in China have better environmental performances in water pollution discharges than the SOEs and the POEs, suggesting that COEs may internalize environmental externalities.

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Acknowledgements

This paper is a product of a research project on China environmental policy which was funded partially by a World Bank research grant (RF-P065614). The authors would like to thank for contributions made by the project participants including Jun Bi, Fengzhong Cao, Susmita Dasgupta, Dongmei Guo, Benoit Laplante, Genfa Lu,Guangshou Peng, David Wheeler, Zhifeng Yang, Guomei Zhou, etc.. Usual disclaimers apply.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Development Research Group, World Bank, 1818 H Street N.W., Washington, DC, 20433, USA

    Hua Wang

  2. Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, TX, 77843, USA

    Yanhong Jin

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  1. Hua Wang
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  2. Yanhong Jin
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Correspondence to Hua Wang.

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Wang, H., Jin, Y. Industrial Ownership and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China. Environ Resource Econ 36, 255–273 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-006-9027-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-006-9027-x

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