Abstract
This paper seeks to broaden the analysis of transboundary water interaction, by examining and interpreting the influence of ‘soft’ power therein. The ‘soft’ power of persuasion is understood to be exercised through discursive and to a lesser extent ideational means, and is interpreted in terms of compliance related to distributive (conflictual) or integrative (consensual) ends (after Scott (1994)). The focus is on inter-state water conflicts in hegemonic political contexts, where, it is found, the ‘first among equals’ has a greater ability to exploit ‘soft’ power and to determine the outcome. ‘Soft’ power is also seen to influence the choices states make or avoid in their transboundary water interaction, which explains in part how treaties intending to manage conflict may in fact delay or perpetuate it. For example, ‘soft’ power can be used by the basin hegemon to frame inequitable forms of cooperation in a cooperative light, such that unfair and ultimately unsustainable transboundary arrangements are replicated by the international donor community. Non-hegemonic riparian states also employ their capacity of ‘soft’ power, though may find themselves with little choice other than to comply with the arrangement established by the basin hegemon. The findings stress the importance of analysts questioning claims of interaction promoted as ‘cooperative’, and of examining the ‘soft’ power plays that underlie all transboundary water arrangements. Exemplification is provided through transboundary river basins and aquifers around the globe.
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Notes
The Jordan River was subject to military power when fighter-jets and tank shells from Syria and Israel passed across it, in each state’s bid to halt the other’s infrastructure projects in 1955 and 1963 (el Musa 1997). But the analyst looking for evidence of damaged dams and flooded defences to assist with interpretation of hydropolitics will not get very far. When it comes to the control of transboundary flows, the treaty may be mightier than the F-16 fighter jet, and most water conflicts occur in the rather less headline-grabbing world of closed-door meetings, ‘Track-2’ negotiations, websites and donor’s reports and brochures. See Barnaby (2009) for an interesting explanation of the absence of ‘water wars’.
The focus also complements the ongoing debate in International Environmental Agreements on the (independent) variables regarding the gap between intention and implementation of cooperative initiatives in transboundary waters. Recent contributions have begun to explore some of the reasons why multilateral agreements fail to deliver. Fox and Sneddon (2007), for example, argued that transboundary river basin agreements based on international watercourse law permit the legal principle of ‘equitable utilisation’ to be interpreted according to each riparian’s own wish within its territories. Kistin et al. (2009) reported that while there are many multilateral water agreements in place in Southern Africa, they lack explicit arrangements on water allocation.
Oğuzlu (2007) views the issue differently, in what he calls the ‘logic of action’: “… the main difference between these two types of power stems from the kind of 'logic of action' that governs the behaviour of agents. If an instrumental logic of action were in play, meaning if the goal were to force others to make a cost-benefit analysis through coercing or coaxing strategies, then one could talk about hard power. If the goal were to ensure that others would automatically follow the lead of the power-holder due to the power of attraction the latter has in the eyes of the former, then one could refer to the existence of ‘soft’ power’’.
The way in which compliance is assured makes a great difference to the degree to which the exercise of power is regarded as positive or negative by the complying side. Lustick (2002), for example, viewed the nature of compliance in terms of mechanisms used to ‘produce’ it (see Zeitoun and Warner 2006).
A potential analytical pitfall here is that of ‘false consciousness’. The pitfall is perhaps more representative of defective thinking on the part of the outside analyst than it is of responses made by weaker parties’ living within power structures. Scott (1985) and others demonstrate that the so-called weak have not only consciousness but powers of obstruction and the potential for successful improvements of their lot (through reform within the hegemony, or revolution against it). If the chance of successful rebellion is slim, playing along with the hegemon may, after all, meet the (altered) interests prioritised by the ‘weaker’ agent in the relationship.
Refer to the discussion on agenda-setting power in Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 950): “‘mobilization of bias’… [can create] dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favour the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others”.
Which Scott (1994) has called ‘sectional’ and ‘non-sectional’ perspectives of power. Sectional power is asymmetrical, an element in non-zero sum conflict. Non-sectional power is collective power arising from ‘harmonious communal organisation’ and exists only in processes of legitimation.
Zeitoun (2008a) describes, for instance, how a discourse of ‘cooperation, not rights’ was adopted by Palestinian water authorities against the expressed intent of Palestinian civil society, but in-line with the views of their Israeli counterparts and their largest financial supporter USAID.
And it is through ‘consent’ that power over ideas blends with Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. One of Gramsci’s (2003 [1935]) significant insights into relations between authorities and those they have authority over was to interpret the give-and-take that goes on in exchanges between them (similar to Scott’s ‘dialectic of control’). As control is more readily maintained through a mix of force and consent (rather than through force alone), the consent of the weaker subject to a hegemonic arrangement is integral to its maintenance. That consent may be obtained and maintained in turn through institutionalised ideological domination—what Gramsci termed ‘hegemony’.
The character of inter-state tensions over water in the absence of a central authority has been documented also in the case of the Aral Sea (Weinthal 2001; Wegerich 2008). The absence of an authority is even more relevant when there is also an absence of an agreed-upon code or standard (for work being done to fill these gaps, see e.g. McCaffrey 2007; Stephan 2008). Interesting perspective on the domestic-international dynamic is provided in the case of US-Mexico, in Milman and Schott (2010).
The effects of hierarchy on Indian and Egyptian water planners who placed obligations to British colonial interests ahead of national or local ones has been explored in India by Headrick (1988), and on the Nile by Mitchell (2002) and Tvedt (2004), similar to what Gaffney (1997: 484), calls ‘hydro-imperialism’ in the case of California.
In discussing the use of ambiguity in treaty-making in the 1994 bi-lateral Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, Fischhendler (2008) notes that—according to “Israeli accounting”—the Israeli side conceded between 35 and 105 million cubic metres per year of the Jordan River System (including the Yarmouk River), while securing agreement on its established use. A variety of sources estimate the established Israeli use of waters from the Jordan Rivers System to be between 420 and 570 million cubic metres per year (Jridi 2002: 24, UNEP 2003: 11, HSI 2004: 288, Markel 2004a)). According to “Jordanian accounting”, the Israeli side conceded between 225 and 295 million cubic metres per year (Fischhendler 2008). Actual flows from the system used by Jordan around year 2000 were roughly 135 million cubic metres per year, of which only 25–45 are additional releases by Israel (Courcier et al. 2005, see also Bílen 2009: 203). Jordan also lives informal inequitable arrangements on its only other two significant transboundary water sources: the Disi Aquifer (transboundary with Saudi Arabia) and the Yarmouk river (part of the Jordan River System, and transboundary with Syria).
Regime theory would describe such an arrangement as an ‘imposed-order’ regime (Young 1982).
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Zeitoun, M., Mirumachi, N. & Warner, J. Transboundary water interaction II: the influence of ‘soft’ power. Int Environ Agreements 11, 159–178 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-010-9134-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-010-9134-6